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ABSTRACT
This dissertation comprises three chapters dealing with unobserved heterogeneity
in observational studies. In Chapters 2 and 3, I develop new estimators that deal
with unobserved heterogeneity in the cases in which panel data is not available or
the outcome of interest is binary, respectively. In Chapter 4, I analyze the effect
of parties’ contacting voters on the extent of tactical voting in the 2015 and 2017
United Kingdom General Elections, applying the estimator developed in Chapter 3.
In Chapter 2, I develop a semi-parametric two-step estimator for linear models with
unobserved individual level heterogeneity that can be applied on a series of Re-
peated Cross-Sections, when panel data is unavailable. I show that this estimator
provides consistent and asymptotically normal estimates of the parameters of inter-
est. Identification relies on a restriction that requires the conditional expectation
of the unobserved individual-level heterogeneity on observed characteristics to be
continuous. UsingMonte Carlo simulations, I show that this estimator typically out-
performs other available alternatives. In particular, it typically has a smaller Root
Mean Squared Error, and a relatively small bias that disappears for moderate sample
sizes. Furthermore, it is robust to mild violations of the continuity assumption.
Finally, I also show that this estimator can recover sensible estimates compared to
those from an real panel.
In Chapter 3, I propose a method for estimating binary outcome models with panel
data in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, called the Penalized Flexible
Correlated Random Effects (PF-CRE) estimator. I show that this estimator produces
consistent and efficient estimates of the model parameters. PF-CRE also provides
consistent estimates of partial effects, which cannot be calculated with existing
consistent estimators. UsingMonteCarlo simulations, I show that PF-CREperforms
well in small samples. To demonstrate that accounting for unobserved heterogeneity
has important consequences for empirical analysis, I use PF-CRE in three studies
of voting behavior: tactical voting during the 2015 British Election, support for the
Brexit referendum of 2016, and vote choice in the 2012 U.S. Presidential election.
In all three cases, I find that ignoring the unobserved heterogeneity leads to an
overestimation of the effects of interest, and that PF-CRE is a valid approach for the
analyses.
In Chapter 4, I apply the PF-CRE estimator developed in Chapter 3 to the study
vof tactical voting in the United Kingdom General Elections of 2015 and 2017. In
particular, I study the effect that party contacts during the electoral campaigns has on
the probability that voters decide to cast a tactical vote for a less preferred party when
their most preferred party is out of the race. I show that these effects are of moderate
size, but substantively important. For example, during the 2017 election, contact by
the most preferred party discouraged tactical voting by 7.02%, while contact by the
most preferred viable party encouraged it by 13.41%. Combining counterfactual
simulations with Multilevel Regression and Poststratification I estimate the effect
that party contact has on the seat distribution inWestminster through tactical voting.
My results show that between 9 and 18 seats change hands, depending on the
election. Importantly, the Conservative party would have obtained a majority in
2017 had non-viable parties given up contacting their supporters.
vi
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1C h a p t e r 1
INTRODUCTION
Unobserved heterogeneity is ubiquitous in observational studies in political science,
and the social sciences in general. It is generally defined as differences across units
of analysis that are not measured, influence the outcome, and may correlate with
observed characteristics of interest. While unobserved heterogeneity can have dif-
ferent origins and forms, it always poses the same problem: if ignored and correlated
with the covariates of interest, it leads to biased and inconsistent estimates of the
quantities of interest. One of the best ways to deal with unobserved heterogeneity
is to use panel data. Panel data allows researchers to control for time-invariant
unobserved heterogeneity by leveraging the information that comes from observing
each individual in multiple time periods. In the following three chapters I deal with
this type of unobserved heterogeneity in studies of political behavior, and propose
new estimators that deal with it.
In Chapter 2, I deal with the case in which no panel data is available, but researchers
have access to a series of Repeated Cross Sections (RCS). In RCS data, a random
sample from the same population is taken at several points in time. A large number
of social and political research data comes in this form (e.g., General Social Survey,
Latin American Public Opinion Project).
To deal with these type of data in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, I develop
a semi-parametric two-step estimator, the Local Cohorts (LC) estimator, that allows
for the estimation of linear fixed-effects with RCS data. The LC estimator relies on
the assumption that, on average, individuals with similar observed time-invariant
characteristics have similar (but not necessarily identical) unobserved characteris-
tics. I show that this estimator produces root-n consistent and asymptotically normal
estimates of the parameters of interest, under certain assumptions.
The first step of the LC estimator generates a synthetic panel, where each observation
corresponds to the average individual with some time-invariant characteristics, as
observed in the RCS data. In the second step, the LC estimator applies the within
transformation to this synthetic panel to produce estimates of the model parameters.
Using Monte Carlo simulations, I compare the LC estimator with Deaton’s cohort
average approach (Deaton 1985) and with Moffitt’s instrumental variables approach
2(Moffitt 1993). My simulations show that the LC estimator typically has a smaller
Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) than the other approaches.
In addition, I study the performance of the LC estimator relative to a fixed-effects
estimator from real panel data, by analyzing the effect of partisan news exposure
on the favorability ratings of Obama. I find that the LC estimator outperforms
alternative RCS data estimators. Moreover, while there is some bias relative to the
real panel estimates, the results show that the identification assumptions of the LC
estimator are plausible in this case.
In Chapter 3, I deal with a standing problem in the literature: in the case of binary
outcome models (like probit or logit), consistent panel data estimators of the model
parameters do not permit the estimation of partial effects and probabilities, which
are usually the quantities of interest to researchers. My solutions is the Penalized
Flexible Correlated Random Effects (PF-CRE) estimator for binary outcomemodels
with panel data. This estimator provides consistent and efficient estimates of the
model parameters and partial effects, without imposing excessive restrictions on the
unobserved heterogeneity. PF-CRE relies on modeling the conditional distribution
of the unobserved heterogeneity using a high-dimensional flexible specification
based on observed characteristics, combined with a penalized estimation technique
to reduce the dimensionality of the model and induce efficiency.
UsingMonte Carlo simulations, I show that PF-CRE performswell in small samples,
and that it performs better than alternative estimators such as Conditional Maximum
Likelihood, pooled Logit, and the traditional Correlated Random Effects estimators.
I also provide three applications where I show that the assumptions of PF-CRE hold
in each case, and that controlling for unobserved heterogeneity is important in each
of the three studies.
In Chapter 4, I study the effect of party contacts during the 2015 and 2017 United
Kingdom General Elections on the decision of voters to cast a tactical vote. Tactical
voting is defined as casting a vote for a less preferred party when the most preferred
party is considered out of the race. Estimating these effects from observational
data is challenging because parties may be more likely to contact those voters
who are already likely to cast a tactical vote in the first place, artificially inflating
the effect of party contacts. To resolve this issue, I use the PF-CRE estimator
developed in Chapter 3 to account for unobserved heterogeneity in voter behavior.
This unobserved heterogeneity is likely to capture whatever it is parties see in voters
that makes them contact them.
3My findings show that voters who are contacted by their most preferred party are
7.02 and 2.75 percentage points less likely to cast a tactical vote in 2017 and 2015,
respectively. This indicates that party contacts can enforce loyalty or sincerity at
the polling booth. However, being contacted by the most preferred viable party
increases the probability of a tactical vote by 13.41 and 7.03 percentage points in
2017 and 2015, respectively. Through a combination of counterfactual estimation of
Multilevel Regression and Poststratification, I show that these effects influence the
distribution of Parliamentary seats. Among other findings, I show that if non-viable
parties in each constituency gave up contacting their supporters, the Conservative
party would have obtained an outright majority in the 2017 General Election.
4C h a p t e r 2
LOCAL COHORTS ESTIMATOR FOR SYNTHETIC PANELS
WITH FIXED EFFECTS
2.1 Introduction
In many circumstances, there is a lack of panel data allowing specific individuals
to be followed over time. In many of those situations, however, Repeated Cross-
Sectional data (RCS) may be available. In RCS data, random samples from the
same population are taken at several points in time, using the same (or very similar)
sampling techniques and questionnaires. A substantial amount of data available for
social research, in fact, comes in the form of RCS data; for example, the Current
Population Survey (CPS), the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES),
the Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), data from the Pew Research
Center, the General Social Survey (GSS), the American National Election Studies
(ANES), among others.
The advantage of panel data over RCS data comes precisely from the fact that a
single individual is observed at different points in time. This allows researchers to
control for unobserved individual-level heterogeneity (by using fixed-effects) that
aids in causal identification, or to estimate dynamic models where individuals’ past
behavior influences their current behavior. In contrast, RCS data has the drawback
that it cannot leverage this information, because each individual is observed only
once, meaning that standard estimation techniques cannot be applied.
In light of the relative abundance of RCS data compared to panel data, and the need
for reliable estimates under the presence of unobserved individual-level heterogene-
ity, I develop a semi-parametric two-step estimator, the Local Cohorts estimator
(LC), that allows for the estimation of linear fixed-effects models using RCS data.
I show that, under some assumptions, this estimator produces root-n consistent
and asymptotically normal estimates of the parameters of interest. Furthermore, in
Monte Carlo simulations, I show that the LC estimator outperforms other available
estimators in small samples.
The main assumption on which the LC estimator relies on is that similar individuals
have, on average, similar unobserved individual fixed-effects, where similarity is
measured with respect to a set of observable time-invariant individual-level char-
5acteristics. Under this assumption, the first step of the LC estimator is to generate
a synthetic panel, where each observation corresponds to the average individual
with some time-invariant characteristics observed in the RCS data. The second step
of the LC estimator is to apply the within transformation, common in fixed-effects
models, to the synthetic panel generated in the first step in order to obtain estimates
of the parameters of interest.
The LC estimator has advantages over other estimators proposed for fixed-effects
models with RCS data. These estimators fall in two categories. The first, and closest
to the LC estimator, is the cohort averaging approach developed by Deaton (1985).
In this approach, individuals sharing common characteristics (most typically gender
and year of birth) are grouped into disjoint cohorts, after which averages within these
cohorts are treated as observations in a synthetic panel.1 This stands in contrast
with the LC estimator, which allows observations in the RCS data to belong to
multiple groups, being weighted within each group depending on how closely they
share observable time-invariant characteristics with other members of the group.
This allows the LC estimator to make better use of the information available in
the RCS data, compared to the arbitrary splitting of the data in Deaton’s approach.
The second approach, first developed by Moffitt (1993), relies on observable time-
invariant characteristics and functions of time to instrument for variables in the
model that are correlated (or suspected to be) with the unobserved fixed effects.2
Both these approaches have drawbacks. The cohort averaging approach can produce
biased estimates in small samples, even after using bias-correction techniques. This
is, in large part, because it cannot resolve the tension that exists between cohort sizes
and the number of cohorts: for this estimator’s assumptions to be tenable, there must
be a large number of observations per cohort, but this necessarily implies that the
number of cohorts must be small, which translates into a synthetic panel with few
observations.3 Another shortcoming is that the design of the cohorts is entirely up
to the researcher, which can give rise to different estimates from the same data by
two researchers seemingly using the same estimation method.
The instrumental variables (IV) approach can suffer from the weak instruments
1See also, Verbeek and Nijman (1992, 1992), Collado (1997), Devereux (2007), McKenzie
(2004), and Ridder and Moffitt (2007), among others.
2See also, Ridder and Moffitt (2007) and Pelser, Eisinga, and Franses (2002, 2004), among
others. Verbeek (2008) provides a short review of the literature on the cohort averaging and
instrument variable approaches.
3Of course, if the data set contains hundreds of thousands of observations this tension is not a
serious constraint.
6problem, with a first step estimation that has too little variance. This then translates
into a large degree of uncertainty around the estimates of the parameters of interest.
This approach also requires a correct specification of the instruments’ equation
which, in general, is unknown. Therefore, a workable version of the IV approach
requires the use of a flexible first step specification that allows for an unknown
functional form. While this approach can generate consistent estimates of the
parameters of interest, using a flexible specification in the first step estimation
necessarily leads to larger uncertainty around the estimates of the parameters of
interest.
Compared to Deaton’s approach, the Local Cohorts estimator is better able to
resolve the tension between cohort size and the number of cohorts because it allows
observations from the RCS data to belong to multiple cohorts. This translates into
smaller bias in small samples but, because of the greater complexity of the first step
estimation, it can lead to a larger variance. My simulation results suggest that the
reduction in bias is greater than the increase in the variance, leading to a smaller
Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) for the LC estimator. Another advantage of the
LC approach is that the non-parametric nature of the first step better captures non-
linearities in the relation between the unobserved fixed-effects and the observed
time-invariant characteristics that are used to construct the cohorts. This also
contributes to reducing the bias of the estimator in small samples.
In addition, I study the performance of the LC estimator relative to a fixed-effects
estimator from real panel data. The effect of interest is the impact of partisan news
exposure on the favorability ratings of Obama. In this study, I find that the LC
estimator outperforms alternative RCS data estimators. Moreover, while there is
some amount of bias relative to the real panel estimates, the results show that the
identification assumptions of the LC estimator are plausible in this case.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 I present the Local
Cohorts estimator and I show that it is root-n consistent and asymptotically nor-
mally distributed. In Section 2.3 I describe Deaton’s and Moffitt’s approaches to
the estimation of fixed-effects models with RCS data. In Section 2.4 I compare the
performance of the LC estimator with alternative estimators under different spec-
ifications, using Monte Carlo simulations. In Section 2.5 I estimate the effects of
partisan news exposure on voters’ perceptions of Obama using the LC estimator,
finding them comparable to those derived from real panel data. Finally, in Section
2.6 I conclude and suggest avenues for further research.
72.2 Unobserved Heterogeneity and the Local Cohorts Estimator
Before presenting the estimation of models with unobserved individual-level het-
erogeneity using RCS data, it is useful to review the estimation of these models
when panel data is available, as this serves as the basis for the Local Cohorts es-
timator developed in this chapter. Consider the following model with unobserved
individual-level heterogeneity (fixed-effects):
yit = xitβ0 + fi + εit, t = 1, ...,T, i = 1, ..., n, (2.1)
where xit denotes a k-dimensional vector of real-valued explanatory variables, β0 ∈
Rk are the parameters of interest, fi ∈ R are individual-level unobserved effects that
may be corelated with xit , and εit is an error term with mean 0 and variance σ2 such
that E(ε |x, f ) = 0. Because xit and fi are (potentially) correlated, estimating β0 via
an OLS regression of yit on xit ignoring fi yields biased and inconsistent estimates.
When panel data is available, this problem can be solved by applying the within
transformation to the model in equation 2.1, which demeans the variables for each
individual. Since the unobserved individual-level heterogeneity is assumed to be
constant in time, demeaning eliminates the unobserved term fi from equation 2.1,
and β0 can be then consistently estimated via OLS on the transformed equation.
When only RCS data is available, however, each individual in the sample is only
observed at a single time period (or cross-section). That is, letting it denote that
individual i is observed at time t only, the data generating process for the model
with unobserved individual-level heterogeneity can be re-written as:
yit t = xit tβ0 + fit + εit t . (2.2)
Precisely because in RCS data each individual is only observed at only one time
period, the within transformation cannot be applied to eliminate the individual-level
heterogeneity, fit .
Local Cohorts Estimator
Consider the model in equation 2.2 and a RCS sample of (yit t, xit t, zit ), where
yit t ∈ R is the outcome of interest, xit t ∈ Rk are the explanatory variables, and
zit ∈ Z ⊂ Rd are additional observable individual-level characteristics. Calculating
the expectation of equation 2.2 conditional on a given value zc of the observed time-
invariant characteristics results in:
E(yit t |Z = zc) = E(xit t |Z = zc)β0 + E( fit |Z = zc) + E(εit t |Z = zc), (2.3)
8which, by denoting rct = E(rit t |Z = zc) for any variable r , can be written as:
yct = xctβ0 + fct + εct . (2.4)
Under the assumption that conditional on a value of z, the expected fixed-effects
from different cross-sections are the same, that is, fct = fc ∀t, equation 2.4 reduces
to:
yct = xctβ0 + fc + εct . (2.5)
By using multiple values of the time-invariant characteristics, it is possible to
generate multiple (synthetic) observations as the one in equation 2.5. That is,
computing equation 2.3 for values (z1, ..., zC), with zc ∈ Z, results in a synthetic
panel of size C × T , where I refer to each c = 1, ...,C as a local cohort.
Based on the synthetic panel generated as in equation 2.3, it is possible to estimate
β0 by applying OLS on the within transformation of equation 2.4. Thus, I define the
Local Cohorts estimate of β0 as:
βˆLC = (X˜′X˜)−1 X˜′Y˜, (2.6)
where Y˜ is the matrix form of y˜ct = yct −
T∑
t=1
1
T yct , and similarly for X˜ .
The challenge of the procedure described in equation 2.3 is to obtain sample es-
timates of the conditional expectations that are used to create the synthetic panel.
They key assumption required for identification is that E( fit |Z = zc) ≡ fct = fc, ∀t;
that is, individuals who are similar on observables, have on average the same unob-
served individual-level heterogeneity. For this assumption to hold in practice, it is
necessary for each local cohort to have a sufficiently large number of observations.
In that case, it is reasonable to say that the average individual with the a particular
value of the observed time-invariant characteristics has the same average fixed-effect
at different time periods. Given that the idea is to generate a local cohort for each
individual observed in the first cross-section of the RCS data, each local cohort at
each point in time will typically contain only one individual such that zit = zc.4
Thus, using simple averaging to approximate the conditional expectations will not
work, as it is unjustifiable to say that the average fixed-effect for each cohort will be
constant across time with only one observation in each local cohort.
To solve this issue, I use non-parametric estimation to generate the synthetic panel.
The idea is that individuals in a neighborhood of zc also are similar in terms of
4Except when z takes on discrete values.
9fixed-effects. Hence, in order to capture the average fixed-effect for the local cohort
defined by zc, I average the observations in the neighborhood of zc. For this
approach to be valid, it requires a slight modification of the fixed-effects stability
assumption described earlier. In particular, it requires that E( fit |Z = zc) = ψ(zc),
where ψ(·) is a continuous function of zc. That is, it requires that, on average, the
fixed-effect of individuals who are similar in terms of their observable time-invariant
characteristics, be also similar, with the relation being stable across time.
More formally, I propose a two-step semi-parametric estimator of the parameter
of interest, β0, which I call the Local Cohorts estimator (LC). In the first (non-
parametric) step, the conditional expectations of yit t and xit t on zc (denoted yct and
xct) are obtained using kernel estimators:
yct =
nt∑
it=1
K (S−1/2(zit − zc)/h)yit t
nt∑
it=1
K (S−1/2(zit − zc)/h)
and
xct =
nt∑
it=1
K (S−1/2(zit − zc)/h) xit t
nt∑
it=1
K (S−1/2(zit − zc)/h) ,
where K(u) denotes a kernel function, h is a bandwidth, and S is the variance-
covariance matrix of the time-invariant covariates z.5
The second (parametric) step uses the estimated values yct and xct for multiple
values of zc as the input in a within estimator for fixed-effects. That is, I estimate
the finite dimensional parameter vector β0 by:
β̂LC = arg min
β∈B
C∑
c=1
T∑
t=1
1
2
(y˜ct − β x˜ct)2, (2.7)
where y˜ct = yct − 1T
T∑
t=1
yct is the within transformation of yct , and similarly for x˜ct .
While any choice of zc values is valid, I advocate the use of those z actually observed
in the first-cross section of the RCS data to generate the synthetic panel. This has two
practical advantages relative to arbitrary user-specified values. First, using values of
z actually observed in the sample ensures that the estimates incorporate the sample
5This is exactly the same specification as the multidimensional Naradaya-Watson non-parametric
regression estimator.
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distribution of these covariates, ensuring a representative sample. Second, it reduces
the amount of extrapolation necessary in the first step estimates, as it guarantees that
there exists at least one observation with said value.
Asymptotic Properties of the Local Cohorts Estimator
To establish the asymptotic properties of the Local Cohorts estimator, it is useful
to define some notation first. Let (Y˜, X˜) denote the matrix form of the within
transformation of the estimates from the first step, (Y˜0, X˜0) their population values;
finally, Gn(β, Y˜, X˜) =
C∑
c=1
T∑
t=1
g(β, y˜ct, x˜ct), where g(β, y˜ct, x˜ct) = 12 (y˜ct − β x˜ct), the
squared loss function. Notice that both (Y˜, X˜) and (Y˜0, X˜0) are functions of z.
In what follows, I first formally define the assumptions I use to establish the asymp-
totic properties of the estimator and then discuss their meaning and the role they
play in the proofs.
A1. E(ε |z, x) = 0, with ε i.i.d. with mean 0 and variance 1.
A2. For all t, E( fit |Z = zc) = ψ(zc), where ψ(·) is a continuous function of zc.
A3. |K(u)| < ∞, and
∫
Rd
|K(u)|du < ∞, andK(u) is symmetric, and
∫
|u|2 |K(u)|du <
∞.
A4. For some Λ1 < ∞ and L < ∞, either K(u) = 0 for | |u| | > L and for
all u, u′ ∈ Rd , |K(u) − K(u′)| ≤ Λ1 | |u − u′| |, or K(u) is differentiable,
| ∂∂uK(u)| ≤ Λ1, and for some ν > 1, | ∂∂uK(u)| ≤ Λ1 | |u| |−ν, for | |u| | > L.
A5. f (z), f (z) ×E(y |Z = z), and f (z) ×E(x |Z = z) are uniformly continuous and
bounded, where f (z) is the density of z.
Assumption A1 is simply a strict exogeneity assumption, common in regression
analysis, and I assume the variance of ε to be one to simplify notation.6 Assumption
A2 is the key identifying assumption. It states that, on average, the fixed-effects of
individuals who are similar to each other in terms of their observable time-invariant
characteristics, is similar across those individuals. Assumption A3 imposes some
mild restrictions on the kernelK(·). Assumption A4 requires that the kernelK(·) be
sufficiently smooth, in this case that it either has truncated support and is Lipschitz
6This could be weakened to E(ε[x z]) = 0.
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continuous, or that it has a bounded derivative with an integrable tail.7 Assumptions
like A4 are common in the literature of semi-parametric two-step M-estimators.8
Finally, assumption A5 requires that the expectations of y and x conditional on z be
continuous.
To show the consistency of the Local Cohorts estimator, it is first useful to establish
the following uniform convergence in probability result:
Proposition 1 (Uniform Convergence) Under assumptions A1-A5, and h → 0
“fast enough,”
sup
β∈B
|Gn(β, Y˜, X˜) − E(g(β, Y˜0), X˜0)| p→ 0
Proof. See Appendix.
The proof of this proposition relies on using the triangle inequality to separate
|Gn(β, Y˜, X˜) − E(g(β, Y˜0), X˜0)| into a term that depends on the estimated functions
of the conditional expectation of y and x with respect to z, (Y˜, X˜), and a term that
depends on the population functions of the conditional expectations, (Y˜0, X˜0). The
latter term can be shown to converge in probability to zero by standard results for
M-estimators (see, for example, Newey and McFadden 1994) as it does not de-
pend on the kernel estimates. The former term relies on uniform convergence of
kernel estimators coupled with the smoothness of g(·) to prove that it also con-
verges in probability to zero.9 The requirement that h → 0 “fast enough" means
that Op(( ln(n)nhd )1/2 + h2) = op(1); this requirement is not particularly stringent, and
it is satisfied by the optimal bandwidth for the Naradaya-Watson non-parametric
regression estimator, h ∝ n−1/(d+4).10
Proposition 2 (Consistency) Under assumptionsA1-A5, and h→ 0“fast enough,”
the Local Cohorts estimator β̂LC is consistent:
β̂LC
p→ β0
7Hansen (2008)) notes that most commonly used kernels satisfy this assumption, including the
polynomial kernel class, the higher order polynomial kernels of Muller (1984) and Granovsky and
Muller (1991), the normal kernel, and the higher order Gaussian kernels of Wand and Schucany
(1990) and Marron and Wand (1992).
8See, for example, Newey (1994), Escanciano, Jacho-Chávez, and Lewbel (2012, 2014), Mam-
men, Rothe, and Schienle (2012), and Hahn and Ridder (2013).
9See, for example, Andrews (1995), Fan and Yao (2003), and Hansen (2008).
10See, for example, Pagan and Ullah (1999), Chapter 3.
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Proof. See Appendix.
The proof of this proposition relies on the consistency of M-estimators (see, for
example, Theorem 2.1 in Newey and McFadden (1994). Assumptions A1 and A2
provide the identification conditions, so that the population parameter vector β0
maximizes the population objective function E(g(β, Y˜0, X˜0)). Proposition 1 estab-
lishes that the sample analog of the objective function is asymptotically arbitrarily
close to its population version, so that the maximum of Gn(β, Y˜, X˜) converges to the
maximum of E(g(β, Y˜0, X˜0)), which is β0.
Proposition 3 (Asymptotic Normality) Under assumptions A1-A5, and h → 0
“fast enough,” √
nT
(
βˆLC − β0
)
d→ N(0,V−10 Σ0V−10 ),
where
V0 =
∂2
∂β2
g(β0, Y˜0, X˜0) = X˜′0 X˜0
and
Σ0 = E(Γ′0Γ0),
where
Γ0(z) =
[
∂
∂β
g(β0, Y˜0, X˜0)
]
+
∑
v=y˜,x˜1,..,x˜d
Dv
[
∂
∂β
g(β0, Y˜0, X˜0)
] [
v − v0
]
,
where Dv denotes the first-order derivative with respect to v = y˜, x˜1, ..., x˜k .
Proof. See Appendix.
The proof of this proposition comes from verifying the conditions for Theorem 3.2
in Ichimura and Lee (2010). V−10 is the standard variance estimator for the case in
which the regressors used in the second step are known. Σ0 incorporates the effects
of the first (non-parametric) step estimation in the final estimate for β0. Notice that
if there were no first step estimation, the second term in Γ0(z) would be zero, and
then Σ0 would simplify to X˜′0 X˜0. In that case, the overall variance of the estimator
simplifies to (X˜′0 X˜0)−1, which is the standard variance for the fixed-effects estimator
when the regressors are known (instead of being generated by the first step of the
estimation).
The proofs of consistency and normality of the LC estimator rely on the time-
invariant characteristics being continuous. However, discrete variables are often
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available (for example, gender). Incorporating these types of variables to the LC
estimator is nonetheless straightforward. The estimation in the first step must
simply be conducted for each value of the discrete variable or variables. Moreover,
the availability of discrete variables for use in the first step can reduce the small
sample bias of the estimator by reducing the size of the bandwidth required for the
continuous time-invariant characteristics.
Intuitively, the first stage of the LC estimator aggregates similar individuals (in
terms of their observed time-invariant characteristics) to create the synthetic panel
used in the second stage. The time-invariant characteristics, z, operate similarly to
instruments; that is, the time-varying elements of the model, (y, x), are projected to
z as in the first stage of instrumental variables estimation. Just like IV estimators,
the better the prediction of the first (nonparametric) step in LC, the better its per-
formance. Better prediction in the first step implies that the local cohorts capture
a significant proportion of the variation in the original data, reducing information
loss due to aggregation.
2.3 Alternative Estimators
Cohort Averaging Approach
The first approach to estimating fixed-effects models with RCS data is the cohort
averaging approach of Deaton (1985). This approach uses cohorts to generate a
synthetic panel that is then used to estimate β0, similarly to the Local Cohorts
estimator. In Deaton’s approach cohorts are defined as a partition of space of
observed time-invariant characteristicsZ =
C⋃
c=1
Zc, where Zc ∩ Zc′ = ∅ for all c and
c′. For example, if Z includes gender and year of birth, cohorts in this approach
may be defined as disjoint groups by gender and decade of birth.11 Deaton then
averages the RCS observations by cohort and time, obtaining the following equation
based on equation 2.2:
y¯ct = x¯ctβ0 + f¯ct + ε¯ct, (2.8)
where y¯ct =
n∑
it=1
yit tI(zit ∈ Zc)/
n∑
it=1
I(zit ∈ Zc), the average of the yit ts that belong to
cohort c observed in cross-section t, and similarly for xit t , fir and εit t . This results
in a synthetic panel with observations on C cohorts across T periods. To estimate
11Browning, Deaton, and Irish (1985) use cohorts of households defined on the basis of five year
bands and whether the heads of the household is a manual or non-manual worker; Blundell, Duncan,
and Meghir (1998) use year of birth intervals of 10 years, interacted with two education groups;
Banks, Blundell, and Preston (1994) use five year age groups; Propper, Rees, and Green (2001) use
seven birth groups and ten regions to build their cohorts.
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β0 from equation 2.8, Deaton assumes that f¯ct = fc for all c, which implicitly
states that the unobserved individual-level heterogeneity actually has the form of
group effects (with some noise around each group). This assumption is related to
assumption A2 in the Local Cohorts estimator, but it uses a coarser aggregation.
While the continuity assumption in the Local Cohorts estimator establishes a local
restriction, Deaton’s assumption is about larger sets. Under that assumption, the
within transformation can be applied on equation 2.8 to obtain an estimate of β0 by
OLS:
β̂D =
( C∑
c=1
T∑
t=1
(x¯ct − x¯c)(x¯ct − x¯c)′
)−1 ( C∑
c=1
T∑
t=1
(x¯ct − x¯c)(y¯ct − y¯c)
)
, (2.9)
where x¯c =
T∑
t=1
1
T x¯ct , and similarly for y¯c.
The asymptotic behavior of this estimator can be obtained using several alternative
asymptotic sequences; this is because in addition to the two dimensions in panel
data (n and T), there are two other dimensions in cohort models: the number of
cohorts C and the size of the cohorts nc.12
Deaton (1985) also proposes a related estimator that performs better in finite sam-
ples with smaller cohort sizes (although cohort sizes must still tend to infinity for
consistency, to ensure that f¯ct = fc). Considering the cohort averages y¯ct and x¯ct to
be measurements of population values y?ct and x?ct with errors, he proposes to use
an errors-in-variables model, in which the measurement errors are distributed with
mean zero and independently of the true values; that is:(
y¯ct
x¯ct
)
iid∼ N
((
y?ct
x?ct
)
;
(
σ00 σ
′
σ Σ
))
. (2.10)
With estimates of Σ and σ in equation 2.10, the within estimator can be adjusted to
eliminate the variation due to measurement error:
βˆDE =
( C∑
c=1
T∑
t=1
(x¯ct− x¯c)(x¯ct− x¯c)′−τΣˆ
)−1 ( C∑
c=1
T∑
t=1
(x¯ct− x¯c)(y¯ct− y¯c)−τσˆ
)
, (2.11)
12Deaton (1985), Verbeek and Nijman (1993), and Collado (1997) assume that the number of
cohorts tends to infinity, with cohort sizes held (roughly) constant (which implies that the number
of individuals tends to infinity). Moffitt (1993) and Verbeek and Vella (2005) consider the case in
which the number of individuals tends to infinity while the number of cohorts is held fixed (thus
cohort sizes tend to infinity). McKenzie (2004) considers the case in which T → ∞ and the cohort
sizes tend to infinity.
15
where Σˆ and σˆ are estimators of Σ and σ that can be obtained from the data, and
τ = 1 in Deaton (1985), but Verbeek and Nijman (1993) show that τ = (T − 1)/T
has better small sample properties.13
The cohort averaging approach to estimating fixed-effects models with RCS data
relies on the assumption that, on average, the fixed-effect for a given cohort is the
same for all cross-sections under analysis. In practical terms, this requires that in
each cohort there is a sufficient number of observations such that the average is
somewhat close to the population value, even when using the estimator in equation
2.11. That is, each cohort needs to average across a reasonably large number of
observations from the the RCS data. In empirical applications, Browning, Deaton,
and Irish (1985) use cohort sizes of about 190 individuals, whileBlundell, Browning,
and Meghir (1994) use cohort sizes of around 500. More recently, Devereux
(2007) argues that cohort sizes should be much larger than that, possibly over 2,000
individuals. The need for large cohorts puts a strain on the data, as larger cohorts
necessarily imply fewer cohorts overall, which translates into a synthetic panel with
few observations. This may not be a very strong restriction for the CPS data used in
many of the empirical applications of thismethod, as cross-sectional sizes are around
150,000 individuals. But for smaller sample sizes, it creates a tension between the
bias generated by small cohort sizes and the uncertainty over the estimates generated
by having few observations in the synthetic panel.
Another significant shortcoming of the cohort averaging approach is that the way
cohorts are constructed is important. A priori, there is no guidance as to how to
define a cohort, which can lead to different researchers working with the same data
to use completely different cohorts and obtain different estimates of the quantities of
interest. Besides the arbitrary definition of cohorts, Deaton’s approach can also lead
to some groupings that are not entirely reasonable. For example, suppose cohorts
are defined by gender and decade of birth. One such cohort might comprise men
born between 1960 and 1969, and another men born between 1970 and 1979. This
way of constructing cohorts implies that a man born in 1969 has more in common
(in terms of his unobserved individual-level characteristics) with a man born in 1960
than with one born just a year after him, in 1970. The use of disjoint cohorts always
allows for unreasonable groupings such as this one, regardless of the specifics of
how cohorts are defined.
13 For more details on this estimator, please see Deaton (1985), Verbeek and Nijman (1993), and
Ridder and Moffitt (2007).
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The Local Cohorts estimator developed in this chapter significantly reduces the
shortcomings of the cohort averaging approach. First, by using a local definition
of cohort and by allowing observations to belong to multiple cohorts, it avoids
the tension between cohort size and the number of cohorts that is inherent to
Deaton’s approach. This implies that the Local Cohorts estimator is better able
to capture the underlying unobserved individual-level heterogeneity, especially in
smaller samples where this tension is more apparent. Second, by defining cohorts
based on neighborhoods whose size depends on the characteristics of the data and
can overlap with each other, the Local Cohorts estimator avoids the arbitrariness
that cohorts in Deaton’s approach have.
Instrumental Variables Approach
Moffitt (1993) proposes to use instruments to solve the omitted variable bias that
comes with the unobserved fixed-effects. As Deaton’s approach, it relies on a
vector of observed time-invariant individual-level characteristics zit ∈ Z ⊂ Rd .
Moffitt also considers a vector wit t ∈ W ⊂ Rm of time-varying variables that are
uncorrelated with the fixed effects fit . These variables wit t may simply consist of
functions of t. Moffitt’s IV approach is based on the following two equations:
xit t = δ1wit t + δ2zit + eit t (2.12)
and
fit = zitγ + νit . (2.13)
To estimate β0 with this approach, one first obtains the predicted values x̂it t from
equation 2.12, as in any IV approach and the estimates the following equation via
OLS:
yit t = x̂it tβ + zitγ + νit + εit t . (2.14)
Letting y, X , Z , and ν be the stacked n × T vectors for all i and t, and defining
U = [X Z] and Û = [X̂ Z], the IV estimator of β0 is consistent if plim 1nT Û′ν = 0
(and Û is of full rank, d + m), which can be achieved as n goes to infinity, holding
T fixed. Notice that the assumption that plim 1nT Z
′ν = 0 is similar to Deaton’s
assumption that the average of the individual fixed-effects is time invariant. In
fact, if z is defined as cohort dummies interacted with time, Moffitt’s and Deaton’s
estimators are identical (see Verbeek 2008).
A clear shortcoming ofMoffitt’s approach is that it requires a correct specification of
the first stage model. For example, if the fixed-effect is related to the observed time-
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invariant characteristics via a quadratic function, but the model is specified with a
linear function, the assumption that Z′ν approaches zero as n goes to infinity will not
hold. This problem can potentially be addressed by using a flexible functional form
in the first stage estimation, but this incurs in efficiency costs. Moreover, despite
the attractiveness of using time-varying covariates, wit t , that are unrelated to the
fixed-effects, finding variables that are unrelated to the fixed-effect is hard to do.
2.4 Monte Carlo Simulations
To study the small sample properties of the Local Cohorts estimator, I conduct a
series ofMonte Carlo simulations and analyze the bias, standard error, and rootmean
squared error (RMSE) of the Local Cohorts estimator, Moffitt’s IV estimator, and
two versions of Deaton’s cohort averaging approach with different cohort sizes.14
For these simulations I consider the following data generating process:
• yit = 2xit + fi + εit, εit ∼ N(0, 10)
• xit = 12 f
2
i + fi + νit, νit ∼ N(0, 5), so that x and f have a non-linear relation.
I consider three cases in terms of the relation between the time-invariant character-
istics z and the fixed-effect f :
• BaseCase: Z ⊂ R2, z1 ∼ U(−15, 15), z2 ∼ N(0, 2), and fi = z1i sin(z1i/6)+
z2i + ηi, ηi ∼ N(0, 2).
• Group Effects Case: Z ⊂ R2, z1 ∼ U(−15, 15), z2 ∼ N(0, 2), and fi =
1
2
(
5∑
q=1
I(z1i ∈ q(z1)) +
5∑
q=1
I(z2i ∈ q(z2))
)
, where q denotes the quintiles of z
and q(z) is the set that indicates that an observation belongs to the qth quintile.
Therefore, in this case, f is simply the average of the quintiles to which
the observation belongs to in terms of z1 and z2, taking values on the set
{1, 32 .2, 52, 3, 72, 4, 92, 5}.
14For Moffitt’s estimator I use a polynomial in z for equations 2.12 and 2.13 to capture the non-
linearities in the data generating process for both x and f with respect to z. For Deaton’s estimator
I use versions that have cohorts of approximate size 50 and 200. These cohorts are created by
splitting the data along percentiles of the observable time-invariant covariates such that each cohort
has (approximately) the same size.
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• Underspecified Case: Z ⊂ R3, z1, z2, z3 ∼ N(0, 2), with corr(z1, z2) =
corr(z1, z3) = 0.2 and corr(z2, z3) = −0.3, with z3 unobserved, and fi =
z1i sin(z1i/6) + z2i + z3i + ηi, ηi ∼ N(0, 2).15
TheBaseCase satisfies all the assumptions for consistency and asymptotic normality
of the Local Cohorts estimator. The Group Effects Case satisfies the assumptions
in Deaton’s estimator, but represents a mild violation of the continuity assumption
(A2) of the Local Cohorts Estimator. The violation is mild because it only occurs
at a finite number of points (16). This case is included to show that, even when the
continuity assumption does not hold, the Local Cohorts estimator can still perform
relatively well. The Underspecified Case incorporates an additional time-invariant
characteristic that affects the fixed-effect and is correlated with the other time-
invariant characteristics but that is not observed. This case is designed to show that
an incomplete specification of the first step model does not affect the Local Cohorts
estimator’s main properties, but it compromises the validity of Moffitt’s approach.16
For all cases, I draw samples for two time periods, T = 2, with cross-sectional sizes
between 250 and 5,000, in increments of 250. Unless otherwise noted, for each
sample size and case, I draw a total of 200 Monte Carlo samples.
Figure 2.1 shows 1,000 estimates from the Local Cohorts estimator for the Base
Case with three different cross-sectional sample sizes: 750, 1,500, and 2,500. As
can be seen from the figure, when the sample size is relatively small the distribution
of the estimates is not centered around the true value of the coefficient (in this
case, β0=2), and the distribution is skewed and is slightly platykurtic. When the
sample size is larger, like in the case with 2,500 observations per cross-section, the
distribution of the estimates is centered at the true value of the coefficient, and has
almost no skewness and is mesokurtic, meaning that for moderate samples sizes a
normal distribution describes the distribution of the estimates sufficiently well.
Figure 2.2 (and Table 2.B1 in the Appendix) shows the Monte Carlo simulation
results for the Base Case. As can be seen from panel (a), the Local Cohorts
estimator has a smaller RMSE than the alternative estimators for all sample sizes.
15The distribution of z1 in the Underspecified case is different from the distribution used for this
variable in the other cases. This was done to simplify the creation of non-independent variables. If
the simulations for the Base Case and the Group Effects Case were run with z1 distributed as in the
Underspecificed Case, the results would remain qualitatively the same, although with smaller biases
for Deaton’s and the Local Cohorts estimators.
16However, because of increased unexplained variability, the Local Cohorts estimator will have a
higher variance and may need more observations to sufficiently reduce the small sample bias.
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of LC for Different Sample Sizes: Base Case Simulations
The data generating process in the Base Case satisfies all the assumptions in the Local Cohorts
estimator. The vertical line at 2 indicates the true value of the parameters β0.
Deaton’s estimator with cohort size 50 is the next best one in terms of RMSE in the
smaller samples, but it is defeated by Deaton’s estimator with cohort size 200 for
moderate to larger samples. Moffitt’s IV estimator is the one with the largest RMSE,
except for the larger sample sizes where it is better than Deaton’s with cohort size
50.
In terms of the bias, shown in panel (b), Moffitt’s IV estimator is clearly superior to
all others in small and moderate samples, and performs similarly well to the Local
Cohorts estimator for the larger samples.17 Both versions of Deaton’s estimator have
17The large variability in the bias of Moffitt’s IV estimator is due to the rather small number
of Monte Carlo simulations coupled with the large standard error of this estimator. If the Monte
Carlo simulations included a significantly larger number of simulations, this bias should be a flat line,
approximately at zero. The use of a relatively small number of simulations is due to the computational
demands of the LC estimator.
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Figure 2.2: Base Case Simulations
The data generating process in the Base Case satisfies all the assumptions in the Local Cohorts
estimator. For reference, the true value of the parameter of interest is β0 = 2. RMSE, Absolute
Bias, and Standard errors are in units (not as percentages of β0). LC refers to the Local Cohorts
estimator; D50 and D200 refer to Deaton’s estimator with cohort sizes of approximately 50 and
200 individuals, respectively; and Moffitt refers to Moffitt’s estimator implemented with a flexible
polynomial to account for the unknown data generating process’ functional form.
rather large biases, and these biases do not decrease in time. The reason for this poor
performance in terms of bias is partly due to the inflexibility of Deaton’s approach,
which requires either the fixed-effects for individuals who are very different in terms
of time-invariant characteristics to be the similar (the partition of Z is too coarse)
or, when it avoids that, it uses too few observations in each cohort that cannot ensure
that the estimates of the fixed-effect for a given cohort are stable across time (the
partition ofZ is too fine-graded).
Panel (c) of Figure 2.2 shows the standard error of each of the estimators for the
different sample sizes. Moffitt’s IV estimator has the largest standard error of all
the estimators considered, which explains why, despite having the smallest bias,
it performs poorly in terms of RMSE. The Local Cohorts estimator is somewhere
in between the two versions of Deaton’s estimator, and has a larger standard error
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than them for the larger samples. To get a better idea of what these standard errors
mean, it is useful to compare them to the standard error from the estimates of an real
panel. For a sample size of 5,000 observations per time period, the Local Cohorts
estimator has a standard error that is 32% larger than that of the real panel (with the
same data generating process), whereas Moffitt’s IV estimator has a standard error
that is 108% larger than the panel’s.
Overall, the Local Cohorts estimator performs better than the other estimators
considered. Although Deaton’s estimators can have smaller variances, they are
biased; and while Moffitt’s IV estimator is the one with the smallest bias, it has a
much larger variance.
Figure 2.3 (and Table 2.B2 in the Appendix) show the Monte Carlo results for
the Group Effects Case, which satisfies the assumptions in Deaton’s approach but
violates the continuity assumption (A2) of the local cohorts estimator at 16 distinct
points.18 As expected, Deaton’s estimator with cohort size 50 outperform the other
estimators in terms of RMSE.
With respect to the bias, both the Local Cohort estimator and Deaton’s perform
similarly well, with very small biases. Moffitt’s estimator has the largest bias of
all estimators in this case. This bias is due to the fact that the flexible polynomial
used in the first step of this estimator is not adequate to deal with the discontinuities
present in the relation between the unobserved individual-level heterogeneity ( f )
and the observed individual-level characteristics (z). Panel (c) shows that it is in
terms of the standard error that Deaton’s estimators outperform the Local Cohorts
estimator. The main reason for the better performance of Deaton’s estimator in this
case is that the relation between f and z follows a step function. This significantly
helps Deaton’s approach, since it assumes that the fixed-effects are actually group
effects, which matches exactly the data generating process in this case. Contrary
to this, the Local Cohorts estimator does not assume that the fixed-effects follow a
step function, meaning that it loses efficiency in determining that this.19 That is,
in this case, the more parsimonious nature of Deaton’s approach allows for a more
precise estimation, with standard errors of about half the size of the Local Cohorts
estimator.
Figure 2.4 (and Table 2.B3 in the Appendix) shows the Monte Carlo simulation
18These points are defined by combinations of the first to fourth quintiles of z1 and z2.
19This is similar to comparing the OLS estimates of a linear regression model with nonparametric
estimation of the same model.
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Figure 2.3: Group Effects Case Simulations
The data generating process in the Group Effect case assumes that the unobserved individual-level
heterogeneity is constant (up to random noise) within groups defined by the quintiles of the observable
time-invariant characteristics (which implies a mild violation of assumption A2 of the Local Cohorts
estimator). For reference, the true value of the parameter of interest is β0 = 2. RMSE, Absolute
Bias, and Standard errors are in units (not as percentages of β0. LC refers to the Local Cohorts
estimator; D50 and D200 refer to Deaton’s estimator with cohort sizes of approximately 50 and
200 individuals, respectively; and Moffitt refers to Moffitt’s estimator implemented with a flexible
polynomial to account for the unknown data generating process’ functional form.
results for the Underspecified Case, in which the fixed-effects depend on three time-
invariant characteristics that are correlated with one another, but only two of them
are Observable. As can be seen from the simulations, the performance of Deaton’s
estimators and the LC estiamtor are qualitatively similar to their performance for
the Base Case.20
The most significant change between the Base Case and the Underspecified Case
is the performance of Moffitt’s IV estimator. As Panel (b) of Figure 2.4 shows,
this estimator is no longer unbiased. The source of its bias is the misspecification
20There are differences in the sizes of the bias and variance term, which are in part due to the
different distribution used for z1.
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Figure 2.4: Underspecified Case Simulations
The data generating process in the Underspecified Case assumes that the unobserved individual-
level heterogeneity depends on three time-invariant characteristics (and noise), one of which is
unobserved. For reference, the true value of the parameter of interest is β0 = 2. RMSE, Absolute
Bias, and Standard errors are in units (not as percentages of β0. LC refers to the Local Cohorts
estimator; D50 and D200 refer to Deaton’s estimator with cohort sizes of approximately 50 and
200 individuals, respectively; and Moffitt refers to Moffitt’s estimator implemented with a flexible
polynomial to account for the unknown data generating process’ functional form.
in the first step of the estimator, derived from the unobservability of z3. This
implies that in the second step, the predicted values of x remain correlated with
the unobserved heterogeneity from z3. Both the LC and Deaton’s estimator do not
suffer significantly from this problem, as in both, the first step estimation integrates
over the unobserved time-invariant characteristics.21
To summarize, the Local Cohorts estimator has some bias in the smaller samples,
but this bias disappears in larger samples, even when the identification assumption
(A2) is mildly violated or when there is an unobserved systematic component among
the time-invariant characteristics. Deaton’s estimator performs better than the Local
21This integration over unobserved time-invariant characteristics helps reduce the bias from
misspecification, but it increases the variance of the estimates.
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Cohorts estimator only when the fixed-effects are indeed group effects. However,
when this is not the case, it becomes biased, even for the larger sample sizes.
Moffitt’s estimator generally has no bias, except when its first step is misspecified.
This estimator is also very inefficient, always resulting in the highest variance of
all the estimators analyzed. Taken together, the Local Cohorts estimator typically
outperforms the alternative estimators analyzed here.
2.5 Comparison to Real Panel Data
In this section I compare the performance of the Local Cohorts estimator developed
in this paper with fixed-effects estimates from actual panel data. To do this, I use
the National Annenberg Election Study (NAES), 2008 Online Panel. The NAES
panel is composed of five waves of interviews conducted over the curse of 16
months, including the pre-primary season of the 2008 Presidential Campaign, early
primaries, late primaries and party conventions, general election campaign, and post
election period. I limit the analysis to the 10,742 respondents who participated in
all five NAES waves. I also limit the analysis to the last three waves as these are the
ones that include all the variables necessary for the analysis.
The model examined in this section studies the effect of partisan news exposure on
respondents’ favorability ratings for the Democratic Presidential Nominee, Obama.
Favorability of Obama is measured via a feeing thermometer on a scale from 1
(unfavorable views) to 100 (favorable views). To measure exposure to partisan
news on television, I use a question that asks respondents to report which programs
they watch regularly on television, out of multiple lists adding up to the 45 most
frequently watched news programs, according to Nielsen Ratings. The ideological
bias of the 45 TV programs is taken from Dilliplane (2014), who classifies them
as liberal, conservative, and neutral.22 I use several time-invariant characteristics
to obtain the LC estimates. These characteristics include age, education, income,
party ID, and race, and were obtained from a panel profile wave in NAES. Formally,
the model of interest is:23
ObamaThermit = β1#LiberalTVit+β2#ConservativeTVit+β3#NeutralTVit+ fi+εit
(2.15)
22Table 2.C1 shows the classification of TV programs.
23Note that the model specification used in this paper is different from that used in Dilliplane
(2014). That paper estimates a fixed effects model using as explanatory variables the average
exposure to each type of media for each individual throughout the panel interacted with the panel
waves. Thus, the model estimates by Dilliplane (2014) is more a study of individual trends, than it
is a traditional fixed-effects analysis.
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To study the performance of the LC estimator, I generate a sample of repeated
cross-sections from the NAES panel in the following way: (1) I draw a random
sample of 3,000 respondents from the first wave; (2) draw a random sample of 3,000
respondents from the second wave from among those respondents not sampled in
the first wave; (3) draw a random sample of 3,000 respondents from the third wave
from among those not sampled in the first or second wave. This ensures that none
of the respondents in each of the cross-sections is included in the other ones, so that
the resulting dataset resembles real RCS data.
The first, non-parametric, step of the LC estimator requires choosing a kernel. For
this application I use a product kernel composed of (1) the identity function for party
ID and race, and (2) Gaussian 4th order kernels for age, education, and income. The
bandwidths for age, education, and income were selected via cross-validation on the
feeling thermometer for Obama.
I compare the results from the LC estimator with those of Moffitt’s IV approach,
where I use the same time-invariant characteristics plus time dummies in the first
stage equation, and to a linear regression that includes the time-invariant character-
istics as controls. As ground truth, I use the estimates from a subpanel defined by
the individuals in the first repeated cross-section described above.24
Figure 2.5 shows the estimated coefficients for the effect of the number of liberal,
conservative, and neutral TV shows regularly watched by respondents on their
favorability ratings of Obama estimated with the real panel, the LC estimator, and a
simple OLS regression with controls. The estimates from Moffitt’s IV approach are
very large and off target, and are therefore reported separately in Table 2.C2 in the
appendix.25 As the figure shows, the LC estimator generally overestimates the effect
of watching all three types of TV programs on the favorability ratings of Obama.
While the fixed-effects estimates using the real panel predict that regularly watching
an extra liberal TV show leads to an increase of 0.57 in Obama’s favorability ratings,
the LC estimates predict an increase of 0.87 points.26 However, the panel and LC
confidence intervals have sufficient overlap so that both estimates are statistically
24I do not include a version of Deaton’s estimator since this estimator can be though of as a special
case of the LC estimator, but where cohorts are arbitrarily defined by the researcher.
25The most likely reason why Moffitt’s IV approach estimates are off target by such a large
margin is that the number of TV shows regularly watched in each category resembles an exponential
distribution with a small rate. This hampers the ability of the first stage estimates to generate good
predictions of the independent variables.
26Note that these quantities are actually quite small. Given Obama’s average rating of 51.6, it
implies and increase of 1.1% or 1.68% according to the panel and LC estimates, respectively.
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Figure 2.5: Coefficient Estimates from a Real Panel, LCE, and Linear Regression
with Controls
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Panel estimates are fixed effects estimates from a real panel of size 3000, based on the same cross-
section at time 1 as the LCE and Controls estimates. Controls estimates refer to a linear model of
the pooled cross-sections, including the time-invariant characteristics as controls. The variance of
the LC estimator was obtained via bootstrap.
indistinguishable from one another in this case. The estimate from the linear
regression with controls, which ignores the unobserved heterogeneity, predicts an
increase of 2.1 points in Obama’s favorability rating, which is almost 4 times the
estimate from the panel. Moffitt’s IV estimator instead predicts an increase of 26.9
points.
The panel estimates for the number of conservative TV programs watched shows
a non-significant effect of -0.13 points, while the LC estimator shows a larger, but
still non-significant estimate of -0.6 points. The linear regression with controls and
Moffitt’s IV estimator, on the other hand, predict a decrease in Obama’s rating of
1.8 and 11.6 points, respectively, and are statistically significant.
Finally, the panel fixed-effects estimator predicts an increase of 0.35 points in
Obama’s rating from watching an extra neutral TV program, while the LC estimator
significantly overestimates this quantity, at 1.1 points. The linear regression with
controls provides an estimate that is closer to the panel estimate, at 0.49 points.
Moffitt’s IV estimator is, as with the other variables, significantly misestimating the
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effect, at -5.7 points.
Overall, the results for the LC estimator are encouraging. While the LC estimator
overestimates the effects of different TV media slants on feeling thermometers for
Obama relative to the estimates from a real panel, this overestimation is not severe.
Importantly, the estimates obtained with LC have smaller bias from the ground truth
than those obtained with alternative estimators that do not rely on real panel data.
This indicates that the identification assumptions of the LC estimator plausibly hold
in this case, notwithstanding the relatively small bias encountered.
2.6 Discussion
In this chapter I develop a semi-parametric two-step estimator procedure, the Local
Cohorts estimator, for estimating linear models with individual-level unobserved
heterogeneity using repeated cross-sections. I provide identification conditions and
derive asymptotic properties of the estimator, establishing its root-n consistency
and asymptotic normality. The identification conditions require that similar indi-
viduals have, on average, similar individual-level unobserved heterogeneity. This
assumption is typically weaker than the ones used by other estimators, which require
that the unobserved individual-level heterogeneity be in fact a group effect with no
systematic variation within each group.27 Strictly speaking, the identification as-
sumptions for the Local Cohorts estimator do not include group effects as a special
case, although when these groups are known it can be easily modified to account
for them. However, even under unknown groups, this restriction does not represent
a significant shortcoming for the LC estimator relative to others, as estimators that
rely on group effects have severe problems if the groups are unknown.28
In Monte Carlo simulations, I show that the Local Cohorts estimator performs well,
with some bias in small samples that disappears in moderate sample sizes, even
when the unobserved individual-level heterogeneity comes in the form of group
effects. Furthermore, compared to other available estimators, it typically has a
smaller RMSE, being only larger than models that assume the presence of group
effects when this is indeed the case.
Beyond the Monte Carlo simulations, I compare the Local Cohorts estimator to a
fixed-effects estimator derived from real panel data. The model being estimated
seeks to determine the effects of partisan news exposure on the favorability ratings
27See, for example, Deaton (1985) and Inoue (2008).
28Deaton (1985) implicitly assumes that there are group effects, but does not establish what these
groups are, how many there are, or how to discover them from the data.
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of then presidential candidate Obama. I find that the LC estimator typically out-
performs alternative models for RCS data. Moreover, while there is some amount
of bias relative to the real panel estimates, the results show that the identification
assumptions of the LC estimator plausibly hold in this case.
It is possible that the Local Cohorts estimator can prove a useful alternative to the
fixed-effects estimators if the efficiency loses are not too large (i.e., when the RCS
data is large). This is because RCS data will generally not suffer from attrition as
panel data does, and it is cheaper to collect, allowing for significantly larger sample
sizes that could more than compensate the efficiency loses relative to the fixed-
effects estimator for panel data. Finally, the Local Cohorts could be developed into
a complement of fixed-effects panel estimators to help deal with attrition and non-
response at certain waves of a panel, as well as boosting the estimates by including
in the estimation individuals sampled in cross-sections complementary to the panel
design.
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2.A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 (Uniform Convergence)
First, notice that by the Triangle Inequality sup
β∈B
Gn(β, Y˜, X˜) − E(g(β, Y˜0, X˜0)) ≤
sup
β∈B
Gn(β, Y˜0, X˜0)−E(g(β, Y˜0, X˜0))+ sup
β∈B
(nT)−1 ∑∑ [g(β, Y˜, X˜)−g(β, Y˜0, X˜0)] .
Notice that the first term does not depend on the nonparametric first step esti-
mator (but on its true functional form). Therefore, the first term is simply an
M-estimator. Since B is assumed to be compact, the function g(·) is continuous in
β, and E(sup
β∈B
g(β, Y˜0, X˜0)) < ∞, this term is op(1) by standard results of the Uniform
Law of Large Numbers for M-estimators (Newey and McFadden, 1994).
Next, notice that the function g(·) is continuously differentiable (since it is simply
a square function). Therefore, it is Lipschitz continuous. This means that ∃ κ such
that
g(β, Y˜, X˜) − g(β, Y˜0, X˜0) ≤ κ | |(Y˜, X˜) − (Y˜0, X˜0)| |, and this holds true for all z
(remember that Y˜ and X˜ are functions of z). Since this holds for all z, it also holds
for the supremum over z. Thus:(nT)−1 ∑∑ [g(β, Y˜, X˜) − g(β, Y˜0, X˜0)]  ≤ κ sup
z∈Z
| |(Y˜, X˜) − (Y˜0, X˜0)| |.
Now, notice that
sup
z∈Z
| |(Y˜, X˜) − (Y˜0, X˜0)| | ≤ sup
z∈Z
|Y˜ − Y˜0 | + sup
z∈Z
| x˜1 − x˜10 | + ... + sup
z∈Z
| x˜k − x˜k0 |,
where the superscripts in x˜m indicate the mth column of the matrix X˜
Now, each of the terms in the right hand side of the last inequality can be bounded
by:
sup
z∈Z
|r¯ct − r¯0ct | + 1T supz∈Z
|r¯ct − r¯0cs |,
where r here stands for y and each of the k dimensions of x. Under assumptions
A3-A5, each of the terms in the last equation is of order Op
((
ln(n)
nhd
)1/2
+ h2
)
,
which under appropriate conditions for h is op(1) (Hansen, 2008).29 For example,
taking h to be the optimal bandwidth for the Naradaya-Watson estimator (the one
that minimizes the mean integrated squared error), h ∝ n−1/(4+d), is sufficient for
29Newey (1994a,1994b) also provide similar results but under stronger conditions that require z
to have bounded support.
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obtaining the op(1) rate. Then, given that T is fixed, these are finite sums of op(1)
terms, and therefore:
sup
z∈Z
| |(Y˜, X˜) − (Y˜0, X˜0)| | = op(1).
So, putting all of it together, we have that:
sup
β∈B
|Gn(β, Y˜, X˜) − E(g(β, Y˜0, X˜0))| p→ 0.
Proof of Proposition 2 (Consistency)
The consistency of the LC estimator follows from the consistency of M-estimators
(see, for example, Theorem 2.1 in Newey and McFadden, 1994). The identifica-
tion assumption A2, plus the exogeneity assumption A1, ensure that the function
g(β, Y˜0, X˜0) has a well-separated maximum at β0. The uniform convergence result
from Proposition 1 fulfills the other requirement for consistency.
Proof of Proposition 3 (Asymptotic Normality)
The assumptions in Theorem 3.2 in Ichimura and Lee (2010) can be verified, from
which the asymptotic normality follows.
• Asumption 3.1 This assumption requires identification and consistency of the
estimator. It is satisfied by the identification restrictions and Proposition 2
(Consistency).
• Asumption 3.2 This assumption requires the existence a linear approximation
of the objective functionwith a bounded error. It is satisfied by the smoothness
of g(·).
• Asumption 3.3 This assumption requires that a second-order Taylor expan-
sion of E(g(·)) be well defined. This assumption is satisfied, again, by the
smoothness of g(·) and the continuity assumptions in A5.
• Asumption 3.4 This assumption imposes a series of smoothness conditions
on the first step estimation. Condition (a) in this assumption is satisfied from
the identification assumption. Condition (b) is satisfied by the smoothness of
the kernels. Condition (c) is satisfied from the uniform convergence results
for Kernel estimators (Hansen, 2008, Newey, 1994a and 1994b). Conditions
(d) and (e) are satisfied as the first stage estimation does not depend on β0.
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• Asumption 3.5 This assumption ensures that the remainder term of the Taylor
Series expansion is negligible. It can be verified by applying proposition 3.1
of the same paper. Conditions (a) and (b) are satisfied by choosing
ω(·) =
[
2 −2β
−2β 2β2
]
and condition (c) is satisfied as the first step estimation does not depend on
β0.
• Asumption 3.6 This assumption requires that the effect of the first stage
estimation on the final precision of the estimates of β0 be representable as the
sum of zero-mean and finite-variance random variables. It can be verified by
using the results from remark 3.3 of Ichimura and Lee (2010), and defining:
g(z, θ) =
[
E(2y˜ − β x˜)
E(−2β(y˜ − β x˜))
]
and
E
(
ϕ(z, θ)|ν(Z) = ν(z)) = [ E(y |Z = z)
E(x |Z = z)
]
.
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2.B Tables from Simulations
Table 2.B1: Bias, Standard Error, and Root Mean Square Error for Simulations of
the Base Case
Sample RMSE Absolute Bias Standard Error
Size LC D50 D200 M LC D50 D200 M LC D50 D200 M
250 0.17 0.21 0.54 0.43 0.10 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.13 0.19 0.53 0.43
500 0.15 0.16 0.27 0.32 0.08 0.10 0.03 0.01 0.12 0.12 0.27 0.32
750 0.13 0.13 0.19 0.26 0.06 0.10 0.03 0.02 0.11 0.09 0.19 0.26
1000 0.12 0.13 0.17 0.24 0.06 0.11 0.04 0.03 0.11 0.07 0.16 0.23
1250 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.21 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.06 0.14 0.21
1500 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.19 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.12 0.19
1750 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.19 0.04 0.11 0.06 0.02 0.09 0.05 0.11 0.19
2000 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.17 0.05 0.11 0.07 0.01 0.08 0.05 0.10 0.16
2250 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.15 0.04 0.11 0.07 0.01 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.15
2500 0.08 0.12 0.11 0.15 0.03 0.11 0.07 0.01 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.15
2750 0.08 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.04 0.11 0.08 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.14
3000 0.08 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.03 0.11 0.08 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.13
3250 0.07 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.02 0.11 0.08 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.13
3500 0.07 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.02 0.11 0.08 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.12
3750 0.07 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.02 0.11 0.09 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.12
4000 0.07 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.02 0.11 0.09 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.12
4250 0.07 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.02 0.11 0.09 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.11
4500 0.07 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.01 0.11 0.09 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.12
4750 0.07 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.01 0.11 0.09 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.11
5000 0.07 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.01 0.11 0.09 0.00 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.11
The data generating process in the Base Case satisfies all the assumptions in the Local Cohorts
estimator. LC refers to the Local Cohorts estimator, D50 and D200 refer to Deaton’s estimator with
cohort sizes of 50 and 200 individuals, and M refers to Moffitt’s estimator using a flexible polynomial
to account for the unknown data generating process. For reference, the true value of the parameter
of interest is β0 = 2.
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Table 2.B2: Bias, Standard Error, and Root Mean Square Error for Simulations of
the Group Effects Case
Sample RMSE Absolute Bias Standard Error
Size LC D50 D200 M LC D50 D200 M LC D50 D200 M
250 0.35 0.45 4.42 1.83 0.03 0.02 0.68 0.14 0.35 0.45 4.36 1.82
500 0.31 0.27 0.96 1.28 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.31 0.27 0.96 1.27
750 0.29 0.20 0.55 1.15 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.29 0.20 0.55 1.15
1000 0.27 0.15 0.47 1.09 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.26 0.15 0.46 1.08
1250 0.24 0.13 0.36 0.93 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.13 0.24 0.12 0.36 0.93
1500 0.23 0.12 0.31 0.84 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.23 0.12 0.31 0.84
1750 0.23 0.11 0.29 0.83 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.23 0.11 0.29 0.83
2000 0.22 0.11 0.27 0.72 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.22 0.10 0.27 0.72
2250 0.21 0.10 0.24 0.64 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.21 0.10 0.24 0.64
2500 0.19 0.10 0.22 0.64 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.19 0.09 0.21 0.64
2750 0.17 0.09 0.20 0.61 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.17 0.09 0.20 0.60
3000 0.18 0.08 0.18 0.53 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.18 0.08 0.18 0.53
3250 0.19 0.09 0.16 0.52 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.18 0.09 0.16 0.52
3500 0.17 0.08 0.15 0.52 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.17 0.08 0.15 0.52
3750 0.16 0.08 0.15 0.50 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.16 0.08 0.14 0.49
4000 0.15 0.08 0.15 0.47 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.15 0.08 0.15 0.47
4250 0.15 0.08 0.14 0.47 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.15 0.08 0.14 0.47
4500 0.15 0.08 0.13 0.46 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.15 0.08 0.12 0.46
4750 0.15 0.08 0.12 0.45 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.15 0.07 0.11 0.45
5000 0.14 0.07 0.12 0.45 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.14 0.07 0.12 0.45
The data generating process in the Group Effects Case assumes that the unobserved individual-level
heterogeneity is constant (up to random noise) within groups defined by the quintiles of the observable
time-invariant characteristics (which implies a mild violation of assumption A2 of the Local Cohorts
estimator). LC refers to the Local Cohorts estimator, D50 and D200 refer to Deaton’s estimator with
cohort sizes of 50 and 200 individuals, and M refers to Moffitt’s estimator using a flexible polynomial
to account for the unknown data generating process. For reference, the true value of the parameter
of interest is β0 = 2.
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Table 2.B3: Bias, Standard Error, and Root Mean Square Error for Simulations for
the Underspecified Case
Sample RMSE Absolute Bias Standard Error
Size LC D50 D200 M LC D50 D200 M LC D50 D200 M
250 0.22 0.47 18.07 2.15 0.07 0.05 0.33 0.13 0.20 0.47 18.06 2.14
500 0.17 0.28 1.27 2.00 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.17 0.15 0.27 1.27 1.99
750 0.15 0.21 0.64 1.81 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.13 0.13 0.20 0.64 1.80
1000 0.13 0.18 0.51 1.57 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.11 0.12 0.16 0.51 1.56
1250 0.11 0.15 0.41 1.37 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.40 1.37
1500 0.11 0.14 0.33 1.36 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.32 1.35
1750 0.10 0.14 0.30 1.31 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.29 1.30
2000 0.09 0.13 0.29 1.06 0.03 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.28 1.06
2250 0.08 0.13 0.27 1.04 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.26 1.04
2500 0.08 0.12 0.24 1.24 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.23 1.24
2750 0.07 0.12 0.21 1.18 0.02 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.20 1.18
3000 0.07 0.12 0.19 0.85 0.01 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.18 0.85
3250 0.06 0.11 0.18 0.77 0.01 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.17 0.76
3500 0.06 0.11 0.17 0.76 0.01 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.16 0.76
3750 0.06 0.11 0.17 0.76 0.01 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.15 0.75
4000 0.05 0.10 0.16 0.77 0.01 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.05 0.08 0.14 0.76
4250 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.76 0.01 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.13 0.75
4500 0.05 0.11 0.15 0.69 0.01 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.13 0.69
4750 0.05 0.11 0.14 0.65 0.01 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.65
5000 0.05 0.11 0.13 0.65 0.01 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.11 0.65
The data generating process in the Underspecified Case assumes that the unobserved individual-
level heterogeneity depends on three time-invariant characteristics (and noise), one of which is
unobserved. LC refers to the Local Cohorts estimator, D50 and D200 refer to Deaton’s estimator
with cohort sizes of 50 and 200 individuals, and M refers to Moffitt’s estimator using a flexible
polynomial to account for the unknown data generating process. For reference, the true value of the
parameter of interest is β0 = 2.
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2.C Tables from Application
Table 2.C1: Classification of TV Programs
Liberal Conservative Neutral
Anderson Cooper 360 Fox News ABC World News
Countdown with Keith Olbermann Fox Report with Shepard Smith CBS Evening News
Hardball with Chris Matthews Hannity and Colmes Lou Dobbs
CNN Headline News/Newsroom Hannity’s America NBC Nightly News
ABC News Nightline The O’Reilly Factor Meet the Press
Situation Room w. Wolf Blitzer The Beltway Boys Today Show
The Daily Show w. Jon Stewart Studio B w. Shepard Smith The NewsHour w. Jim Lehrer
Good Morning America Geraldo at Large Larry King Live
This Week w. G. Stephanopoulos Your World with Neil Cavuto 60 Minutes
The View Fox and Friends Face the Nation
The Colbert Report Special Report w. Brit Hume Reliable Sources
Late Edition w. Wolf Blitzer The Early Show
MSNBC Live Frontline
Out in the Open CBS Sunday Morning
BET News 20/20
Dateline NBC
The McLaughin Group
CBS Morning News
America This Morning
The classification of TV programs comes from Dilliplane (2014).
Table 2.C2: Estimates from NAES 2008 Data
Lib TV L U Con TV L U Neu TV L U
Panel 0.57 0.19 0.94 -0.13 -0.56 0.30 0.35 0.08 0.62
LCE 0.87 0.17 1.57 -0.62 -1.33 0.09 1.11 0.61 1.61
Controls 2.11 1.82 2.40 -1.79 -2.03 -1.55 0.49 0.28 0.70
Moffitt’s 26.93 23.00 30.86 -11.63 -13.19 -10.07 -5.72 -8.30 -3.15
Panel refers to estimates obtained from real panel data. Controls refers to a linear regression that
includes the observed time-invariant characteristics as controls. L and U denote the lower and upper
bounds of 95% confidence intervals for the corresponding coefficients.
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C h a p t e r 3
PARTIAL EFFECTS FOR BINARY OUTCOME MODELS WITH
UNOBSERVED HETEROGENEITY
3.1 Introduction
The presence of unobserved heterogeneity is ubiquitous in observational studies
in political science, and the social sciences in general. It is generally defined as
differences across units of analysis that are not measured, influence the outcome,
and may correlate with observed characteristics of interest. In studies of political
behavior, this heterogeneity sometimes takes the form of voters’ core beliefs, which
are hard to define, let alone to measure. It can also take more mundane forms.
For example, researchers rarely get to observe how political parties choose which
voters to contact during electoral campaigns. Regardless of its origins and form,
unobserved heterogeneity poses the same problem: ignoring it when it is correlated
with the covariates of interest leads to biased and inconsistent estimates of the
quantities of interest. Returning to the example, if a party contacts those voters who
are already likely to support it (in a way that researchers do not observe), then the
effect of party contact on the probability of voting for that party will be overestimated
if researchers do not account for the unobserved heterogeneity in some way.
There are three main estimation approaches for binary outcome models with panel
data in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity: treat the heterogeneity as param-
eters to be estimated; use conditional maximum likelihood estimation (Rasch 1961;
Chamberlain 1980) and related semiparametric techniques (e.g., Abrevaya 2000); or
use random or correlated random effects (Mundlak 1978; Chamberlain 1980). Each
of these approaches suffers from one of three problems. They produce inconsistent
and biased estimates, cannot produce estimates of the probability of the outcome
nor partial effects of the covariates of interest, or they require making restrictive as-
sumptions about how the individual heterogeneity relates to the observed covariates
in the model.1
In this chapter I develop an estimator that deals with unobserved heterogeneity in
binary outcome models, the Penalized Flexible Correlated Random Effects (PF-
1Making restrictive assumptions about the individual heterogeneity also leads to biased estimates.
I distinguish the bias and inconsistency that arise from unrealistic assumptions from the one that
arises from the estimation procedure itself.
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CRE) estimator. In the PF-CRE estimator, I explicitly account for the correlation
between the observed and unobserved components of the model, using a large
flexible specification (more details below). Moreover, I include a penalization
step for variable selection to induce efficiency. This estimator addresses the three
problems described above: it provides consistent estimates for themodel parameters,
allows for the estimation of partial effects, and makes mild assumptions about the
unobserved heterogeneity.
The PF-CRE estimator builds upon the correlated random effects (CRE) approach
by using a rich and flexible specification of the correlation between the unobserved
heterogeneity and the observed covariates in the model. This flexible specification is
composed of functions of the observed covariates (such as individual time-means and
other exchangeable functions2), additional observed time-invariant characteristics,
and higher order interactions between these terms. The flexible specification in
PF-CRE requires making weaker assumptions about the unobserved heterogeneity
than in the traditional CRE approach. Weaker assumptions mean that PF-CRE is
more likely to capture the underlying heterogeneity correctly and lead to correct
inferences.
The key challenge of the specification in PF-CRE is that it requires the estimation
of additional parameters. When the number of covariates is small, this does not
pose a major hurdle. However, the number of parameters grows exponentially with
the number of covariates in the model. For example, with 3 observed covariates, a
relatively simple specification that models the unobserved heterogeneity on the time-
means of the covariates with up to three-way interactions requires the estimation
of 25 parameters, which is manageable; with 5 covariates, 63 parameters; with 10
covariates, 298 parameters.3 Moreover, if the specification also includes additional
time-invariant characteristics, the number of coefficients in the model can become
unmanageable very fast.
To address the dimensionality issue, I estimate the model via penalized Maximum
Likelihood using the Smoothly Clipped Absolute Deviation (SCAD) penalty. Im-
portantly, the penalization is only applied to the terms that model the unobserved
heterogeneity, but not to the covariates of interest. Like other penalized estimation
2Exchangeable functions are those for which the order of their arguments does not change their
value. For example, moments are exchangeable functions: an average does not change if the order
in which the terms enter the sum is altered.
3With three covariates there are 3 coefficients associated with the covariates, a constant term,
three asssociated with the time-means, 6 for two-way interactions, 10 for three-way interactions, and
the variance of the random effect.
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methods, SCAD introduces a cost in the likelihood function for the size of each
parameter to be estimated. Therefore, when the penalized likelihood is maximized,
the polynomial coefficients with little or no predictive power are shrunk to zero,
a form of variable selection. In the case of PF-CRE, the penalization selects the
polynomial terms that are necessary to control for the unobserved heterogeneity and
discards the rest. Since the main covariates of interest are not penalized in PF-CRE,
no shrinkage is introduced to those parameters. The reduction of dimensionality is
especially useful in small samples, as it can significantly reduce the variance of the
estimates, leading to more accurate inferences.
The assumptions underlying the PF-CRE estimator may not always be sufficient to
capture the unobserved heterogeneity in the data. The underlying heterogeneity may
be correlated with the observed covariates in a highly convoluted way that PF-CRE
may fail to successfully approximate. Thus, for the logistic case, I present a model
specification test to determine whether the PF-CRE approach is appropriate for the
data at hand. This provides an indirect test of the assumptions in PF-CRE and a tool
for researchers to decide when it is correct to use it.
I study the small sample performance of the PF-CRE estimator using Monte Carlo
simulations. The simulations show that the asymptotic properties of PF-CRE hold
in small samples, and that it performs better than alternative estimators. In addition,
the penalization step is the key for reducing uncertainty around the estimates. For
the logistic case, the simulations show that the rejection rate of the specification test
is close to theoretical levels.
To illustrate the performance of PF-CRE in a real-data environment, I provide an
application to tactical voting during the 2015 United Kingdom General Election.
The outcome of interest is whether a voter intends to cast a tactical vote, that is,
vote for a party that is not her most preferred one. I use three waves of the British
Election Study Online Panel. The effects of interest are the extent to which parties
can influence the probability of a tactical vote through campaign contacts to voters.
The unobserved heterogeneity in this application represents all the information that
parties know about voters’ that outsiders (the researcher) do not know. In particular,
parties may know which voters may consider casting a tactical vote and be more
likely to contact them. The specification test shows that PF-CRE’s assumptions
hold in this case. The results show that ignoring the unobserved heterogeneity leads
to an overestimation of the effects of party contacts during the campaign on the
probability that a voter casts a tactical vote.
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I also provide two additional applications that show that the assumptions of PF-
CRE hold in other political science applications. In particular, I show that PF-
CRE provides consistent and efficient estimates of (1) the effect of preferences for
immigration and economic fears on voting for the 2016 Brexit Referendum in the
U.K.; and (2) the effect of ideological preferences and candidate characteristics on
vote choice during the 2012 U.S. Presidential Election. In both these cases, ignoring
the unobserved heterogeneity leads to significant differences in the estimated partial
effects of the covariates of interest and to our understanding of voter behavior.
3.2 Penalized Flexible Correlated Random Effects
In this section I first provide a short introduction to binary outcome models with
unobserved heterogeneity and define the quantities of interest. Second, I present the
identification strategy, estimation, and asymptotic properties of PF-CRE.
Binary Outcome Models with Unobserved Heterogeneity
Abinary outcomemodelwith unobserved heterogeneity consists of a binary reponse,
yit , and a k-dimensional vector of time-varying characteristics, xit , such that the
response for individual i at time t is generated by:
yit = I[α + xitβ + ci − εit > 0], i = 1, ..., n, t = 1, ...,T, (3.1)
where I(A) is an indicator function that takes the value of one if A holds and
zero otherwise; α is a constant; β is a k-dimensional parameter vector; ci is the
unobserved heterogeneity that is constant over time; and εit is an individual- and
time-specific error.4
When the error terms are independently and identically distributed according to a
known cumulative distribution G(·), equation 3.1 can be alternatively written as:
Prob(yit = 1|xit, ci) = G(α + xitβ + ci). (3.2)
Typical choices of G(·) are the normal distribution, which gives the probit model,
or the logistic distribution, which gives the logit model.
In some applications researchers may only be interested in the sign and relative sizes
of the β coefficients. In many others, however, the interest lies in the partial effects
that reflect how the probability of the outcome changes with respect to a change in
the covariates x. In the presence of unobserved heterogeneity these partial effects
4The focus on a balanced panel is for simplicity; however, T can differ across individuals.
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are calculated by taking expectations over c.5 The partial effects for the model in
equation 3.2 are defined as:
PE j(x) = E
[
∂
∂x j
G(α + xβ + c)x] , j = 1, ..., k (3.3)
wherex j denotes that jth element of x. Additionally, researchers may be interested
in the average partial effect, defined as:
APE j = E
[
∂
∂x j
G(α + xβ + c)
]
, j = 1, ..., k (3.4)
where the last expectation is taken with respect to both x and c.6
Assumptions for Identification and Estimation
The identification challenge in the model of equation 3.2 lies in ci being unobserved
and correlated with xit .7 The identification strategy I use in this chapter is to specify
a distribution for ci conditional on (xi1, ..., xiT ) without imposing excessively strong
restrictions on the unobserved heterogeneity. I begin with the following assumption:
Assumption 1 (Exchangeability)
f (ci |xi1, ..., xiT ) = f (ci |xis1, ..., xisT ), where s j ∈ {1, ...,T}, s j , s j ′ .
Assumption 1 requires that the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity con-
ditional on the observed covariates, f (ci |xi1, ..., xiT ), does not depend on the order
in which xit enters the density f (ci |·). Returning to the example of party contacts,
this assumption requires that what matters for the conditional distribution of the
unobserved heterogeneity is, for example, how many times a voter was contacted,
but not exactly when she was contacted.
Under Assumption 1, without loss of generality, f (ci |xi1, ..., xiT ) can be written as
a polynomial on z1i , ..., z
T
i , where z
t
i =
T∑
s=1
(xis)t (Altonji and Matzkin 2005, and
5Alternatively, one can calculate effects for particular values of c. However, I prefer not to take
this approach, as it presumes knowledge about which values of c are interesting, even though it is an
unobserved quantity.
6Note that some authors refer to equation 3.3 as the average partial effect, as it is averaging over
the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity. However, researchers also use the term average
partial effect for equation 3.4. I reserve the term average partial effect for equation 3.4.
7When c is independent of x, it is known as a random effect. This case does not pose significant
challenges to traditional estimators. However, the PF-CRE approach is also valid.
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references therein for further details).8 Note that when divided by T , (z1i , ..., zTi ) are
in fact the first T non-central moments of (xi1, ..., xiT ).
In most circumstances, researchers also observe time-invariant information, wi,
about each individual i, such as gender, race, and year of birth. These time-invariant
characteristics can be added to the conditional distribution of ci to improve fit.
Moreover, the inclusion of these auxiliary variables can help the exchangeability
assumption hold.
Assumption 1 alone is not sufficient for identification. The reason is that the first
T non-central moments characterize the T observations per individual i, exhaust-
ing the degrees of freedom. Therefore, additional restrictions are necessary for
identification:
Assumption 2 (Linear Index) The conditional density function f (ci |z1i , ..., zTi ,wi)
depends on a linear index of (z1i , ..., zTi ,wi) and interaction terms, for some τ < T .
That is:
f (ci |z1i , ..., zTi ,wi) = f (ci |ziγ),
where zi is the vector of the first τ moments, the observed time-invariant character-
istics, wi, and interaction terms.
Under Assumption 2, I restrict attention to a linear index of the first τ moments of
(xi1, ..., xiT ), observed time-invariant characteristics, and interaction terms (notice
that this actually represents a polynomial). This implies a stronger condition than ex-
changeability alone, but it maintains sufficient flexibility to capture (or approximate)
the conditional distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity.
Assumption 3 (Normality) f (ci |·) is a normal density function with variance σ2.
In order to obtain parametric identification, it is necessary to specify a distribution
for the unobserved heterogeneity, hence Assumption 3. However, other distributions
are possible, as long as they have finite moments.9
8The Weierstrass approximation theorem establishes that a function with bounded support can
be uniformly approximated by a polynomial function. Because of exchangeability, this is a sym-
metric polynomial. By the fundamental theorem of symmetric polynomials, it may be written as a
polynomial in the power functions (i.e., the moments). See Altonji and Matzkin (2005, p. 1062).
Other polynomial bases can be used. I use the power functions because they have a more intuitive
interpretation.
9Finite moments are required because expectations are not well defined otherwise.
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Combining assumptions 1, 2, and 3, the unobserved heterogeneity and its density
function can be written as:
ci = ziγ + ηi, ηi ∼ N(0, σ2) (3.5)
f (ci |xi1, ..., xiT ) = N(ziγ, σ2)
Estimation
Imposing Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 to the model in equation 3.2 results in the
following specification:
Prob(yit = 1|xit, ci) = G(α + xitβ + ziγ + ηi), with ηi iid∼ N(0, σ2), (3.6)
where zi is a vector of moments of (xi1, ..., xiT ), observed time-invariant character-
istics, and interaction terms among these; and ηi is a normally distributed random
effect with variance σ2 that is independent of the covariates of the model.10
In principle, the parameters β in equation 3.6 can be estimated via Maximum
Likelihood. The log-Likelihood function for this model is:
log L(β, α, γ, σ) =
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
[yit log(pit) + (1 − yit) log(1 − pit)] (3.7)
with
pit ≡ Prob(yit = 1|xit) =
∞∫
−∞
G(α + xitβ + ziγ + ηi) 1
σ
φ(ηi/σ)dηi, (3.8)
where φ(·) is the standard normal density function.
The model in equation 3.6 represents a flexible specification of a Correlated Random
Effects (CRE) model. It is a CRE-type model as it assumes a specific correlation
form between the unobserved heterogeneity and the covariates in the model (repre-
sented by ziγ). It is flexible because, underAssumptions 1 and 2, it can accommodate
a wide range of correlation forms.
The flexible specification derived from Assumptions 1 and 2 requires the estimation
of additional coefficients (γ). When the number of covariates is small, γ is relatively
low dimensional. However, the dimensionality of γ increases exponentially with
the number of covariates in the model. With three covariates, a simple specification
of zi that includes the time-means of the covariates and up to three-way interactions
10Independence follows from Assumptions 1 and 2, and normality from Assumption 3.
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requires the estimation of 20 additional parameters.11 The same type of specification
with 5 covariates requires the estimation of 56 additional parameters with 10 co-
variates, 286 parameters. Moreover, the inclusion of time-invariant characteristics
exacerbates this problem. However, the assumptions establish that the polynomial
ziγ is sufficient to capture the unobserved heterogeneity, but it does not establish that
all its terms are necessary for this. That is, the underlying unobserved heterogeneity
may have a simpler form that relies only on some of the terms of the polynomial.
For this reason, detecting unnecessary terms in the polynomial and removing them
can produce more efficient estimates of the parameters of interest and simplify the
specification.
To address the dimensionality issue introduced by the flexible specification, I use
a penalized Maximum Likelihood estimation technique. This technique performs
variable selection in an efficient way that avoids computing an infeasible number of
models to choose the one with the better fit. I estimate β using Penalized Flexible
Correlated Random Effects (PF-CRE), which is defined by:
(β̂, α̂, γ̂, σ̂) = arg max
(β,α,γ,σ)
log L(β, α, γ, σ) − Πλ(γ), (3.9)
where Πλ(·) is a penalty function that penalizes only the terms used to model the
unobserved heterogeneity (γ), but not the parameters associated with the observed
covariates (β). I use the Smoothly Clipped Absolute Deviation (SCAD) penalty
(Fan and Li 2001), defined as:
Πλ(γ) =

λ |γ | if |γ | ≤ λ,
− |γ |2−2aλ |γ |+λ22(a−1) if λ < |γ | ≤ aλ,
(a+1)λ2
2 if |γ | > aλ,
(3.10)
where a and λ are constants that govern the penalization. The SCAD penalty shrinks
small values of γ towards zero, while leaving larger values of γ mostly unpenalized.
This way, SCAD selects those terms in zi that are most predictive of the outcome
and discards those that are not. Importantly, the shrinkage introduced by the SCAD
penalty does not affect the coefficients of interest, β, directly since they are left
unpenalized.12
113 time-means, 6 two-way interactions, 10 three-way interactions, and the variance of the random
effect.
12The parameter a in the SCAD penalty is usually set to a = 2.3 (Fan and Li 2001). The parameter
λ can be chosen via cross-validation.
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Asymptotic Properties
The PF-CRE estimator with the SCAD penalty produces consistent, efficient, and
asymptotically normal estimates of the model parameters, β. I state this result in
the following Theorem 1 for easy reference:
Theorem 1 Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3,
√
nT(β̂ − β) d→ N(0, I(β)−1), (3.11)
where I(β) is the Fisher information matrix.
Theorem 1 follows from standard properties ofMaximumLikelihood estimation and
the Oracle property of the SCAD penalty. The Oracle property of SCAD establishes
that the penalized estimator has the same asymptotic distribution as the underlying
(and unknown) data generating process (Ibrahim et al. 2011; Hui, Muller, and
Welsh 2017). Consequently, it has the same asymptotic properties of the Maximum
Likelihood estimator of the data generating process. Consistency, efficiency, and
normality of the PF-CRE estimator thus follow from the properties of Maximum
Likelihood estimators.13
The next result establishes that the PF-CRE estimates of partial effects are also
consistent:
Corollary 1 Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, the partial effects are identified, and
for all x:
P̂E j(x) ≡
∞∫
−∞
g(αˆ + x β̂ + zγ̂ + η) 1
σ̂
φ(η/σ̂)β̂ jdη p−→ PE j(x), j = 1, ..., k,
where g(·) is the probability density function of G(·).
Moreover, √
nT(P̂E j(x) − PE j(x)) d−→ N(0, Σ)
The Oracle properties of SCAD guarantee that zγ̂ is a consistent estimator of zγ.
Corollary 1 follows from this and Theorem 1 by direct application of the continuous
13The asymptotic properties ofMaximumLikelihood estimation hold under a number of regularity
conditions, which the PF-CRE model satisfies.
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mapping theorem.14 Standard errors for the partial effects can be obtained via the
Delta method or bootstrap.
To estimate the partial effects, it is necessary to specify a value of z. In principle,
any value of z is valid for estimating the partial effects. However, a significant
proportion (or all) of the terms in z are functions of x. For this reason, it is advisable
to ensure that the values of x and z used to calculate the partial effects are consistent
with one another to avoid issues similar to those of extreme counterfactuals (King
and Zeng 2006). For example, suppose x represents individuals’ ideology, and z
corresponds to the average ideology of each individual across panel waves. If we
want to estimate the effect of changing x from liberal to very liberal, then the value
of z should also correspond to a liberal (or very liberal) individual. Although using
a value of z corresponding to a very conservative individual is technically correct,
inferences in this case will rely heavily on extrapolation from the model.15
3.3 Relation to Existing Estimators
As previously mentioned, there are three main strategies for the estimation of binary
outcome models with panel data in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity. I
briefly discuss each of them and how they relate to the PF-CRE estimator I develop
in this chapter.16
The first approach is estimation via Fixed Effects (FE), where the cis are treated
as parameters to be estimated. This is operationalized through dummy variables
for each individual in the sample. When the panel is short (small T), this requires
estimating each dummy with a handful of observations, a problem known as the in-
cidental parameters problem (first noted by Neyman and Scott 1948). The incidental
parameters problem implies that estimates from the FE approach are inconsistent
for small T . This asymptotic bias can be substantial. For example, simulations in
Greene (2004) show that with T = 5 this bias can be 40% of the true parameter
value.17,18
14The continuous mapping theorem states that continuous functions are limit-preserving. There-
fore, a continuous function, G(·), of a random variable, (β̂, α̂, γ̂, σ̂), converges in distribution to the
function of the random variables.
15This is because individuals who report being a liberal in a wave, but have generally reported to
be very conservative in other waves, are rare or non-existent.
16See Greene (2015) for a review of the literature on parametric estimation of discrete choice
models.
17In the case of T = 2 Abrevaya (1997), shows that the maximum likelihood estimates of β using
the FE approach converge to 2β. Thus, dividing the FE estimate by 2 results in a consistent estimate
of β. However, the incidental parameters problem persists in the estimation of partial effects.
18The asymptitic bias is of order Op(T−1), meaning that it disappears as T tends to infinity.
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In light of the inconsistency of the FE estimator, bias correction procedures have been
proposed.19 These corrections reduce the bias; however, they do not eliminate it.20
A related strand of literature seeks to ameliorate the incidental parameters problem
(as well as the computational burden of estimating n + k parameters) by assuming
that the individual heterogeneity is in fact group heterogeneity.21 However, these
group fixed-effects estimators also suffer from the incidental parameters problem
(although to a lesser extent) and may not be appropriate for short panels.
The second approach is estimation via Conditional Maximum Likelihood (CMLE),
which results in consistent estimates of β (Rasch 1961; Andersen 1970; Chamberlain
1984). This approach relies on conditioning the estimation only on those individuals
with variation in the outcome across time. By restricting the estimation to these
individuals, the conditional likelihood only depends on β and not the unobserved
heterogeneity ci, avoiding the incidental parameters problem. However, this property
only holds for the logistic distribution.22
TheCMLE approach has twomain shortcomings. First, it does not provide estimates
of the partial effects.23 This is because location parameters are not estimated;
in fact, β is estimated by eliminating the location parameters ci and α from the
likelihood function. The second shortcoming is inefficiency. The CMLE approach
allows the heterogeneity to be completely unrestricted, which implicitly assumes
that individuals with no variation in the outcome provide no information about
β. However, if the heterogeneity has a less general form, conditioning on these
individuals results in a loss of information, and consequently larger standard errors
Monte Carlo evidence in Heckman (1981) suggest that this bias is negligible for a panel of size
T = 8, although more recent studies in Coupe (2005) suggest that a larger size of T = 16 is
preferable.
19See, for example, Fernandez-Val (2009), Fernandez-Val and Vella (2011), Hahn and Newey
(2004), and Dhaene and Jochmans (2015).
20In fact, Dhaene and Jochmans (2015) show that the elimination of the leading term of the bias
leads to larger magnitudes of the higher oder terms of the bias in the bias-corrected estimator.
21See, for example, Bonhomme and Manresa (2015), Ando and Bai (2016), and Su, Shi, and
Phillips (2016). Bonhomme, Lamadon, and Manresa (2017) do not assume group heterogeneity, but
assume that the heterogeneity can be coarsened into groups without significant loss.
22Chamberlain (2010) shows that if the support of the observed predictor variables is bounded,
then identification is only possible in the logistic case. Moreover, if the support is unbounded, the
information bound is zero unless the distribution is logistic. This means that consistent estimation
at the standard asymptotic rates is only possible in the logistic case. For alternative semi-parametric
estimators that require unbounded support, see Manski (1987) and Abrevaya (2000).
23This is also a problem with semi-parametric alternatives to CMLE.
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in the estimates.24,25
The third approach is estimation via Correlated Random Effects (CRE). This ap-
proach requires making explicit assumptions about the unobserved heterogeneity.
The strongest restriction is assuming that the heterogeneity is independent of the
covariates in the model, leading to the Random Effects (RE) model. Mundlak
(1978) proposes to model the unobserved heterogeneity as a linear combination of
the time-means of the covariates and a random effect, which allows for correlation
between the model covariates and the unobserved heterogeneity.26
Themain advantage of CRE is that, by providing an explicit model of the unobserved
heterogeneity, it allows for the estimation of partial effects. However, it does
so at the cost of severely restricting the unobserved heterogeneity with ad-hoc
specifications. When this restriction is not satisfied by the data generating process
(which is unobserved), CREmodels aremisspecified and provide incorrect estimates
of the model parameters and partial effects.
The PF-CRE estimator represents a compromise between the unrestricted unob-
served heterogeneity that FE and CMLE allow for and the restrictive and ad-hoc
assumptions underlying CRE models. I achieve this compromise through the ex-
changeability assumption proposed in Altonji and Matzkin (2005), which leads to
a flexible specification of the unobserved heterogeneity. This flexible specification
can capture a wide range of correlation forms between the unobserved heterogeneity
and the observed covariates in the model.
If the exchangeability assumption holds, the PF-CRE estimator has several advan-
tages relative to the FE and CMLE approaches. Unlike the FE approach, it does
not suffer from the incidental parameters problem. It also allows for the estimation
of probabilities and partial effects, which cannot be done with CMLE. Finally, PF-
CRE also provides more efficient estimates of the model parameters than FE and
24Note that CMLE’s conditioning on those individuals with variation in the outcome can also
introduce errors if this subpopulation behaves differently than the overall population, beyond the
unobserved heterogeneity. However, an implicit assumption in this chapter is that despite the
presence of unobserved heterogeneity, individuals’ behavioral rules are the same. That is, they all
have the same β.
25Note that the FE approach results in the same kind of information loss without discarding
observations outright. The behavior of individuals with no variation in the outcome is fully explained
by the dummy variables corresponding to these individuals. Thus, these individuals do not contribute
to the estimation of the model parameter β (see, for example, Beck and Katz 2001).
26Chamberlain (1980) proposes a more general version of Mundlak’s model, modeling the un-
observed heterogeneity by projecting the time dimension of the model into one dimension. This is
akin to a weighted mean of the covariates across time.
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CMLE. This is because FE and CMLE account for every possible form of correla-
tion between the covariates and the unobserved heterogeneity, even when it is not
necessary. PF-CRE, on the other hand, selects the minimal specification for this
correlation that is necessary to control for the unobserved heterogeneity, leading to
efficiency gains. In other words, FE and CMLE assume there is no information in
cross-sectional variation. PF-CRE allows cross-sectional variation to be informative
of the parameter vector β when the estimated specification is sufficiently sparse (i.e.,
when few γ parameters are non-zero).
3.4 Specification Test
The method outlined in section 3.2 relies on the assumption that the unobserved het-
erogeneity in the data can be appropriately captured through the flexible correlation
specification represented by the zγ terms. This assumption does not necessarily
hold in every application. Therefore, I present a model specification test for one of
the most commonly used models in applied research: the logistic case.
If the correlation between the observed and unobserved components of the model
can be correctly captured by the zγ terms, then the PF-CRE estimator proposed
in this chapter is both consistent and efficient. The Oracle property of the pe-
nalized estimator plays a crucial role here, as it ensures that the penalized model
asymptotically attains the same information bound as the Oracle estimator, which is
efficient.
For the logistic case, the CMLE estimator provides a consistent estimator of the
model parameters. Under the null hypothesis that the unobserved heterogeneity can
be sufficiently captured by the PF-CRE specification, the PF-CRE estimator is both
consistent and efficient, whereas the CMLE estimator is consistent but inefficient.
Under the alternative hypothesis, the PF-CRE estimator is inconsistent, but the
CMLE estimator remains consistent.27 Following Hausman (1978), I construct an
specification test based on the standardized squared difference between these two
estimators. That is, the test statistic is defined as:
δ = d′V(d)−1d, with d = β̂CMLE − β̂PF−CRE, (3.12)
where V(d) is the variance of d.
27The reason the test is restricted to the logistic case is that CMLE is consistent only for the logistic
case. Semi-parametric alternatives to CMLE provide consistent estimates of the model parameters
for any distribution. However, the convergence rates of these estimators is slower than
√
n. For this
reason, asymptotic comparisons with the PF-CRE estimator, which converges at rate
√
n, are not well
defined.
52
Under the null hypothesis, δ is asymptotically distributed χ2 with k degrees of
freedom. This is because both estimators are asymptotically normal with identical
means under the null hypothesis, and therefore their difference d, is asymptotically
normal with mean zero. The χ2(k) distribution follows from δ being the sum of the
squares of k normally distributed terms.
Under the null hypothesis, the variance V(d) has a simple expression due to the
efficiency of the PF-CRE estimator:28
V(d) = V(β̂CMLE ) − V(β̂PF−CRE ). (3.13)
Hence, putting equations 3.12 and 3.13 together:
δ ≡
(
β̂CMLE − β̂PF−CRE
)′ (
V(β̂CMLE ) − V(β̂PF−CRE )
)−1 (
β̂CMLE − β̂PF−CRE
)
.
(3.14)
Thus, when the test statistic δ takes a small value, there is no evidence to reject the
null hypothesis that the PF-CRE estimator of β is consistent and efficient.
3.5 Simulations
I conduct three sets of simulation studies to analyze the performance of the PF-
CRE estimator in small samples and compare it to that of alternative methods. I
use the Oracle estimator as a benchmark for comparison. The Oracle estimator
is the Maximum Likelihood estimate that uses the exact specification of the data
generating process. In the first set of simulations I analyze the of PF-CRE andCMLE
estimates of β relative to the Oracle. In the second set, I compare the estimates of the
Partial Effects (PEs) from PF-CRE, the traditional CRE specification fromMundlak
(1978), an unpenalized version of PF-CRE, denoted by UF-CRE, and a pooled logit
that ignores the unobserved heterogeneity.29 The final set of simulations studies the
specification test for the PF-CRE for different sample sizes.
The data generating process in all simulations is given by:
Prob(yit = 1|xit, ci) = Λ(α + xitβ + ci), with xit ∈ R5, (3.15)
β = (0.7, 1.3,−0.4, 1.2,−0.2), α = 0.2, (3.16)
ci |xi ∼ N(µi, σ2c ),
28Hausman (1978) shows that the variance of the difference between two consistent estimators
when one of them is efficient is the difference of the variances.
29Mundlak (1978)’s specification of CRE uses the time-means of the covariates to model the
unobserved heterogeneity. The UF-CRE uses the same specification as PF-CRE but without the
penalized estimation step.
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where Λ(·) is the logistic cumulative distribution, xit ∼ N(0, I5). For each set of
simulations I use three different correlation forms for the unobserved heterogeneity:
• Sparse Specification:
µi = 0.5xi1 + 0.6xi2 + 1.2xi1x12
• Random Effect Specification:
µi = 0
• Complex Specification:
µi = xi1+xi2+xi3+xi4+xi5+xi1xi2+xi1xi3+xi2xi3+xi2xi4+xi3xi4+xi3xi5+xi4xi5
where xi j denotes the time-mean of xit j , where j denotes the jth variable in xit .
The three data generating processes for the conditional mean of the unobserved
heterogeneity (µi) have several characteristics that make them interesting to study.
The sparse specification represents one of the best case scenarios for PF-CRE. In
this case, the model is relatively simple and should lead to significant efficiency
gains relative to CMLE. Moreover, because the inclusion of an interaction term, the
traditional CRE approach should be biased. Finally, the sparsity of the specification
helps illustrate the gains from the penalization step. The random effect specification
is included to show the performance of the PF-CRE estimator when the only hetero-
geneity present in the data is actually random heterogeneity. Finally, the complex
specification is useful to study the performance of PF-CRE in a case in which the
efficiency gains from the penalization are significantly reduced.
For all simulations T = 2. For the first two sets, n is 1,500, whereas for the
specification test simulations I use an n size of 1,000, 2,000, 3,000, and 4,000. All
results are based on 1,000 draws from the corresponding data generating process.
Parameter Simulations
The DGP in equation 3.15 satisfies the assumptions of both the CMLE and PF-CRE
estimators, and therefore the estimates of β from both of them are consistent. Table
3.1 shows the RMSE of the CMLE and PF-CRE estimates of β relative to the RMSE
of the Oracle estimator. Because both estimators are consistent, the differences in
the relative RMSEsmainly come from the variance of the estimators.30 As expected,
30Both estimators have a small bias in small samples. The simulations show that this bias is
typically smaller for the PF-CRE than the CMLE estimator. See Table 3.A1 in the appendix.
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given that the heterogeneity in the DGP is not completely unrestricted, the CMLE
estimator produces less efficient estimates than the PF-CRE approach. In fact, the
CMLE approach produces RMSEs that are 30% to almost 80% higher than those
of the Oracle, depending on the specification of the unobserved heterogeneity. The
RMSEs of the PF-CRE approach deviate by at most 3% from those of the Oracle.
This illustrates the efficiency gains of this estimator relative to the CMLE estimator,
as well as the Oracle properties of PF-CRE.
Table 3.1: β̂ RMSE relative to RMSE of the Oracle Estimator
Sparse RE Complex
CMLE PF-CRE CMLE PF-CRE CMLE PF-CRE
β1 1.32 1.03 1.72 1.00 1.41 1.00
β2 1.50 1.00 1.70 1.02 1.53 1.00
β3 1.68 1.00 1.74 1.01 1.35 1.00
β4 1.87 1.00 1.78 1.02 1.53 1.00
β5 1.74 1.00 1.81 1.00 1.29 1.00
A value of 1 indicates identical RMSE to the Oracle estimator. Larger (smaller) values indicate a
larger (smaller) RMSE than the Oracle’s
It is important to note that for the more complex model the efficiency gains of
PF-CRE relative to CMLE are smaller relative to the other specifications. This is
to be expected. The more complex the unobserved heterogeneity, the less informa-
tion there is in cross-sectional variation. Therefore, an estimator like CMLE that
discards cross-sectional variation will have a smaller efficiency loss than in simpler
specifications
Partial Effects Simulations
Here I compare the Partial Effects for the DGP in equation 3.15 estimated via the
PF-CRE approach, the traditional CRE approach, the UF-CRE (i.e., the unpenalized
version of PF-CRE), and a pooled logit model.
Table 3.2 shows the RMSE of the four estimators relative to that of the Oracle
estimator for the 5 covariates in the model. Partial effects are calculated for the
mean value of the covariates. The RMSE of the PF-CRE approach is the lowest,
and is at most 3% deviated from that of the Oracle’s. The traditional CRE, in
turn, produces estimates with RMSEs that can be more than 400% higher than the
Oracle’s. This is because the CRE approach includes terms that do not belong
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in the data generating process for the unobserved heterogeneity (as in the Sparse
and RE specifications), while it excludes terms that do belong there (as in the
Sparse and Complex specifications). This leads to both inconsistent and inefficient
estimates. The UF-CRE approach also produces estimates with a RMSE that can
be 35% higher than the Oracle’s. This reflects the inefficiency of the unpenalized
approach, as it includes many more parameters than there are in the DGP in all three
specifications. However, the efficiency loss is smaller for the Complex specification,
as this specification contains more terms. Finally, the pooled logit approach, which
ignores the unobserved heterogeneity producesRMSEs that can be 400%higher than
the Oracle’s. This high RMSE is a consequence of the logit approach completely
ignoring the unobserved heterogeneity. Most of the error in this case comes from
the bias of the logit approach (see Tables 3.A3 and 3.A4 for the bias and standard
deviations of the estimators). The only case in which the pooled logit performs well
is for random effects. This is expected, as the unobserved heterogeneity in this case
is independent of x.
Table 3.2: P̂E RMSE relative to RMSE of the Oracle Estimator
Sparse RE Complex
PF-CRE Logit UF-CRE CRE PF-CRE Logit UF-CRE CRE PF-CRE Logit UF-CRE CRE
β1 1.02 2.40 1.08 3.43 1.00 0.99 1.53 2.37 1.19 2.49 1.28 4.16
β2 1.00 5.05 1.23 5.57 1.00 0.97 1.83 3.37 1.36 1.44 1.53 5.93
β3 1.02 1.23 1.39 2.93 1.00 1.00 1.48 1.86 1.07 6.04 1.11 2.56
β4 1.00 1.86 1.50 6.46 1.00 0.97 1.68 3.04 1.36 1.43 1.52 5.88
β5 1.03 1.02 1.38 1.90 1.00 1.00 1.38 1.48 1.02 5.54 1.03 1.52
A value of 1 indicates identical RMSE to the Oracle estimator. Larger (smaller) values indicate a
larger (smaller) RMSE than the Oracle’s
Specification Test Simulations
Using the same setting as for the previous simulations, I calculate the rejection
rate of the model specification test in equation 3.14 for four different sample sizes
(1,000, 2,000, 3,000, and 4,000) at the 90% and 95% level. For each sample size,
I draw 1,000 samples of the data generating process for the Sparse and Complex
Specifications. Table 3.3 shows that the rejection rate of the (true) null hypothesis
that the PF-CRE estimator is consistent and more efficient than the CMLE estimator
is close to the theoretical 5% and 10% values for the Sparse Specification.
For the Complex Specification of the unobserved heterogeneity, the specification
test tends to over-reject the null hypothesis that the PF-CRE estimator is efficient and
consistent. This implies that the test will provide a conservative recommendations
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when the unobserved heterogeneity is complex. However, this over-rejection rate
approaches theoretical levels with larger sample sizes.
Table 3.3: Simulations: Specification Test
Rejection Rate
Sparse Complex
n 10% 5% 10% 5%
1,000 0.096 0.053 0.133 0.087
2,000 0.094 0.049 0.113 0.065
3,000 0.097 0.048 0.107 0.059
4,000 0.103 0.050 0.106 0.056
Rejection rate calculated as the percentage of p-values smaller than 5% or 10% from 1,000 simula-
tions for each sample size.
Figures 3.A7 and 3.A8 in the appendix show quantile-quantile plots, where the
horizontal axis represents the quantiles from the simulations, and the vertical axis
the quantiles from the theoretical distribution of the test (in this case, a χ2(5)). The
quantile-quantile plots for the Sparse Specification test show that the empirical
quantiles of the test statistic are similar to their theoretical counterparts.31 In the
case of the Complex Specification, the plots show that the specification test tends
to generate larger statistics than it should, but that this tendency diminishes and
disappears for larger samples sizes.
Overall, the simulations show that the PF-CRE estimator produces estimates of the
model parameters that are more efficient than those of the CMLE estimator when the
data generating process for the unobserved heterogeneity satisfies the assumptions
of PF-CRE. In addition, the simulations also illustrate the advantages of the PF-CRE
estimator in the estimation of partial effects. They show that the flexibility of its
specification gives it a significant advantage over the traditional correlated random
effects, and that the penalization step can help to significantly reduce the uncertainty
around the estimated quantities. Finally, the simulations show that the specification
test has rejection rates that are close to theoretical levels.
31Deviations for the larger values are expected as many more simulations would be necessary
for an accurate representation of the tail of the distribution, as larger values occur with very small
probability
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3.6 Application: Tactical Voting in the 2015 U.K. General Election
In elections with more than two candidates, voters often cast tactical votes. That is,
when they believe their most preferred candidate is unlikely to win, they often vote
for a less preferred candidate with chances of winning, if only to prevent their most
disliked one from being elected (Duverger 1954).32
The literature on tactical voting has generally focused on measuring its extent, but
less on why some voters behave tactically while others do not. In this application I
focus on the effect that being contacted by political parties has on voters’ propensity
to cast a tactical vote. The empirical challenge lies in correctly identifying the
effect of party contact itself, independent of the effect of unobserved confounders.
In particular, parties possibly contact the voters that they believe are more likely to
respond to the parties’ message or appeals. However, researchers do not observe how
parties decide which voters to contact. Thus, from the researchers’ point of view,
this constitutes unobserved heterogeneity in voters’ behavior that is also correlated
with the observed covariates (in this case, being contacted by a party).33
To address this challenge, I use a panel data survey collected prior to the 2015
United Kingdom General Election. Controlling for the unobserved heterogeneity
using PF-CRE allowsme to reduce or eliminate the concerns outlined in the previous
paragraph. In particular, the unobserved heterogeneitymodeled byPF-CREcaptures
voters’ overall characteristics and tendencies, which will reflect the fact that parties
choose to contact some voters but not others.
Data and Model Specification
To study the effect of party contact on the probability of casting a tactical vote I
use data from three waves of the British Election Study Online Panel. These data
were collected prior to the 2015 United Kingdom General Election.34 I restrict
the sample to respondents that reported vote intention and party preferences in at
least two waves of the panel. This leaves 3,824 respondents for a total of 10,378
observations. I impute missing values for other variables using the package mice in
32I use the term tactical voting instead of strategic voting, as it is the common denomination used
for this behavior in Britain.
33Ideally, disentangling the effects of party contacts from the fact that parties parties choose
whom to contact can be done by relying on field experiments, in the spirit of Gerber, Green, and
Larimer (2008) for voter turnout. However, while an experimental intervention in a real election
aimed at increasing voter turnout may be relatively uncontroversial, one aimed at altering voters’
choices faces significant moral dilemmas.
34The study covers England, Scotland, and Wales, but excludes Northern Ireland because of its
different party system.
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R (Buuren and Groothuis-Oudshoorn 2011).
The analysis focuses on those voters whose most preferred party is not viable. I
define a party as viable if it finished among the top-two in a given district. I define
voters’ most preferred party in the following way: (1) the party with the highest
thermometer score; (2) if there are ties, these are broken by the thermometer scores
for the leaders of the corresponding parties; (3) if ties remain, then all tied parties
are considered the voters’ most preferred party.35 I defined voters’ most preferred
viable party as the most preferred party from among the viable ones.
The covariates of interest are indicators for whether a voter’s most preferred party
or most preferred viable party contacted the voter during the four weeks prior to
each wave. I also include as dependent variables the thermometer score for the most
preferred andmost preferred viable parties as reported by each respondent, measured
on a scale from 1 to 10. Finally, I include a number of time-invariant characteristics
that serve as control variables in pooled logit estimates and also as additional terms to
model the conditional distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity in the PF-CRE
estimator. Among these, I include employment status, retirement status, student
status, education level, gender, ethnicity, age, and home ownership.
Tomodel the correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity and the covariates of
interest in the PF-CRE estimator, I use the time-means of the covariates of interest,
plus the time-invariant characteristics, and two-way interactions among them, for
a total of 230 terms. Given that I use the logistic distribution in this application,
I compare the coefficient estimates from the PF-CRE estimator with those of the
Conditional Maximum Likelihood estimator (CMLE). While both PF-CRE and
CMLE account for unobserved heterogeneity, only PF-CRE allows for the estimation
of partial effects. Additionally, I estimate a pooled logit that includes the time-
invariant characteristics as controls.36 Despite the inclusion of additional controls,
the logit model does not account for the unobserved heterogeneity. I compare
coefficient and partial effect estimates from the pooled logit and PF-CRE estimator
to show the discrepancies that arise from ignoring the unobserved heterogeneity.
35In these cases, a tactical vote for these voters only occurs when none of their most preferred
parties are viable and they cast a vote for the most liked viable party.
36I do not include a traditional CRE estimator here because the CRE estimator is nested in
PF-CRE.
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Results
Figure 3.1 shows that the coefficient estimates of PF-CREandCMLEare very similar
to one another.37 Indeed, the specification test does not reject the null hypothesis that
PF-CRE is consistent and more efficient than CMLE, with a p-value of 0.29. This
clearly establishes the validity of the PF-CRE approach in this case. Importantly,
PF-CRE allows me to estimate partial effects that CMLE cannot estimate. It is also
clear from Figure 3.1 that the pooled logit model overestimates the effects of being
contacted by the most preferred and most preferred viable parties on the decision to
cast a tactical vote. Estimates for the thermometer scores also show overestimation
by the logistic model.
Figure 3.1: Coefficient Estimates, Tactical Voting 2015 U.K. Election
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The tuning parameter for PF-CRE was obtained through 10-fold cross validation using the Akaike
information criterion. Logit standard errors are clustered by respondent.
Why does pooled logit overestimate the effects of party contacts? In principle,
unobserved heterogeneity is in fact unobserved, and researchers can only speculate
37See Table 3.B1 in the appendix for details with the estimates from the three models.
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as to its sources. In the case of party contacts, it is possible that candidates (and their
campaigns) from viable parties in a given constituency tend to contact supporters
of non-viable parties that they believe are likely to defect their preferred party and
vote tactically. At the same time, candidates from non-viable parties may be more
likely to contact potential defectors from among their supporters as a way to prevent
their number from dropping. This implies that the voters that parties contact are
those who are more likely to cast a tactical vote in the first place. Therefore, when
ignoring the heterogeneity (like the pooled logit does) the coefficient estimates for
party contact capture both the effects of contact itself plus the selection effects just
described.
Accounting for the unobserved heterogeneity, as the PF-CRE estimator does, con-
trols for the selection effect introduced by the way parties choose voters for contact.
This reduces or eliminates the bias introduced by this selection effect, as it captures
voters’ overall characteristics, which are likely related to how parties decide which
voters to contact.
Figure 3.2 presents the partial effects for the pooled logit and PF-CRE estimators.
While the CMLE and PF-CRE coefficient estimates are indistinguishable from one
another, only the PF-CRE estimator provides estimates of probabilities and partial
effects. To calculate the partial effects I use a baseline individual who is a man
between 40 and 50 years of age, who works full time, owns his home outright, and
finished high school, with all other variables set at the median for an individual with
these characteristics.
The PF-CRE estimates show that when the baseline respondent is contacted by his
most preferred party, he is 2.9% less likely to cast a tactical vote for a less preferred
party, suggesting that party contact enforces party loyalty or sincerity in voters.
Logit estimates this quantity at 13.7%, almost five times the effect. Interestingly,
being contacted by the most preferred viable party has a countervailing effect that is
stronger than being contacted by the most preferred party, increasing the probability
of casting a vote for a less preferred party by 6.6%. Logit also overestimates this
effect, in this case at 21.3%.
The results presented here show that unobserved heterogeneity is an important
confounder in the study of tactical voting during the 2015 U.K. General Election.
This is evidenced by the significant overestimation of different effects when the
heterogeneity is ignored. The PF-CRE estimator allows for the estimation of partial
effects when accounting for the unobserved heterogeneity that other estimators
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Figure 3.2: Partial Effects, Tactical Voting 2015 U.K. Election
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Partial effects are calculated for a baseline individual. Baseline values for the conditional mean
equation in PF-CRE were chosen to be consistent with those of the observed characteristics in the
baseline individual. Logit standard errors are clustered by respondent.
cannot, and the results show that parties’ efforts to contact voters during the pre-
election season have significant effects on the probability that voters cast a tactical
vote. These results are important, because they show that parties can benefit from
contacting voters as a way to encourage or discourage them from voting tactically.
3.7 Additional Applications
In this section I present a very brief discussion of two additional applications: the
effect of preferences for immigration and economic fears on voting decisions in the
2016Brexit Referendum in theU.K.; and (2) the effect of ideological preferences and
candidate personality perceptions on vote choice during the 2012 U.S. presidential
election. The goal of this section is to show that the unobserved heterogeneity
matters in these contexts and that PF-CRE provides consistent estimates of the
model parameters. Further details and discussion of both these applications are
available in appendices 3.C and 3.D.
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In the Brexit Referendum case, the outcome of interest is voting in favor of Brexit.
The covariates of interest are preferences against European integration, views on
immigration as it relates to British culture and the economy, and fears of falling into
poverty or unemployment in the coming year. I model the conditional distribution
of the unobserved heterogeneity with a total of 1258 terms (of which 22 are selected
by the penalization term). The specification test for PF-CRE returns a p-value of
0.074, which providesmixed statistical evidence for its validity. However, coefficient
estimates from PF-CRE are similar to those of CMLE, and have smaller standard
errors (see Figure 3.3a). Importantly, pooled logit overestimates some effects and
provides excessively small confidence intervals for other variables.
Figure 3.3: Coefficient Estimates, Additional Applications
(a) Brexit Referendum
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(b) 2012 U.S. Presidential Election
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The tuning parameters for the penalty in the PF-CRE estimator was obtained through 5-fold cross
validation using the Akaike information criterion. Logit standard errors are clustered by respondent.
In the case of the 2012 U.S. Presidential Election, the outcome of interest is voting
for Obama. The covariates are respondents’ ideological distances to Obama and
Romney, and personality evaluations about the candidates. I model the conditional
distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity in PF-CRE with 868 terms. The
specification test supports the PF-CRE specification, with a p-value of 0.97. As
Figure 3.3b shows, this is reflected in the similar coefficient estimates from PF-CRE
and CMLE, with PF-CRE estimates generally having a slightly smaller variance.
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Pooled logit coefficients, on the other hand, overestimate the effects of personality
evaluations and distance to Obama.
Put together, the main application to tactical voting in Britain, plus the two appli-
cations briefly described in this section show that PF-CRE is a valid alternative
to estimating binary outcome models with unobserved heterogeneity. PF-CRE’s
value is two-fold: (1) it provides consistent estimates of the model parameters and
partial effects, which estimators like CMLE cannot estimate, and (2) it provides
more efficient estimates (albeit sometimes only slightly more efficient).
3.8 Conclusion
Unobserved heterogeneity is pervasive in observational studies in political science,
and the social sciences in general. Whatever its origins and form, all unobserved
heterogeneity poses the same problem: if ignored, and correlated with the covariates
of interest, it leads to biased and inconsistent estimates. One of the best ways to deal
with unobserved heterogeneity is to use panel data. However, a standing problem
in the case of binary outcomes (and discrete outcomes generally) is that consistent
estimators of the model parameters do not allow for the estimation of partial effects,
which are usually the quantity of interest to researchers.
In this chapter, I develop the Penalized Flexible Correlated Random Effects (PF-
CRE) estimator for binary outcome models with panel data. PF-CRE provides
consistent and efficient estimates of the model parameters and partial effects. It
relies on adopting a flexible specification for the unobserved heterogeneity that is
complementedwith a penalization step for variable selection. The flexibility requires
imposing weak assumptions on the unobserved heterogeneity, and the penalization
step induces a parsimonious model that results in efficiency gains. Using a model
specification test, I show that these assumptions hold in three different applications
to political behavior.
The PF-CRE estimator has a number of advantages relative to alternative estimators.
Unlike Fixed Effects, it does not suffer from the incidental parameters problem that
leads to inconsistent estimates. PF-CRE allows for the estimation of partial effects
that the Conditional Maximum Likelihood estimator does not provide. Finally, its
assumptions are significantly less restrictive than those of traditional Correlated
Random Effects models, meaning that PF-CRE’s assumptions are more likely to
hold in real world applications.
The main application I provide for the PF-CRE estimator is to tactical voting during
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the 2015 U.K. General Election. I show that ignoring unobserved heterogeneity
leads to overestimation of the effect of being contacted by the most preferred and
most preferred viable parties on the probability of casting a tactical vote, by as much
as a factor of five. The intuition behind this overestimation is that parties possibly
know something about voters, that researchers do not observe, that makes them
more attractive for proselytizing. This makes party contacts correlated with these
unobserved factors, leading to biased estimates.
I also provide two additional applications on electoral behavior, one to vote choice
during the 2012 U.S. Presidential Election, and the other to vote choice during the
2016 Brexit Referendum in the U.K. In both these cases, the assumptions of the
PF-CRE estimator hold, and alternative estimators produce upward or downward
biased estimates of the partial effects of interest. While the validity of PF-CREmust
be determined on a case by case basis, these results suggest that it is feasible in a
number of applications.
PF-CRE can be applied in other areas of social science beyond political behavior. An
area where PF-CRE can be an important contribution is to the study of comparative
political institutions and international relations. In this type of environment, most
of the variation in the data is usually across units; within unit variation is typically
much smaller. For this reason, methods like CMLE and Fixed Effects tend to
discard almost all of the information in the data, leading to mostly statistically
non significant results. The alternative is to ignore unobserved heterogeneity in
these environments, which is also not desirable. The appeal of PF-CRE in these
cases is that, while it accounts for unobserved heterogeneity, it does not discard
all cross-sectional variation in the data. This is accomplished via the penalization
step: if it selects a relatively sparse specification for the unobserved heterogeneity,
a significant portion of cross-sectional variation will still be used to estimate the
parameters of interest and partial effects.
A number of extensions to PF-CRE are possible. The most natural ones are exten-
sions to discrete outcome models other than binary ones. Commonly used multi-
nomial and ordered response models (like Conditional Logit and Ordered Probit)
can incorporate unobserved heterogeneity in the form of correlated random effects
(Wooldridge 2010). However, the penalization step in these cases requires some
refining. As in the binary case, allowing for a flexible specification with a penaliza-
tion step can help these models realistically capture the unobserved heterogeneity,
without leading to inefficient estimates or very restrictive assumptions.
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Another extension is to allow for the model coefficients and the coefficients in the
conditional distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity to vary by individual in the
form of random coefficients. Random coefficients can be powerful tools to capture
unobserved heterogeneity (independent of the covariates). An extension in this
direction can exploit recent developments in penalized estimation of generalized
linear mixed models (see Hui, Muller, and Welsh 2017).
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3.A Additional Figures and Tables from Simulations
Table 3.A1: β̂ Bias relative to true β
Sparse RE Complex
CMLE PF-CRE CMLE PF-CRE CMLE PF-CRE
β1 1.37% −0.60% 0.30% −0.82% 2.76% 0.32%
β2 2.15% −0.22% 1.09% −0.86% 2.40% 0.36%
β3 0.43% −1.30% −0.15% −1.99% 3.63% 1.37%
β4 1.87% −0.50% 1.65% −0.71% 2.66% 0.69%
β5 2.53% −1.11% 0.71% −2.11% 4.64% 1.82%
The quantities in this table are calculated as: (β̂/β − 1) × 100.
Table 3.A2: β̂ Standard Deviation relative to true |β|
Sparse RE Complex
CMLE PF-CRE CMLE PF-CRE CMLE PF-CRE
β1 13.50% 10.50% 13.79% 7.98% 16.66% 11.95%
β2 9.53% 6.51% 9.19% 5.50% 11.22% 7.46%
β3 21.61% 12.81% 21.89% 12.53% 26.32% 19.72%
β4 9.79% 5.31% 9.50% 5.45% 11.72% 7.85%
β5 41.45% 23.72% 41.69% 22.99% 47.81% 37.12%
The quantities in this table are calculated as:
√
V(β̂)/|β | × 100.
Table 3.A3: P̂E Bias relative to true PE
Sparse RE Complex
PF-CRE Logit UF-CRE CRE PF-CRE Logit UF-CRE CRE PF-CRE Logit UF-CRE CRE
β1 −2.48% 23.45% −2.08% −14.89% −1.56% −0.91% −1.34% −3.48% −1.51% 25.36% −1.91% −23.86%
β2 −1.88% −30.81% −1.47% −14.40% −1.65% −1.01% −1.39% −3.39% −1.11% 7.96% −1.44% −23.71%
β3 −2.29% −9.84% −2.01% −14.84% −1.05% −0.39% −1.37% −3.47% −1.73% −108.07% −2.34% −24.28%
β4 −1.45% −8.66% −0.90% −13.84% −1.72% −1.09% −1.12% −3.23% −1.35% 9.04% −1.68% −23.76%
β5 −1.84% −8.41% −1.38% −14.05% −1.50% −0.87% −0.96% −3.06% 0.14% −189.76% −0.31% −22.04%
The quantities in this table are calculated as: (P̂E/PE − 1) × 100.
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Table 3.A4: P̂E Standard Deviation relative to true |PE |
Sparse RE Complex
PF-CRE Logit UF-CRE CRE PF-CRE Logit UF-CRE CRE PF-CRE Logit UF-CRE CRE
β1 10.21% 7.41% 10.92% 31.91% 7.23% 7.30% 11.27% 17.21% 12.53% 7.78% 13.52% 37.32%
β2 5.85% 4.31% 7.46% 31.20% 4.47% 4.48% 8.61% 15.68% 9.97% 7.07% 11.23% 36.82%
β3 12.80% 12.24% 17.65% 34.33% 11.94% 12.03% 17.68% 21.99% 19.14% 11.65% 19.79% 39.23%
β4 5.14% 4.81% 7.96% 31.52% 5.02% 5.03% 8.87% 15.82% 10.03% 5.64% 11.24% 36.84%
β5 24.55% 22.87% 33.08% 43.33% 23.50% 23.63% 32.36% 34.71% 35.13% 24.79% 35.70% 47.70%
The quantities in this table are calculated as:
√
V(P̂E)/|PE | × 100.
Figure 3.A1: β̂ Distributions: PF-CRE v. CMLE, Sparse Specification
β1 β2
β3 β4
β5
Estimator
CMLE
Oracle
PF.CRE
Vertical lines represent the true value of the parameters. The distributions correspond to the estimates
for each parameter and estimator.
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Figure 3.A2: β̂ Distributions: PF-CRE v. CMLE, Random Effect Specification
β1 β2
β3 β4
β5
Estimator
CMLE
Exact
PFCRE
Vertical lines represent the true value of the parameters. The distributions correspond to the estimates
for each parameter and estimator.
Figure 3.A3: β̂ Distributions: PF-CRE v. CMLE, Complex Specification
β1 β2
β3 β4
β5
Estimator
CMLE
Exact
PFCRE
Vertical lines represent the true value of the parameters. The distributions correspond to the estimates
for each parameter and estimator.
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Figure 3.A4: P̂E Distributions, Sparse Specification Specification
PE1 PE2
PE3 PE4
PE5 Estimator
Oracle
PF.CRE
Logit
UF.CRE
CRE
Vertical lines represent the true value of the parameters. The distributions correspond to the estimates
for each parameter and estimator.
Figure 3.A5: P̂E Distributions, Random Effect Specification
PE1 PE2
PE3 PE4
PE5 Estimator
Oracle
PF.CRE
Logit
UF.CRE
CRE
Vertical lines represent the true value of the parameters. The distributions correspond to the estimates
for each parameter and estimator.
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Figure 3.A6: P̂E Distributions, Complex Specification
PE1 PE2
PE3 PE4
PE5 Estimator
Oracle
PF.CRE
Logit
UF.CRE
CRE
Vertical lines represent the true value of the parameters. The distributions correspond to the estimates
for each parameter and estimator.
Figure 3.A7: Specification Test, Quantile-Quantile Plots, Sparse Specification
Observed are the sample quantiles from the simulations. Theoretical are the theoretical quantiles
from a χ2(5). The shaded area represents the 95% theoretical quantile.
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Figure 3.A8: Specification Test, Quantile-Quantile Plots, Complex Specification
Observed are the sample quantiles from the simulations. Theoretical are the theoretical quantiles
from a χ2(5). The shaded area represents the 95% theoretical quantile.
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3.B Additional Figures and Tables from Tactical Voting Application
Table 3.B1: Coefficient Estimates, Tactical Voting 2015 U.K. Election
PF-CRE CMLE Logit
β Low High β Low High β Low High
Contact Preferred -0.33 -0.57 -0.09 -0.32 -0.57 -0.08 -0.90 -1.03 -0.77
Contact Viable 0.65 0.43 0.87 0.71 0.49 0.94 0.94 0.81 1.06
Therm. Preferred -0.17 -0.26 -0.09 -0.18 -0.27 -0.10 -0.50 -0.53 -0.46
Therm. Viable 0.30 0.23 0.37 0.31 0.24 0.38 0.39 0.36 0.43
Controls No No Yes
No γ terms 230 - -
Selected γs 42 - -
n 3,824 3,824 3,824
Effective n 3,824 1,164 3,824
Observations (n × Ti) 10,378 10,378 10,378
Effective Obs. 10,378 3,263 10,378
χ2(4) 4.96 - -100.21
p-value 0.29 - NA
All confidence intervals are at the 95% level. Logit standard errors are clustered at the individual
level. The effective n and effective number of observations refers to the number of actual observations
used in CMLE. There is no χ2 test reported for CMLE since this estimator is the basis for that test.
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3.C Application: Brexit Referendum
During the 2015 British General Election, internal struggles within the Conserva-
tive Party lead Prime Minister David Cameron to promise a referendum on E.U.
membership (Becker, Fetzer, and Novy 2017). In the run up to the Brexit Refer-
endum, held on June 23rd, 2016, many arguments were presented for leaving the
European Union. Some of them had to do with ensuring British independence from
bureaucrats in Brussels or with preventing U.K. taxpayer money from lining up the
Euro-coffers. In fact, the Leave campaign stressed that by leaving the EU, the U.K.
would save £350 million each week.38 Other arguments had to do with immigration
(both from the E.U. and from other countries as a result of E.U. policy) and its effects
on the British economy and culture. Research suggests that hostility towards the
European Union has been fueled by the perception that E.U. membership represents
a cultural threat (McLaren 2002; Curtice 2016; Inglehart and Norris 2016). On the
economic side, voters with fears of losing employment or of their economic well-
being being negatively affected by E.U. policy were expected to be more favorable
towards the U.K. exit from the European Union.39
In this application, I focus on whether fears of falling into poverty or unemployment
affected voters’ decision to support or oppose Brexit. Estimating these effects in a
causal manner is not trivial, however. Notably, these economic fears may be more
prevalent among certain groups of the population that, at the same time, are more (or
less) likely to support Brexit for other reasons, some of which may be unobserved.
Data and Model Specification
I use a panel data survey from the British Election Study Online Panel, collected
prior to the Brexit Referendum. These data allow me to study how changes in
individuals’ economic fears and immigration concerns played out in their referendum
vote decisions.
Themain variables of interest indicate respondents’ beliefs that in the next 12months
they will fall into poverty or unemployment, both on a scale from 1 to 5. I also
include respondents’ overall preferences against European integration, on a scale
from 0 (unite fully with the European Union) to 10 (protect our independence).40
38For an account of the Brexit Referendum campaign, see Shipman (2016).
39There is a relatively large literature that focuses on an utilitarian approach to European integra-
tion. See, for example, Tucker, Pacek, and Berinsky (2002), Brinegar, Jolly, and Kitschelt (2004),
and Garry and Tilley (2015).
40Some respondents were assigned to a different version of this question, on a scale from 0
(unification has already gone too far) to 10 (unification should be pushed further). Results change
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I also include two additional questions about attitudes towards immigration. The
first one measures respondents’ beliefs on whether immigration is good for Britain’s
economy, on a scale from 1 (bad) to 7 (good); the second measures respondents’
beliefs on whether immigration enriches Britain’s cultural life, on a scale from 1
(undermines cultural life) to 7 (enriches cultural life). I also include a number
of time-invariant characteristics: identification as middle or working class, age,
gender, race, education level, employment status, household income, and indicators
for whether the respondent has ever lived abroad, has friends from E.U. countries,
and whether his/her parents were born in a foreign country.
I model the conditional distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity using PF-CRE
with the time-means of the covariates of interest, plus the time-invariant characteris-
tics, and up to three-way interactions among these terms, for a total of 1258 terms. I
compare the estimates from PF-CRE to those of Conditional Maximum Likelihood
(CMLE), a pooled logit estimator that includes the time-invariant characteristics
as controls, and a traditional CRE approach that only uses the time-means of the
covariates to model the conditional distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity.
Results
Table 3.C1 presents the coefficient estimates from the three methods considered.
The coefficient estimates from PF-CRE and CMLE are similar, with PF-CRE having
smaller confidence intervals. The specification test of the null hypothesis that PF-
CRE is consistent and more efficient than CMLE returns a p-value of 0.074, which
implies the validity of PF-CRE, albeit with weak statistical evidence. The pooled
logit, which ignores the unobserved heterogeneity, overestimates some effects, par-
ticularly the coefficient on preferences against European integration. Pooled logit
also estimates a significant effect of believing that immigration enriches Britain’s
cultural life. However, this effect disappears when accounting for the unobserved
heterogeneity as in PF-CRE and CMLE.
The estimates of being at risk of unemployment highlight the efficiency advantage
of PF-CRE relative to CMLE.While PF-CRE and CMLE provide very similar point
estimates, the inefficiency of CMLE would incorrectly lead to the conclusion that
there is no statistically significant effect of fears of unemployment on voting for
Brexit. PF-CRE, one the other hand, shows that this effect is statistically significant.
slightly when using this version of the question. However, qualitative (and to a large extent)
quantitative results remain the same.
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Table 3.C1: Coefficient Estimates for Brexit Referendum
PF-CRE CMLE Logit
β Low High β Low High β Low High
Against Integration 0.66 0.58 0.74 0.64 0.55 0.74 0.81 0.75 0.87
Immigration, Cultural -0.05 -0.17 0.06 -0.07 -0.21 0.07 -0.13 -0.20 -0.07
Immigration, Economic -0.30 -0.44 -0.16 -0.22 -0.38 -0.07 -0.34 -0.42 -0.026
Risk Poverty -0.11 -0.26 0.05 -0.07 -0.25 0.10 0.01 -0.07 0.10
Risk Unemployment 0.15 0.00 0.30 0.12 -0.06 0.30 0.11 0.02 0.19
Controls No No Yes
No γ terms 1258 - -
Selected γs 22 - -
Observations 9,466 9,466 9,466
Effective Obs 9,466 2,175 9,466
χ2(5) 10.04 - 27.50
p-value 0.074 - 0.00
All confidence intervals are at the 95% level. Logit standard errors are clustered at the individual
level. The effective number of observations refers to the number of actual observations used in
estimation for CMLE. There is no χ2 test reported for CMLE since this estimator is the basis for that
test.
Figure 3.C9 presents the partial effects estimated for a baseline individual.41 The
PF-CRE estimates show that an increase in preferences against European integration
are associated with a 2.95% increase in the probability of voting in favor of Brexit;
logit overestimates this effect by 3.73 percentage points. In terms of respondents’
views on immigration, the results show that those who find that immigration is good
for the economy are 1.36 percentage points less likely to support Brexit, whereas
there is no effect on the cultural side. Logit overestimates both these effects, by
1.42 and 0.82 percentage points, respectively. Finally, both estimators show that
respondents who consider themselves at risk of unemployment in the near future are
more likely to support Brexit, by about 0.7 percentage points.
Overall, the results show that accounting for unobserved heterogeneity in the Brexit
context has some important implications for our understanding of voting behavior.
Beyond the overestimation of various effects, there is no evidence that cultural fears
actually drive support for Brexit. On the other hand, even after controlling for
unobserved heterogeneity, the evidence shows that those voters with fears of losing
their jobs in the near future are more likely to support the U.K.’s exit from the
European Union. These results suggest that materialist concerns were the prime
41The baseline individual is a 45 year old white male, who is employed full time and has some
college education. All other variables were set to the average value for an individual with those
characteristics, as observed in the sample.
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Figure 3.C9: Partial Effects from Brexit Referendum
l
lLogit
PF−CRE
−0.10 −0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10
Preference against EU Integration
l
lLogit
PF−CRE
−0.05 −0.02 0.00 0.02 0.05
Immigration is Good for Britain's Economy
l
lLogit
PF−CRE
−0.05 −0.02 0.00 0.02 0.05
Immigration Enriches Britain's Cultural Life
l
lLogit
PF−CRE
−0.05 −0.02 0.00 0.02 0.05
At Risk of Poverty in Next 12 Months
l
lLogit
PF−CRE
−0.05 −0.02 0.00 0.02 0.05
At Risk of Unemployment in Next 12 Months
The tuning parameter for PF-CRE was obtained through 5-fold cross validation using the Akaike
information criterion. Logit standard errors are clustered by respondent. Baseline values for the
conditional mean equation for PF-CRE in partial effects were chosen to be consistent with those of
the observed characteristics of the baseline individual.
drivers of the referendum results, and that values related to Britain’s culture did not
play a significant role.
3.D Application: 2012 U.S. Presidential Election
The study of how voters make choices in elections has generally focused on twomain
axes: (1) ideological preferences, and (2) valence issues. The first axis is typically
represented by the ideological distance between voters and the candidates, usually
measured as part of standard political surveys.42 The second axis is measured in
surveys through questions, or batteries of questions, aimed at determining voters’
opinion on different personal characteristics of the candidates, beyond their political
positions: whether they think the candidates are moral, experienced, care about
regular people, among others.
Unobserved heterogeneity is usually present in observational studies of ideology
42Other focus on particular issue positions, sometimes in combination with overall ideological
positions.
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and valence and how they relate to individuals’ vote choices. Important variables
are not measured, are hard to measure, or are simply not available in the data at
hand. For example, core values, which are hard to accurately capture in surveys, can
be important motivators behind vote choices. The challenge they pose is that they
are generally correlated with voters’ ideological and personality evaluations about
the candidates (Alvarez and Brehm 2002; Feldman 1988). Therefore, ignoring
them leads to biased inferences about these variables. Core values are generally
thought of as fixed, at least in the short and near term (Feldman 1988; McCann
1997).43 Therefore, treating them as unobserved heterogeneity during the course of
an election campaign is an appropriate course of action when they are unobserved
or unmeasured.
Beyond the omitted variable bias, there are other challenges that accounting for
unobserved heterogeneity can help ameliorate in the context of vote choice. For
example, positive evaluations of a candidate are usually associated with a higher
probability of casting a vote for that candidate. However, a voter who has decided to
cast a vote for a given candidate may then begin viewing that candidate’s personality
under a kinder light (even if just to diminish cognitive dissonance). Unobserved
heterogeneity can alleviate this problem by accounting for individuals’ general
tendency to have positive (or negative) views about a candidate; the remaining
variation in the data is more likely to reflect how changes in individuals’ views
about the candidates affect vote choices, than the other way around.
Data and Model Specification
To study the effect of ideological distance and candidate personality evaluations
on vote choice, I use data from three waves (February, June, and October) of The
American Panel Study (TAPS) from the 2012 U.S. Presidential Election. The
outcome of interest is whether a respondent intends to vote for Obama during the
General Election (Romney voters, non-voters, and third party voters are grouped
together for the analysis).
The variables of interest are the ideological distance of each respondent to Obama
and Romney, and individuals’ perceptions about the candidates’ personalities. I
construct ideological distance as the absolute distance between the respondents’ self-
reported ideological position and their perceptions about the candidates’ positions.
Given the well-known problems of differential item functioning, self placements
43Goren (2005) challenges that core values are largely fixed, and posits that they are influenced
by partisan identification.
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Figure 3.D1: Principal Components 2012 Presidential Election
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Principal components of personality evaluations were calculated separately for each candidate. The
evaluations for each candidate consist of 10 items, each ranging from 1 (disagree) to 7 (agree).
were adjusted using the Aldrich-McKelvey rescaling (Aldrich and McKelvey 1977),
as implemented in the basicspace package in R (Poole et al. 2013).
Voters’ perceptions of the candidates’ personalities are based on a battery of 10
questions.44 These evaluations are very highly correlated with each other, and using
them all together in a model introduced more noise than explanatory power (An-
solabehere, Rodden, and Snyder (2008) make a similar argument for the case of
issue positions). For this reason, I simplify the personality evaluations by replacing
them with their first three principal components for each candidate, as additional di-
mensions do not contribute significantly to explaining the variance in each candidate
evaluations (see Figure 3.D1).
To model the conditional distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity in PF-CRE, I
use the time-means of the covariates of interest, plus time-invariant characteristics,
with up to two-way interactions, for a total of 868 terms. The time-invariant
characteristics I include are race, income, year of birth, education, gender, and party
identification from the first wave of the panel.45
44Respondents are asked to rate the following statements for each candidate: He is optimistic, He
is partisan, He is fair, He is a strong leader, He is trustworthy, He is experienced, He is knowledgeable,
He is inspiring, He is decisive, He cares about people like me, He is moral, He has a bad temper.
45Party identification in the TAPS data shows some variation across panel waves for some
individuals. However, I choose to use the responses from the first wave, as subsequent variation is
possibly a reflection of measurement error rather than actual changes in party identification.
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I compare the estimates fromPF-CRE to those ofCMLE, a pooled logit estimator that
includes the time-invariant characteristics as control variables, and a traditional CRE
approach that only uses the time-means of the covariates to model the conditional
distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity.
Results
Table 3.D1 shows the coefficient estimates for the main variables of interest in
the model: ideological distance and the first three components of the candidate
personality evaluations for Obama and Romney. The point estimates for PF-CRE
and CMLE are similar to each other, with PF-CRE estimates generally having a
slightly smaller variance. In fact, the specification test does not reject the null
hypothesis that PF-CRE is consistent and more efficient than CMLE, with a p-
value of 0.97. The pooled logit model, which does not account for the unobserved
heterogeneity, significantly overestimates the effect of ideological distance toObama
by a factor of two. Logit also overestimates the effect of the Obama personality
evaluations on the probability of voting for Obama. These differences highlight the
importance of controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in the estimation of vote
choice.
Figure 3.D2 shows the partial effects estimated from PF-CRE and the pooled logit
estimators. The baseline individual for these partial effects is a 40 years old white
woman, withmedian income, some college education, andwith ideological distances
and personality evaluations at the average for an individual with these demographic
characteristics.
The partial effects fromPF-CRE show that, for the baseline individual, increasing the
ideological distance to Obama is associated with a 12.5 percentage points decrease
in the probability of voting for him. An increase in the ideological distance to
Romney increases the probability of voting for Obama by about 15 percentage
points. Pooled logit, which ignores the unobserved heterogeneity, overestimates
these effects by about 75 and 50 percent, respectively. A similar picture arises
from personality evaluations. PF-CRE estimates that a more positive evaluation
of Obama is associated with a 7.75 percentage points increase in the probability
of voting for him, whereas better personality evaluations of Romney are associated
with a decrease of about 9 percentage point in the probability of voting for Obama.
Pooled logit overestimates these effets by 75 and 25 percent, respectively.
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Table 3.D1: Coefficient Estimates for 2012 U.S. Presidential Election
PF-CRE CMLE Logit
β Low High β Low High β Low High
Distance BO -0.73 -1.18 -0.28 -0.59 -1.06 -0.12 -1.11 -1.44 -0.79
Distance MR 0.92 0.41 1.44 0.82 0.26 1.37 0.96 0.61 1.31
BO Eval, 1st 0.48 0.34 0.62 0.33 0.19 0.47 0.59 0.51 0.67
MR Eval, 1st -0.50 -0.65 -0.36 -0.41 -0.57 -0.25 -0.46 -0.55 -0.36
BO Eval, 2nd -0.25 -0.45 -0.04 -0.23 -0.51 0.05 -0.30 -0.51 -0.08
MR Eval, 2nd 0.19 -0.01 0.39 0.04 -0.22 0.31 0.014 -0.03 0.32
BO Eval, 3rd 0.10 -0.13 0.33 0.18 -0.16 0.53 0.07 -0.12 0.27
MR Eval, 3rd 0.06 -0.17 0.28 0.10 -0.19 0.40 0.00 -0.20 0.20
Controls No No Yes
No γ terms 868 - -
Selected γs 19 - -
Observations 3,825 3,825 3,825
Effective Obs 3,825 2,175 3,825
χ2(8 2.21 - -143.69
p-value 0.97 - NA
All confidence intervals are at the 95% level. Logit standard errors are clustered at the individual
level. The effective number of observations refer to the number of actual observations used in
estimation for CMLE. There is no χ2 test reported for CMLE since this estimator is the basis for that
test.
Discussion
Overall, the partial effects from PF-CRE show that voters’ perceptions of personality
characteristics and ideological distance for both candidates have effects of similar
size. While ideological distance to the candidates is an important predictor of
vote choice, after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, its partial effect is of
comparable size to that of personality evaluations. Furthermore, the partial effects
for ideological distance have a large degree of uncertainty relative to those of
personality evaluations. These results suggest that ideological considerations are
not the dominant axis along which vote intentions move, at least within the time-
frame of an election year. Instead, candidate personality evaluations are of similar
importance, and have a stronger statistical association with vote choice.
The difference between pooled logit and PF-CRE estimates of the partial effects for
ideological distance and personality evaluations point to two related conclusions,
one methodological and the other substantive. On the methodological side, this
difference is illustrative of the perils of ignoring unobserved heterogeneity. As the
pooled logit shows, this leads to partial effects that can be twice as large as those of
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Figure 3.D2: Partial Effects from 2012 U.S. Presidential Election
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The tuning parameter was obtained through 10-fold cross validation using the Akaike information
criterion. Logit standard errors are clustered by respondent. Baseline values for the conditional
distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity in the partial effects where chosen to be consistent with
those of the observed characteristics of the baseline individual.
a model that controls for the unobserved heterogeneity. On the substantive side, the
smaller partial effects of the PF-CRE model, and specifically those for ideological
distance, are possibly an indication of the effects of political polarization, as they
point to choices that are weakly responsive to changes in voters’ perceptions to
ideology during the campaign than would otherwise be expected.
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C h a p t e r 4
ENCOURAGING LOYALTY AND DEFECTION: THE EFFECT
OF PARTY CAMPAIGNS ON TACTICAL VOTING IN BRITAIN
4.1 Introduction
In winner-take-all electoral systems, voters are often faced with the situation that
their most preferred candidate is unlikely to carry the seat. In elections with more
than two candidates voters facing this situation often decide to cast a tactical vote
for a less preferred candidate with chances of winning, if only to prevent their most
disliked candidate from being elected (Duverger 1954).1
There is a large empirical literature on tactical voting that has generally focused on
measuring the extent to which it occurs. Evidence from a variety of countries and
electoral systems shows that around 15 to 40 percent of voters who are in a position
to cast a tactical vote actually decide to do so (see Alvarez, Kiewiet, and Núñez
(2018) for a review on this subject).2 In British elections this figure is typically
estimated at around 30 to 40 percent (Alvarez, Boehmke, and Nagler 2006; Kiewiet
2013). These levels of tactical voting can have important consequences for overall
electoral outcomes. For example, Kiewiet (2013) finds that as many as one in five
Labour seats in Westminster are won thanks to tactical votes by Liberal Democrat
supporters.
Perhaps because of the challenges in measuring the extent of tactical voting, the
literature has focused significantly less on why some voters behave tactically while
others do not. Althoughmany important correlates of tactical voting have been found
(see Section 4.2 below), they typically relate to demographic characteristics of the
voters or to electoral circumstances. However, these correlates are generally non-
actionable; that is, they are not variables that an electoral participant can modify (at
least within the time frame of a campaign) so as to encourage or discourage tactical
voting behavior. Therefore, our understanding of tactical voting remains limited.
In this chapter, I estimate the effect that being contacted by political parties has on
voters’ propensity to cast a tactical vote. This is an actionable (potential) correlate,
1What I call tactical voting in this paper has also been referred to as strategic voting.
2Voters in a position to cast a tactical vote are those voters whose most preferred party is
considered to be out of the race.
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because parties can decide whether to contact voters during the electoral campaign.
The empirical challenge lies in correctly identifying the effect of party contact
itself, independent of the effect of unobserved confounders. The worry is that
parties contact the voters that they believe are more likely to respond to the parties’
message or appeals. However, researchers do not observe how parties decide which
voters to contact. Thus, from a researcher’s point of view, this is unobserved
heterogeneity in voters’ behavior that is also correlated with the observed covariates
(in this case, being contacted by a party).3
To address this estimation challenge, I use a panel data survey collected prior to
the 2015 and 2017 United Kingdom General Elections. The use of panel data with
multiple measurements of vote intention and indicators of contact by the different
political parties allows me to significantly reduce or eliminate the concerns outlined
in the previous paragraph. In particular, panel data estimators can control for
unobserved heterogeneity to the extent that it is constant in time (at least within the
time-frame of the study). In that sense, this unobserved heterogeneity will capture
voters’ overall characteristics and tendencies, which are likely closely related to the
information that parties use to decide which voters they want to contact. While
there are several methods that can be used to estimate panel data models with
unobserved heterogeneity, in this chapter I use the Penalized Flexible Correlated
Random Effects (PF-CRE) developed in Chapter 3. This estimator allows me to
control for unobserved heterogeneity in this context, while at the same time yields
consistent estimates of partial effects and predicted probabilities.
My findings show that in 2017 voters who are contacted by their most preferred
party are 7.02 percentage points less likely to cast a tactical vote in 2017, indicating
that party contacts can enforce loyalty and sincerity at the polling booth. However,
being contacted by the most preferred viable party increases the probability of
a tactical vote by 13.41 percentage points. These quantities stand at 2.75 and
7.03 percentage points in 2015, respectively. I also show, through counterfactual
exercises, the effect that party contacts had on Parliamentary seats through tactical
voting. Among other things, I find that if non-viable parties in each constituency
gave up contacting their supporters, the Conservative party would have obtained
a narrow majority following the 2017 General Election; instead, the Conservative
3Ideally, disentangling the effects of party contacts from that of parties choosing whom to contact
could be done by relying on field experiments, in the spirit of Gerber, Green, and Larimer (2008)
for voter turnout. However, while an experimental intervention in a real election aimed at increasing
voter turnout may be relatively uncontroversial, one aimed at altering voters’ choices faces significant
moral dilemmas.
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party formed minority government following a confidence and supply agreement
with the Democratic Unionist Party from Northern Ireland.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 I discuss related
literature; in Section 4.3 I describe the 2015 and 2017 election data and the method-
ology used for estimation; in Section 4.4 I present the main estimation results; in
Section 4.5 I present and develop counterfactual estimates of electoral outcomes
under different contact behavior by the parties; and Section 4.6 concludes
4.2 Related Literature
Asmentioned in the introduction to this chapter, despite the attention that measuring
tactical voting has received by empirical researchers, there is less understanding on
why andwhen some voters cast tactical votes when given the opportunity to do so. In
particular, the determinants identified by the literature do not providewith actionable
recommendations. However, it is worthwhile to review these determinants. The
variables that the literature has found to be associated with tactical voting can be
grouped in two categories: those that relate to the individual voter, and those that
relate to the electoral environment.
Among the individual voter characteristics the literature has found that voters that
have strong partisan or ideological attachments are significantly less likely than
others to cast a tactical vote (Blais 2002; Lanoue andBowler 1992; Karp et al. 2002).4
There is also evidence that voters’ political sophistication and political knowledge
(sometimes proxied by education levels) are positively associatedwith tactical voting
(Alvarez, Boehmke, and Nagler 2006; Gschwend and van der Kolk 2006; Karp et
al. 2002). There is also evidence that when voters are experienced with the electoral
system they are more likely to exploit it and vote tactically (Spenkuch 2017; Duch
and Palmer 2002), and that voters who believe the media influences the voting
decisions of others are more likely to behave tactically (Cohen and Tsfati 2009).
Among the electoral environment variables, theoretical models put particular em-
phasis on the closeness of the election (see, for example Cox 1997). That is, when
the race between the top-two contenders is considered to be close, it is expected that
third party supporters will be more likely to vote tactically, as a defection from their
most preferred party is more likely to be pivotal. Empirical results tend to support
this theoretical expectation, albeit weakly (Lanoue and Bowler 1992; Fisher 2000;
4Similar effects have been found in the study of split ticket voting in the U.S. (Burden and
Kimball 1998; Beck et al. 1992).
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Kiewiet 2013; Elff 2014; Núñez 2016). The empirical literature has also found that
the presence of a viable close ideological substitute to a non-viable preferred party
encourages tactical voting (Karp et al. 2002), and that the presence of an incumbent
politicians interferes with the decision to cast a tactical vote (Moser and Scheiner
2005).5
This paper is also related to the literature that studies campaign effectiveness. Ex-
perimental evidence from the United States shows that citizens are responsive to
efforts aimed at getting them out to vote (see, for example, Gerber, Green, and
Larimer 2008; Arceneaux and Nickerson 2009). Studies based on observational
data have also found this positive effect (see, for example, Geys 2006; Karp, Ban-
ducci, and Bowler 2008). There is a substantial literature on British elections that
studies the effects of local campaigning (like canvassing and other methods). While
the ‘received wisdom’ prior to the early 1990s was that that constituency campaigns
were made irrelevant by the advent of mass national media, more recent research
has found that parties benefit electorally from more organized and intense local
campaigning, both in terms of mobilization (Clarke et al. 2004; 2009; Cutts 2014;
Fieldhouse et al. 2011; Whiteley and Seyd 1994, and references therein) and in
terms of their vote share (Fieldhouse et al. 2011; Fieldhouse et al. 2015; Pattie and
Johnston 2003; Johnston et al. 2013, and references therein).
A significant portion of the literature on campaign effectiveness in the United King-
dom focuses on aggregate data at the constituency level, e.g., the effect of con-
stituency campaign spending (or other measures of campaign intensity) on turnout
and parties’ vote shares. A smaller portion of the literature focuses on analyses at
the individual voter level, and is closer to the study in this chapter. For example,
Pattie and Johnston (2003) use data from the 1997 British Election Study (BES) and
find that door-step canvassing has an impact on respondents’ vote choices, but that
telephone contacts do not. Denver, Hands, andMacAllister (2004) use data from the
1992, 1997, and 2001 BES on respondents’ turnout and find that campaign intensity
at the constituency level increases turnout by those voters, and that individuals that
were contacted by the parties were more likely to turn out to vote. However, these
studies suffer from the problem that partiesmay bemore likely to contact those voters
who are already more likely to turn out to vote and vote for their party. Fieldhouse
et al. (2011) partially resolve this issue using data from the 2010 BES. They use the
5Of course the most important electoral environment consideration is the electoral system. I
avoid discussion of it here because of the focus on the First-Past-The-Post electoral system used in
Britain.
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pre-election wave to identify those respondents who initially declared themselves
to be undecided. With this subsample, they study whether voters contacted by the
different campaigns were more or less likely to support the Conservatives, Labour,
or the Liberal Democrats. They find strong campaign contact effects in all cases.
A notable exception that deals with the problem of parties selecting which voters
to contact is Whiteley and Seyd (2003). They study respondents’ intention to turn
out to vote and vote choice. Importantly, they are able to control for respondents’
self-reported willingness to turn out and vote derived from an earlier panel wave.
This way, their estimates of party campaign efforts are teased out from parties’
mobilization efforts. Their findings show substantially smaller effects than those
found in the rest of the literature. In particular, they find that canvassing face to face
for the Labour party increased the probability of voting for Labour by 6%, whereas
canvassing by phone increased it by 5%. These effects are in line with the ones
found in this paper on the effect of party contacts on tactical voting for the 2015 and
2017 General Elections.
4.3 Data and Methodology
Data
To study the effect of party contacts on the probability of casting a tactical vote, I
use data from six waves of the British Election Study (BES) Online Panel. The first
three waves apply to the 2015 General Election, while the others cover the run-up to
the 2017 General Election.6 I restrict the sample to respondents that reported vote
intention and party preferences in at least two of the waves for each election.
The analysis focuses on those voters whose most preferred party is not viable (i.e.,
those voters in a position to cast a tactical vote). I define a party as viable if it finished
among the top-two contenders in a given district in the corresponding election.7 To
define the outcome of interest, it is first necessary to define voters’ preferences. To
6The study covers England, Scotland, and Wales, but excludes Northern Ireland because of its
different party system.
7This leaves a total of 3,824 individuals in the 2015 sample, and 4,744 individuals in the 2017
sample. Note that there are alternative ways to define party viability. For example, the BES data
includes questions that asks respondents to gauge the probability that a given party wins in their
constituency. However, using this data involves several challenges. First, probabilities do not sum
up to one (in many cases they add up to more than 4). Second, this question is not answered by
all respondents, limiting the sample in potentially biased ways. Finally, this question is only asked
in two waves, thus limiting the sample further. Another alternative is to use the results of the prior
election, as research has shown that voters tend to follow an election history heuristic (Lago 2008).
However, given the strong wins by the SNP in Scotland in 2015 and the strong performance of UKIP
in England, prior election results may not be good measures of viability in this study.
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do this, I define a voter’s most preferred party in the following way: (1) the party
with the highest feeling thermometer score; (2) if the are ties, these are broken by
the thermometer score of the party leaders; and (3) remaining ties are kept and all
tied parties are considered as the most preferred parties for those voters. I also
define voters’ most preferred viable party as the most preferred party from among
the viable ones (ties are dealt with in the same manner as for the most preferred
party).
With these variables in hand, tactical voting is defined as occurring if voters cast a
vote for the most preferred viable party, and as not occurring otherwise.8 The main
covariates of interest are two indicators for whether a voter’s most preferred party or
most preferred viable party contacted the voter during the four weeks prior to each
election wave. I also include as independent variables the thermometer score for the
most preferred and most preferred viable parties, as reported by each respondent,
measured on a scale from 1 to 10. Finally, I include a number of time-invariant
characteristics: respondents’ labor force status (5 categories), education level (5
categories), ethnicity (5 categories), gender (2 categories), and home ownership (3
categories).
Methodology
The empirical challenge in estimating the effect of party contacts on the probability
that a voter casts a tactical vote lies in the fact that parties will tend to contact voters
they think will be more likely to be swayed. In terms of tactical voting, parties
have strong incentives to try to contact those voters who might defect their preferred
party when it is considered to be out of the race. In that case, a simple model that
estimates the probability of a tactical vote as a function of contact indicators will
be upward biased: parties do not contact voters at random, but are instead more
likely to seek out potential defectors. Figure 4.1a represents the source of this bias
graphically.
Without knowledge of how parties choose which voters to contact, it is not possible
to directly control for this confounder. However, the panel structure of the BES data
allows me to account for individual level heterogeneity. To the extent that who is a
potential defector does not vary significantly across the survey waves and parties’
contact strategies remain relatively stable, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity
removes the bias introduced by the way parties decide to contact voters. While the
8Votes cast for neither the most preferred nor the most preferred viable party are considered to
be non-tactical.
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Figure 4.1: Estimation Challenge
(a) Naive Estimation: Biased
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TacticalContact
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zγ
A tactical vote is affected by contact from the parties (the effect of interest β), but also by who are
potential defectors, which is unobserved; the correlation between potential defectors and contact by
parties introduces the bias in estimating β. zγ accounts for this correlation and eliminates this bias
in PF-CRE.
first condition is not testable, it is unlikely that in the short term voters will change
their tendencies strongly.9 The second condition, that parties’ contact strategies do
not vary significantly over the period of analysis, is testable. In Appendix 4.B, I
show that the types of voters that parties contact throughout the waves considered in
this study have almost exactly the same observable characteristics, suggesting that
there is no change in parties’ contact strategies.10
The model I estimate, therefore, considers the probability of casting a tactical vote
as a function of the covariates of interest and the unobserved heterogeneity:
P(yit = 1) = Λ(α + β1CMPit + β2CMPVit + Controlsit + ci), (4.1)
where yit indicates whether respondent i intends to cast a tactical vote at wave t;
CMPit indicates whether i’s most preferred party contacted her in the four weeks
prior to wave t; CMPVit indicates the same thing for i’s most preferred viable party;
Controlsit are i’s thermometer ratings for the most preferred and most preferred
9A voter who is extremely averse to casting a tactical vote, will probably remain very averse
throughout the entire period covered by the survey.
10Voters contacted and not contacted could differ in their unobservable characteristics. However,
it is unlikely that these unobservables are fully independent of the observables. Therefore, finding
no significant differences in voters’ observed characteristics provides reasonable evidence that they
do not differ in the unobservable ones.
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viable parties; ci represents the unobserved heterogeneity; andΛ(·) is the cumulative
logistic distribution.
As is well known in the literature (see Chapter 3), estimating binary outcome
models with unobserved heterogeneity either requires restricting the form of the
unobserved heterogeneity or forgoing the estimation of probabilities and partial
effects. In this chapter, I apply the Penalized Flexible Correlated Random Effects
(PF-CRE) developed in Chapter 3, which imposes mild restrictions on the form of
the unobserved heterogeneity while at the same time allowing for the estimation of
probabilities and partial effects. Estimating these probabilities is key for Section
4.5, where I conduct several counterfactual analyses.
Using PF-CRE, I account for the correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity
and the covariates of interest by explicitly modeling the unobserved heterogeneity
with a flexible polynomial form, denoted by zγ in Figure 4.1b, where z represents
the polynomial terms and γ their coefficients. By accounting for this correlation,
the polynomial allows for the consistent estimation of β, as it accounts for the fact
that parties may target voters who are already potential defectors. This polynomial
is composed of the moments of the covariates for each individual11 as well as the
observed time-invariant characteristics. Given that this polynomial is composed
of a very large number of terms, PF-CRE estimates the model parameters using a
penalized maximum likelihood approach that reduces its dimensionality in order
to achieve efficiency (see Chapter 3). That is, PF-CRE estimates β by penalized
maximum likelihood on:
P(yit = 1) = Λ(α + β1CMPit + β2CMPVit + Controlsit + ziγ). (4.2)
With estimates of the parameters in equation 4.2, partial effects can be readily
obtained.
4.4 Estimation Results
Naive Estimation
Before presenting the estimates that control for unobserved heterogeneity, it is useful
to discuss naive estimates. The first naive estimates are based on simple differences
from cross-tabulations. Table 4.1 shows that in 2017 those voters contacted by their
most preferred party were 31.55 percentage points less likely to cast a tactical vote
than those who were not. In turn, those voters who were contacted by the most
11For example, in how many waves of the panel was individual i contacted by her most preferred
party.
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preferred viable party were 16.53 percentage points more likely than those who
were not contacted, according to this simple measure. For 2015, these figures stand
at -13.29 and 12.41 percentage points.
Table 4.1: Naive Estimation
Variable Technique 2015 2017
Contact MP Difference -13.29% -31.55%Logit -17.61% -33.54%
Contact MPV Difference 12.41% 16.53%Logit 19.52% 22.58%
Difference refers to the difference in tactical voting among those contacted and not contacted by the
corresponding party. Logit refers to the average partial effects for the corresponding party contact.
For details in the logit estimation see Table 4.A1 in the Appendix.
The second naive estimate is based on a pooled logit model of tactical voting as a
function of contact indicators and demographic controls.12 The logit model gener-
ally estimates slightly larger effects of contact by the parties than simple differences.
For example, for 2015 it estimates that contact by the most preferred party dimin-
ishes the chances of tactical voting by 17.61 percentage points, whereas contact by
the most preferred viable party increases these chances by 19.52 percentage points.
It is noteworthy that these estimated effects are quite large, substantively. However,
as mentioned in the previous section, all these estimates potentially suffer from
upward bias. This is because parties are likely to contact those voters whom they
believe are more likely to sway their intended way. The next subsection presents
estimates that account for this selection effect.
Accounting for Unobserved Heterogeneity
Before proceeding to the presentation of the results proper, it is necessary to de-
termine whether the PF-CRE approach can be validly applied to the data at hand.
Table 4.2 shows the result of the specification test for PF-CRE, for both the 2015
and 2017 samples.13 In both cases, the PF-CRE specification is not rejected, and
therefore PF-CRE provides consistent and efficient estimates of the parameters and
partial effects for both years.
12See Table 4.A1 in the Appendix for more information.
13See Chapter 3 for more details on the test.
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Table 4.2: PF-CRE Specification Test
χ2 p-value
2015 0.87 0.93
2017 1.64 0.80
Figure 4.2 presents the parameter estimates obtained through PF-CRE for the 2015
and 2017 U.K. General Elections.14 The results show that voters who are contacted
by their most preferred viable are more likely to defect their preferred party and
vote tactically. On the other hand, voters contacted by their most preferred party are
encouraged to remain loyal, thus reducing the chance that they will cast a tactical
vote. Importantly, the degree of tactical voting depends on the extent to which voters
like their most preferred and most preferred viable party. The more a voter prefers
its most preferred party, the less likely she is to cast a tactical vote; the more she
prefers the viable party, the more likely she is to vote tactically.15
Figure 4.3 shows the partial effects for 2015 and 2017 calculated for a baseline
individual.16 The results show that a 1 point increase in the feeling thermometer
for the most preferred viable party increases the probability that this voter casts a
tactical vote by 2.99 and 1.80 percentage points in 2015 and 2017, respectively.
In turn, a 1 point increase in the feeling thermometer for the most preferred party
is associated with a decrease in the probability of a tactical vote of 1.59 and 4.09
percentage points for 2015 and 2017, respectively. In terms of the main variables
of interest, when the baseline voter is contacted by his most preferred viable party
he is 7.03 and 13.41 percentage points more likely to cast a tactical vote in 2015
and 2017, respectively. On the other hand, being contacted by his most preferred
party reduces the probability that he casts a tactical vote by 2.75 and 7.02 percentage
points in 2015 and 2017, respectively.17
14See Table 4.A2 in the Appendix for additional information.
15Note that voters who are more favorable to their most preferred viable party still have higher
ratings for the most preferred party.
16The baseline individual is a man between 40 and 50 years of age who works full time, owns his
home outright, and has secondary education. The values of all other variables are set at the median
for an individual with these characteristics. I construct the baseline this way, as it helps ensure that the
baseline individual is realistic and, therefore, extrapolation from the model is reduced. Figure 4.A1
presents estimates of the average partial effects, which are in line with the partial effects presented
here.
17Note that these differences between the most preferred and most preferred viable parties are not
an artifact of the baseline individual used for estimation. Figure 4.A1 in the appendix presents the
average partial effects, with an almost identical pattern.
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Figure 4.2: Coefficient Estimates
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l l2015 2017
The tuning parameter was obtained through 10-fold cross validation using the Akaike information
criterion. MP refers to the most preferred party, and MPV the most preferred viable party.
These results point to two interesting differences. The first is that contact by the
most preferred and most preferred parties have asymmetric effects. That is, contact
by the most preferred party (which in this analysis is always out of the race) has
a smaller effect on voter behavior than contact by the most preferred viable party.
This result is quite intuitive: it is harder to convince a voter to waste his or her vote,
than it is to vote for a less preferred alternative that might actually alter the outcome
of the election. The second difference is between the 2015 and 2017 estimates. In
particular, in 2017 parties were more effective at changing voters’ behavior when
contacting them than they were in 2015. Further research can explore the reasons
behind these different magnitudes between the 2015 and 2017 estimates.
The PF-CRE estimates of the effect of party contacts on tactical voting presented
here are less than half the size of those obtained with naive estimation. These large
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Figure 4.3: Partial Effects Estimates
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
Contact MP
Contact MPV
Therm MP
Therm MPV
−0.10 −0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15
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The tuning parameter was obtained through 10-fold cross validation using the Akaike information
criterion. The baseline individual is a male between 40 and 50 years of age who works full time,
owns his home outright and has secondary education. The values of all other variables are set at the
median for an individual with these characteristics.
differences are strongly suggestive of the magnitude of the selection effect. Parties
in the U.K. are generally contacting those voters who will give them the highest
rewards. That is, parties that are out of the race are generally contacting those voters
they might persuade not to defect, whereas parties who are viable manage to contact
potential defectors to sway them their way. The naive estimates ignore these facts,
instead suggesting that party contacts are extraordinarily effective at influencing
voting decisions. In reality, however, party contacts provide moderate influences to
voter behavior.
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4.5 Counterfactuals
To gain better insights into the magnitude of the effects of party contacts on tactical
voting, I conduct two counterfactual studies:
Counterfactual A Viable parties in each constituency contact none of the
voters whose most preferred party is out of the race
Counterfactual B Non-viable parties in each constituency contact none of
the voters whose most preferred party is out of the race
Note that these counterfactuals are only partial counterfactuals: for example, the
change in behavior of the non-viable parties in Counterfactual B is assumed not to
generate an optimal change in behavior from the viable parties in response. That is,
these counterfactuals are not the result of the equilibrium of a game. However, they
are intended to measure the magnitude and direction of the incentives that parties
face in such a strategic interaction.
For both counterfactuals, the baseline is the predicted voter behavior using parties’
contacts as observed in the data. For Counterfactual A, I set the contact indicator for
viable parties to zero for all voters; then, I use the model to predict voter behavior
as with the baseline. For Counterfactual B, I set the contact indicator from the
non-viable parties in each constituency to zero for all voters and then use the model
to predict voter behavior. All other variables remain at their observed quantities for
every respondent.
Table 4.3: Counterfactuals
Counterfactual A Counterfactual B
Year Effect L U Effect L U
2015 -2.70 -3.51 -2.27 1.04 0.11 1.53
2017 -3.88 -4.47 -3.16 1.45 0.75 2.04
95% confidence intervals are calculated by bootstrap from the distribution of the PF-CRE estimates
for the corresponding year.
Table 4.3 presents the aggregate outcome of these counterfactuals. For 2015, if
viable parties gave up on contacting those voters whose most preferred party was
out of the race, tactical voting would have decreased by 2.70 percentage points. On
the other hand, if non-viable parties had given up contact, tactical voting would
have increased by about 1.04 percentage points. For 2017, the effects are somewhat
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larger, with tactical voting decreasing by 3.88 percentage points if the viable parties
gave up contacting these voters, and an increase in tactical voting of 1.45 percentage
points if the non-viable parties did.
Changes in Number of Parliamentary Seats
To have a better picture of the effect that party contacts has on tactical voting, and in
turn, on overall election results, I study the distribution of seats in Westminster that
would occur under both counterfactuals (relative to the observed voter behavior).
To obtain the distribution of seats in Westminster based on the survey data I use
Multilevel Regression and Poststratification, or MRP (Park, Gelman, and Bafumi
2004). MRP models individual survey vote intentions as a function of demographic
and constituency predictors, partially pooling respondents across constituencies to
an extent determined by the data. Then, predicted outcomes from the model for each
demographic-constituency group are poststratified by the percentages of each type
in the actual constituency populations. This provides an estimate of each party’s
support in each constituency, from where a predicted winner can be derived. More
details about the specific MRP procedure I use can be found in Appendix 4.C.
To estimate the Multilevel Regression model, I use the full sample from the final
waves for the 2015 and 2017 elections; that is, the sample that includes all voters,
not only the voters who are in a position to cast a tactical vote. The baseline seats per
party are obtained through MRP from the actual survey responses.18 The seats per
party in each counterfactual are obtained by estimating the MRP model on survey
responses that were modified in accordance with each counterfactual. That is, for
Counterfactual A, I simulate individuals’ vote intention if the viable parties contact
none of the voters whose most preferred party is out of the race; and similarly for
Counterfactual B.
Table 4.4a shows the baseline and Counterfactual A predicted number of seats in
2015. When viable parties contact none of the voters whose most preferred party
is out of the race, a total of 11 seats in Parliament change hands: the Conservative
party loses 3 seats to Labour, but in turn gains 6 seats from Labour and 1 from
UKIP, for a net gain of 4 seats; and the Liberal Democrats gain one seat in Scotland
18Please note that the baseline seats per party obtained through MRP do not match exactly the
seats that each party won in the election. In particular, for 2015 the MRP model predicts one
additional seat for UKIP and one less seat for the Labour party than the actual election results. For
2017, MRP predicts 4 additional seats for the SNP and 4 less seats for the Conservative party than
the actual election results, all in Scotland.
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from the SNP.
The results for Counterfactual B for 2015 are presented in Table 4.4b. In this case,
the Conservative party loses 3 seats to Labour, but gains 4 from Labour and 1 from
UKIP, for a net gain of 2; while the Liberal Democrats get 1 seat from the SNP.
Table 4.5a presents the results for Counterfactual A in 2017. The results show that
when viable parties give up contacting voters whose most preferred party is out of
the race, the Conservative party would have lost 4 seats to Labour, but won 4 seats
from Labour and 3 from th Liberal Democrats, for a net gain of 3 seats. The Labour
party, in addition to gaining and losing 4 seats from the Conservatives, would have
won 2 seats from the SNP but lost 1 other to the SNP as well, for a net gain of
1 seat. The SNP instead, would have lost 2 seats to Labour, but won 2 from the
Conservatives, 1 from Labour, and 2 from the Liberal Democrats, for a net gain of
3 seats.
Finally, Table 4.5b shows what would have happened if the non viable parties gave
up contacting their supporters in constituencies where they are out of the race in
2017. In that case, the Conservative party would have gained 6 seats from Labour
and 5 from the Liberal Democrats, only losing a seat to the SNP, for a net gain of
10 seats. The Scottish Nationalist Party instead, would have lost 1 seat to Labour,
but won 1 seat from the Conservatives and another one from Labour, for a net gain
of 1 seat.
Overall, the results show that a number of seats change hands because parties’
campaign efforts influence tactical voting behavior. As noted before, for 2015
11 seats change hands under Counterfactual A and 9 under Counterfactual B. For
2017, 18 seats change hands in Counterfactual A and 14 in Counterfactual B. These
changes can be substantively important. For example, under Counterfactual B in
2017, the Conservative party would have had a net gain of 10 Westminster seats,
which would have given the Conservative party a narrow majority in Parliament
(of 1 seat), transforming the second May ministry from a minority to a majority
government, without the need to rely on confidence and supply votes from the
Democratic Unionist Party from Northern Ireland.19
19In practice, because of Sinn Fein winning 7 Parliamentary seats from Northern Ireland and
maintaining a policy of abstensionism, the Conservative majority would have been slightly larger, at
4 seats.
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Table 4.4: Counterfactual Seat Allocation, 2015
(a) Counterfactual A
Counterfactual
Con Lab LD SNP PC UKIP Grn
Con 328 3 - - - - -
[316,339] [0,5] [0,1] [0,0] [0,0] [0,1] [0,0]
Lab 6 225 - - - - -
[1,10] [217,241] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [0,2] [0,1]
LD - - 7 1 - - -
[0,0] [0,0] [7,9] [0,1] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0]
SNP - - - 56 - - -
[0,0] [0,1] [0,0] [55,47] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0]
PC - - - - 3 - -
[0,0] [0,1] [0,0] [0,0] [2,3] [0,0] [0,0]
UKIP 1 - - - - 1 -
[0,1] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [0,3] [0,0]
Grn - - - - - - 1
[0,0] [0,1] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [0,1]
(b) Counterfactual B
Counterfactual
Con Lab LD SNP PC UKIP Grn
Con 328 3 - - - - -
[315,339] [0,7] [0,0] [0,1] [0,0] [0,1] [0,0]
Lab 4 227 - - - - -
[0,7] [218,242] [0,0] [0,0] [0,1] [0,1] [0,0]
LD - - 7 1 - - -
[0,1] [0,0] [6,9] [0,1] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0]
SNP - - - 56 - - -
[0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [56,57] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0]
PC - - - - 3 - -
[0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [2,3] [0,0] [0,0]
UKIP 1 - - - - 1 -
[0,1] [0,1] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [0,2] [0,0]
Grn - - - - - - 1
[0,0] [0,1] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [0,1]
Rows represent the number of seats for each party in the baseline (actual) election. Columns
represent the counterfactuals. Numbers in square brackets are 95% confidence intervals. Seats in
the diagonals are those that are held by the same party in the baseline and the counterfactual.
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Table 4.5: Counterfactual Seat Allocation, 2017
(a) Counterfactual A
Counterfactual
Con Lab LD SNP PC UKIP Grn
Con 308 4 - 2 - - -
[294,321] [0,10] [0,1] [0,3] [0,0] [0,1] [0,0]
Lab 4 257 - 1 - - -
[3,15] [240,269] [0,0] [0,5] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0]
LD 3 - 7 2 - - -
[2,8] [0,0] [4,8] [0,2] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0]
SNP - 2 - 37 - - -
[0,3] [0,1] [0,0] [33,40] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0]
PC - - - - 4 - -
[0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [3,4] [0,0] [0,0]
UKIP - - - - - - -
[0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0]
Grn - - - - - - 1
[0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [1,1]
(b) Counterfactual B
Counterfactual
Con Lab LD SNP PC UKIP Grn
Con 313 - - 1 - - -
[296,324] [0,8] [0,2] [0,2] [0,1] [0,0] [0,0]
Lab 6 255 - 1 - - -
[5,20] [236,264] [0,0] [0,5] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0]
LD 5 - 7 - - - -
[2,8] [0,0] [4,9] [0,1] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0]
SNP - 1 - 38 - - -
[0,3] [0,2] [0,1] [32,39] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0]
PC - - - - 4 - -
[0,0] [0,0] [0,1] [0,0] [2,4] [0,0] [0,0]
UKIP - - - - - - -
[0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0]
Grn - - - - - - 1
[0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [0,0] [1,1]
Rows represent the number of seats for each party in the baseline (actual) election. Columns
represent the counterfactuals. Numbers in square brackets are 95% confidence intervals. Seats in
the diagonals are those that are held by the same party in the baseline and the counterfactual.
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4.6 Conclusion
Voters’ preferred party is often unlikely to win in their district. In that situation,
some voters choose to cast a tactical vote for another party with a greater chance
of carrying the seat. The literature that studies tactical voting has typically focused
on measuring its extent. However, less is known about the motivations behind
the decision to cast a tactical vote, beyond voters’ demographics and the electoral
environment.
In this chapter, I show that parties’ campaigning in constituencies, measured by
whether they contacted voters during the campaign, affects voters decisions. In
particular, I show that voters whose most preferred party is out of the race are
between 2.75% and 7.02% more likely to remain loyal if their party contacted
them. On the other hand, contact by the most preferred viable party encourages
voter defections, increasing the probability of a tactical vote between 7.03 and 13.41
percentage points. Estimating counterfactuals combined withMultilevel Regression
and Poststratification, I show how the changes in tactical voting behavior due to
parties’ campaigning affected the distribution of seats in the U.K. Parliament for
both 2015 and 2017. Interestingly, I show that if parties had given up contacting
their supporters in constituencies where they were out of the race, the Conservative
party would have gained enough seats for an outright majority in Parliament in 2017,
instead of forming a minority government.
The findings in this chapter increase our understanding of tactical voting behavior in
mass elections by considering the effects of party campaigns. However, a significant
proportion of tactical votes (non-tactical votes) from among those voters in a position
to cast them remains unexplained. This is particularly true when focusing on
variables or incentives that are under the control of an election participant, be it the
government, political parties, the media, or voters themselves. Future research on
tactical voting should expand its attention to considerations like party campaigns,
which are under the control of election participants, as well as to psychological
underpinnings of tactical vote decisions which might help us better understand why
some voters choose to forfeit the opportunity to affect election outcomes, instead
maintaining their support for a party or candidate who is unlikely to win.
References
Alvarez, R. Michael, Frederick J. Boehmke, and Jonathan Nagler. 2006. “Strategic
Voting in British Elections”. Electoral Studies 25:1–19.
103
Alvarez, R. Michael, D. Roderick Kiewiet, and Lucas Núñez. 2018. “Preferences,
Constraints, and Choices”. In Routledge Handbook of Elections, Voting Behavior
and Public Opinion, ed. by Justin Fisher et al. Elsevier.
Arceneaux, Kevin, and David Nickerson. 2009. “Who is Mobilized to Vote? A Re-
analisis of Eleven Randomized Field Experiments”.American Journal of Political
Science 53 (1): 1–16.
Beck, Paul A., et al. 1992. “Patterns and Sources of Ticket Splitting in Subpresiden-
tial Voting”. American Political Science Review 86:916–928.
Blais, André. 2002. “Why is there So Little Strategic Voting in Canadian Plurality
Rule Elections?” Political Studies 50:445–454.
Burden, Barry C., and David C. Kimball. 1998. “A New Approach To the Study of
Ticket Splitting”. American Political Science Review 45:533–544.
Clarke, Harold, et al. 2009. Performance Politics and the British Voter. Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan.
– . 2004. Political Choice in Britain. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Cohen, Jonathan, and Yariv Tsfati. 2009. “The Influence of Presumed Media Influ-
ence on Strategic Voting”. Communication Research 36:359–378.
Cox, Gary W. 1997. Making Votes Count. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University
Press.
Cutts, David. 2014. “Local Elections as a ’Stepping Stone’: Does Winning Council
Seats Boost the Liberal Democrats’ Performance in General Elections?” Political
Studies 62 (2): 361–380.
Denver, David, GordonHands, and IainMacAllister. 2004. “The Electoral Impact of
Constituency Campaigning in Britain, 1992-2001”. Political Studies 52:289–306.
Duch, Raymond M., and Harvey D. Palmer. 2002. “Strategic Voting in Post-
Communist Democracy?” British Journal of Political Science 32:63–91.
Duverger, Maurice. 1954. Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the
Modern State. New York: Wiley.
Elff, Martin. 2014. “Separating Tactical from Sincere Voting: A Finite Mixture
Discrete Choice Modelling Approach to Disentangling Voting Calculi”. Paper
presented at the 2014 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Associa-
tion, Chicago, April 3-6.
Fieldhouse, Edward, et al. 2015. “Is All Campaigning Equally Positive? The Impact
of District Level Campaigning on Voter Turnout at the 2010 British General
Election”. Party Politics 22 (2): 215–226.
Fieldhouse, Edward, et al. 2011. “The Electoral Effectiveness of Constituency Cam-
paining in the 2010BritishGeneral Election: The ‘Triumph’ ofLabour?”Electoral
Studies 30 (4): 816–828.
104
Fisher. 2000. “Intuition versus Formal Theory: Tactical Voting in England: 1987-
1997”. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association, Washington, DC.
Gerber, Alan S., Donald P. Green, and Christopher W. Larimer. 2008. “Social
Pressure and Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment”.
American Political Science Review 102 (1): 33–48.
Geys, Benny. 2006. “Explaining Voter Turnout: A Review of Aggregate-level Re-
search”. Electoral Studies 25:637–663.
Gschwend, Thomas, and Henk van der Kolk. 2006. “Split Ticket Voting in Mixed
Member Proportional Systems: The Hypothetical Case of The Netherlands”. Acta
Politica 41:163–179.
Hanretty, Chris, Benjamin E. Lauderdale, and Nick Vivyan. 2016. “Comparing
Strategies for Estimating Constituency Opinion from National Survey Samples”.
Political Science Research and Methods: 1–21.
Johnston, Ron, et al. 2013. “The Long and the Short of it: Local Campaigning at the
British 2010 General Election”. Political Studies 61 (S1): 114–137.
Karp, Jeffrey A., Susan A. Banducci, and Shaun Bowler. 2008. “Getting Out the
Vote: Party Mobilization in a Comparative Perspective”. British Journal of Polit-
ical Science 38:91–112.
Karp, JeffreyA., et al. 2002. “StrategicVoting, PartyActivity, andCandidate Effects:
Testing Explanations for Split Voting in New Zealand’s New Mixed System”.
Electoral Studies 21:1–22.
Kiewiet, D. Roderick. 2013. “The Ecology of Tactical Voting in Britain”. Journal
of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties 23 (1): 86–110.
Lago, Ignacio. 2008. “Rational Expectations or Heuristics? Strategic Voting in
Proportional Representation Systems”. Party Politics 14 (1): 31–49.
Lanoue, David J., and Shaun Bowler. 1992. “The Sources of Tactical Voting in
British Parliamentary Elections, 1983-1987”. Political Behavior 14 (2): 141–
157.
Lax, Jeffrey R., and Justin H. Phillips. 2009. “How Should We Estimate Public
Opinion in the States?” American Journal of Political Science 53:107–21.
Leemann, Lucas, and Fabo Wasserfallen. 2017. “Extending the Use and Prediction
of Subnational PublicOpinionEstimation”.American Journal of Political Science
61 (4): 1003–1022.
Moser, Robert G., and Ethan Scheiner. 2005. “Strategic Ticket Splitting and the Per-
sonal Vote in Mixed-Member Electoral Systems”. Legislative Studies Quarterly
30 (2): 259–276.
Núñez, Lucas. 2016. “Expressive and Strategic Behavior in Legislative Elections in
Argentina”. Political Behavior 38 (4): 899–920.
105
Park, David K., Andrew Gelman, and Joseph Bafumi. 2004. “Bayesian Multilevel
Estimation with Poststratification: State-Level Estimates from National Polls”.
Political Analysis 12:375–385.
Pattie, Charles, and Ron Johnston. 2003. “Local Battles in a National Landslide:
Constituency Campaigning at the 2001 British General Election”. Political Ge-
ography 22:381–414.
Spenkuch, Jörg L. 2017. “Expressive vs. Pivotal Voters: An Empirical Assessment”.
Wokring paper.
Warshaw, Chris, and Jonathan Rodden. 2012. “How Should We Measure District-
Level Public Opinion on Individual Issues?” Journal of Politics 74 (1): 203–
219.
Whiteley, Paul, and Patrick Seyd. 1994. “Local Party Campaigning and Voting
Behavior in Britain”. Journal of Politics 56 (1): 242–251.
– . 2003. “Party Election Campaigning in Britain: The Labour Party”. Party Politics
9 (5): 637–652.
106
4.A Additional Tables and Figures
Table 4.A1: Logit Average Partial Effects on Tactical Voting
2015 2017
APE Lower Upper APE Lower Upper
Contact MP -0.18 -0.20 -0.15 -0.36 -0.38 -0.33
Contact MPV 0.20 0.17 0.22 0.23 0.21 0.24
Therm. MP -0.10 -0.11 -0.09 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05
Therm. MPV 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.06
Employed Full -0.03 -0.07 -0.00 -0.02 -0.04 0.01
Employed Part -0.00 -0.04 0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.04
Student -0.06 -0.11 -0.02 -0.01 -0.06 0.04
Retired -0.01 -0.07 0.05 -0.02 -0.08 0.04
Unemployed -0.02 -0.05 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.01
Education 1 -0.08 -0.11 -0.05 0.01 -0.02 0.03
Education 2 -0.06 -0.09 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 0.00
Education 3 -0.02 -0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 0.01
Mixed Race 0.10 0.01 0.19 0.05 -0.04 0.13
Asian 0.06 -0.02 0.14 0.06 -0.01 0.12
Black 0.21 0.10 0.33 0.05 -0.09 0.18
Female 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.05
Age -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
Owns Home 0.02 -0.01 0.04 -0.00 -0.02 0.02
Owns Mortgage 0.05 0.02 0.07 -0.02 -0.04 0.00
Observations 10,378 12,539
McFadden’s R2 0.11 0.10
Confidence intervals are at the 95% level. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
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Table 4.A2: Coefficient Estimates, PF-CRE
2015 2017
β Lower Upper β Lower Upper
Contact MP -0.33 -0.57 -0.09 -0.54 -0.79 -0.29
Contact MPV 0.71 0.49 0.92 1.06 0.84 1.28
Therm. MP -0.18 -0.27 -0.10 -0.15 -0.23 -0.07
Therm. MPV 0.32 0.25 0.39 0.14 0.08 0.20
γ terms 230 230
γ selected 41 42
n 3,824 4,744
Observations 10,378 12,539
χ2(4) 0.87 1.64
p-value 0.93 0.80
The tuning parameter λ for each year was obtained through 10-fold cross-validation. Confidence
intervals are at the 95% level.
Figure 4.A1: Average Partial Effects Estimates
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
Contact MP
Contact MPV
Therm MP
Therm MPV
−0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10
l l2015 2017
The tuning parameter was obtained through 10-fold cross validation using the Akaike information
criterion. Confidence intervals are at the 95% level.
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Figure 4.A2: Transitions 2015, Counterfactual A
(a) Baseline (b) Counterfactual A (c) Baseline (d) Counterfactual A
Plots for the SNP are not included as the SNP was viable in all Scottish constituencies
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Figure 4.A3: Transitions 2015, Counterfactual B
(a) Baseline (b) Counterfactual B (c) Baseline (d) Counterfactual B
Plots for the SNP are not included as the SNP was viable in all Scottish constituencies
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Figure 4.A4: Transitions 2017, Counterfactual A
(a) Baseline (b) Counterfactual A (c) Baseline (d) Counterfactual A
Plots for the SNP are not included as the SNP was viable in all Scottish constituencies
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Figure 4.A5: Transitions 2017, Counterfactual B
(a) Baseline (b) Counterfactual B (c) Baseline (d) Counterfactual B
Plots for the SNP are not included as the SNP was viable in all Scottish constituencies
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4.B Parties’ Contact Strategies
For PF-CRE to be valid, it is necessary that the unobserved heterogeneity be time-
invariant.20 A key requirement for this to hold is that parties’ contact strategies
be time-invariant. That is, it requires that across survey waves the individuals
that parties decide to contact have similar observed and unobserved characteristics.
While it is not possible to test whether individuals contacted by the parties across
the different survey waves have the same unobserved characteristics, it is possible
to analyze whether their observed characteristics are actually the same.
To determine whether parties target the same kinds of voters across survey waves,
I first compare the average characteristics of the voters contacted by their most
preferred party in each of the ways, using a t-test for the comparison of means. As
the results in Tables 4.B1 and 4.B2 show, there is no evidence that these means differ
across waves, suggesting that parties tend to contact the same kinds of voters.21
In Table 4.B3 I provide another way to compare parties’ contact strategies across
survey waves. For each wave I split the sample into training (Ei, for estimation,
i = 1, 2, 3) and test (Ti for test, i = 1, 2, 3) sets. Then, for each training set, I estimate a
support vector machine where the outcome is being contacted by the most preferred
party and the input variables are all those described in Tables 4.B1 and 4.B2. Then,
for each of the support vector machines, I predict the outcomes for each of the test
sets. Finally, for each test set, I compare whether the three support vector machines
predict similarly (a for agreement). Formally:
fi(·) = SVM(Ei), i = 1, 2, 3 (4.3)
pri = fi(Tr), i = 1, 2, 3, r = 1, 2, 3 (4.4)
ari, j = 1 −mean(| fi(Tr) − f j(Tr)|), i , j, r = 1, 2, 3. (4.5)
Thus ari, j denotes the percentage of observations in test set r for which the support
vector machines estimated with training sets i and j predict the same outcome.
The results in Table 4.B3 show that for both 2015 and 2017, the prediction rules
derived from the support vector machines estimated with different training set waves
produce similar predictions for each training set wave. For example, for 2015 the
support vector machines estimated with the training sets fromwaves 1 and 2 produce
20This is also required for other methods like Fixed Effects and Conditional Maximum Likelihood
estimation.
21Note, however, that whereas parties tend to contact the same kinds of voters, they do contact
significantly more voters in the final survey wave, right before the election.
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Table 4.B1: Comparison of Means, Contact by Most Preferred Party 2015
µ1 µ2 µ3 t1,2 t1,3 t2,2
Age 53.54 54.73 54.25 -0.08 -0.05 0.03
Household Income 7.39 7.16 7.08 0.06 0.09 0.02
Income 348.75 300.32 392.08 0.03 -0.02 -0.05
Household Size 2.41 2.45 2.41 -0.04 -0.00 0.04
Children 0.31 0.33 0.30 -0.03 0.01 0.04
Agreeableness 5.93 6.03 5.95 -0.06 -0.01 0.05
Concientiousness 6.68 6.80 6.77 -0.06 -0.05 0.02
Extroversion 4.15 4.19 4.14 -0.02 0.00 0.02
Neuroticism 3.59 3.68 3.66 -0.04 -0.03 0.01
Openess 5.96 5.84 5.69 0.06 0.15 0.09
Risk Taking 2.65 2.58 2.58 0.11 0.11 0.00
Middle Class 0.40 0.43 0.41 -0.05 -0.01 0.04
Working Class 0.35 0.36 0.36 -0.02 -0.02 -0.00
Employed Full 0.40 0.37 0.35 0.07 0.10 0.04
Employed Part 0.13 0.16 0.15 -0.08 -0.06 0.02
Unemployed 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.01
Student 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.13 0.06 -0.07
Retired 0.28 0.29 0.31 -0.03 -0.08 -0.04
Married 0.63 0.69 0.66 -0.11 -0.06 0.05
Separated 0.09 0.09 0.09 -0.01 0.02 0.03
Widowed 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 -0.03 -0.07
Never Married 0.25 0.20 0.22 0.12 0.07 -0.05
Education 1 0.10 0.12 0.11 -0.09 -0.05 0.04
Education 2 0.15 0.15 0.18 -0.00 -0.07 -0.07
Education 3 0.17 0.22 0.19 -0.12 -0.05 0.07
Education 4 0.58 0.51 0.52 0.15 0.12 -0.03
Other Race 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05
Mixed Race 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.00 0.03
Asian 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.07 -0.05 0.02
Black 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.03
Female 0.37 0.43 0.43 -0.12 -0.12 -0.01
Own Home 0.43 0.46 0.46 -0.06 -0.06 -0.00
Mortgage 0.36 0.39 0.35 -0.07 0.02 0.09
Therm. Most Preferred 8.46 8.51 8.47 -0.04 -0.01 0.03
Therm. Most Pref. Viable 5.51 6.00 6.11 -0.27 -0.34 -0.07
µi refers to the mean of the variables in wave i; ti, j is a t-statistic of comparison of means between
waves i and j.
the same prediction 86% of the time for the test set from wave 1 in 2015; the vector
machines estimated with waves 1 and 3 coincide 90% of the time in that sample;
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Table 4.B2: Comparison of Means, Contact by Most Preferred Party 2017
µ1 µ2 µ3 t1,2 t1,3 t2,2
Age 54.10 52.24 52.07 0.12 0.13 0.01
Household Income 6.90 7.22 6.88 -0.09 0.01 0.09
Income 241.11 284.16 258.84 -0.03 -0.01 0.02
Household Size 2.26 2.31 2.31 -0.05 -0.04 0.01
Children 0.26 0.24 0.26 0.02 -0.01 -0.03
Agreeableness 6.04 6.03 6.05 0.01 -0.00 -0.01
Concientiousness 6.82 6.69 6.69 0.07 0.07 -0.00
Extroversion 4.19 4.14 4.09 0.02 0.05 0.03
Neuroticism 3.62 3.71 3.70 -0.04 -0.03 0.01
Openess 5.68 5.60 5.73 0.05 -0.03 -0.08
Risk Taking 2.58 2.53 2.56 0.07 0.04 -0.03
Middle Class 0.45 0.47 0.42 -0.04 0.05 0.09
Working Class 0.31 0.28 0.32 0.05 -0.04 -0.09
Employed Full 0.33 0.35 0.35 -0.04 -0.04 -0.00
Employed Part 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.05 0.01 -0.04
Unemployed 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.04 -0.05
Student 0.04 0.05 0.04 -0.05 -0.03 0.03
Retired 0.32 0.31 0.30 0.01 0.03 0.03
Married 0.61 0.61 0.60 -0.00 0.02 0.02
Separated 0.09 0.10 0.10 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01
Widowed 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.02
Never Married 0.25 0.25 0.26 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02
Education 1 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.07 0.08 0.02
Education 2 0.13 0.12 0.16 0.02 -0.08 -0.10
Education 3 0.17 0.17 0.15 -0.02 0.04 0.06
Education 4 0.57 0.59 0.58 -0.05 -0.03 0.02
Other Race 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.03 0.02
Mixed Race 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.07 -0.08 -0.01
Asian 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.00 0.05
Black 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.07 0.07
Female 0.43 0.42 0.44 0.01 -0.03 -0.03
Own Home 0.50 0.50 0.49 -0.00 0.02 0.03
Mortgage 0.34 0.31 0.31 0.08 0.07 -0.01
Therm. Most Preferred 8.38 8.27 8.39 0.07 -0.01 -0.08
Therm. Most Pref. Viable 6.01 6.02 6.13 -0.01 -0.07 -0.06
µi refers to the mean of the variables in wave i; ti, j is a t-statistic of comparison of means between
waves i and j.
and support vector machines estimated with waves 2 and 3 agree 87% of the time.
Therefore, this constitutes additional evidence that parties’ contact strategies do not
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Table 4.B3: Agreement Between Party Strategies
2015 2017
T1 T2 T3 T1 T2 T3
f1 v. f2 0.86 0.89 0.86 0.90 0.90 0.89
f1 v. f3 0.90 0.85 0.89 0.91 0.88 0.89
f2 v. f3 0.87 0.89 0.87 0.89 0.90 0.88
Rows indicate the estimates of which two support vector machines are being compared. Columns
indicate the test sets used in each case. The cells indicate the percentage of respondents for which
the two vector machines in the corresponding row agree in their contact prediction.
vary significantly across the sample period, for both 2015 and 2017.
Tables 4.B4, 4.B5, and 4.B6 show that the same is true for contact by the most
preferred viable party.
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Table 4.B4: Comparison of Means, Contact by Most Preferred Viable Party 2015
µ1 µ2 µ3 t1,2 t1,3 t2,2
Age 54.06 54.56 53.41 -0.03 0.04 0.07
Household Income 6.93 7.41 6.97 -0.14 -0.01 0.13
Income 294.53 230.89 321.14 0.04 -0.02 -0.05
Household Size 2.41 2.41 2.46 0.00 -0.04 -0.04
Children 0.27 0.37 0.33 -0.14 -0.09 0.05
Agreeableness 5.95 6.00 5.88 -0.03 0.04 0.07
Concientiousness 6.76 6.63 6.83 0.07 -0.04 -0.11
Extroversion 4.13 4.17 4.04 -0.02 0.04 0.06
Neuroticism 3.62 3.58 3.56 0.02 0.03 0.01
Openess 5.85 5.75 5.67 0.06 0.11 0.05
Risk Taking 2.58 2.58 2.53 0.00 0.07 0.06
Middle Class 0.41 0.42 0.41 -0.02 -0.02 0.00
Working Class 0.36 0.37 0.37 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01
Employed Full 0.37 0.41 0.39 -0.08 -0.04 0.04
Employed Part 0.15 0.17 0.15 -0.04 0.00 0.04
Unemployed 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.03 -0.04
Student 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.08 -0.01 -0.09
Retired 0.31 0.26 0.28 0.11 0.05 -0.06
Married 0.64 0.68 0.67 -0.07 -0.05 0.02
Separated 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.03 0.09 0.06
Widowed 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 -0.02
Never Married 0.22 0.20 0.23 0.05 -0.01 -0.06
Education 1 0.11 0.12 0.10 -0.02 0.05 0.07
Education 2 0.16 0.12 0.17 0.13 -0.02 -0.15
Education 3 0.15 0.22 0.19 -0.17 -0.09 0.08
Education 4 0.57 0.54 0.54 0.05 0.06 0.01
Other Race 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.03 0.09
Mixed Race 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.06
Asian 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.06 -0.00 -0.06
Black 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.10 -0.04 0.06
Female 0.43 0.43 0.45 -0.00 -0.04 -0.04
Own Home 0.45 0.46 0.46 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01
Mortgage 0.33 0.39 0.36 -0.14 -0.06 0.07
Therm. Most Preferred 8.08 8.28 8.32 -0.13 -0.16 -0.03
Therm. Most Pref. Viable 5.80 6.12 6.29 -0.17 -0.28 -0.10
µi refers to the mean of the variables in wave i; ti, j is a t-statistic of comparison of means between
waves i and j.
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Table 4.B5: Comparison of Means, Contact by Most Preferred Viable Party 2017
µ1 µ2 µ3 t1,2 t1,3 t2,2
Age 52.32 51.25 51.66 0.07 0.04 -0.03
Household Income 6.94 6.72 6.79 0.06 0.04 -0.02
Income 276.20 339.97 265.13 -0.04 0.01 0.04
Household Size 2.28 2.35 2.29 -0.06 -0.00 0.06
Children 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.00 0.04 0.04
Agreeableness 6.13 6.19 6.02 -0.03 0.06 0.10
Concientiousness 6.70 6.75 6.74 -0.02 -0.02 0.00
Extroversion 3.90 3.94 4.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03
Neuroticism 3.81 3.72 3.83 0.04 -0.01 -0.05
Openess 5.78 5.78 5.74 0.00 0.02 0.02
Risk Taking 2.50 2.56 2.52 -0.08 -0.02 0.06
Middle Class 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.01 0.03 0.02
Working Class 0.36 0.38 0.35 -0.05 0.01 0.05
Employed Full 0.35 0.37 0.38 -0.03 -0.06 -0.03
Employed Part 0.14 0.14 0.12 -0.01 0.05 0.06
Unemployed 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.04 -0.01
Student 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.02 -0.00 -0.03
Retired 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.01 0.02 0.01
Married 0.60 0.61 0.60 -0.01 0.01 0.02
Separated 0.09 0.10 0.10 -0.04 -0.04 0.00
Widowed 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.11 0.07 -0.03
Never Married 0.26 0.27 0.27 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Education 1 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.04 -0.01 -0.05
Education 2 0.14 0.16 0.16 -0.04 -0.04 -0.00
Education 3 0.15 0.17 0.15 -0.03 0.02 0.05
Education 4 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.03 0.03 -0.00
Other Race 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.02
Mixed Race 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.02 0.02
Asian 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.01 0.03
Black 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.10
Female 0.45 0.47 0.46 -0.05 -0.03 0.02
Own Home 0.48 0.47 0.48 0.02 -0.01 -0.04
Mortgage 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.02 0.02 0.01
Therm. Most Preferred 8.29 8.22 8.32 0.05 -0.02 -0.07
Therm. Most Pref. Viable 6.32 6.38 6.36 -0.04 -0.03 0.01
µi refers to the mean of the variables in wave i; ti, j is a t-statistic of comparison of means between
waves i and j.
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Table 4.B6: Agreement Between Party Strategies, Most Preferred Viable Party
2015 2017
T1 T2 T3 T1 T2 T3
f1 v. f2 0.88 0.89 0.85 0.89 0.89 0.88
f1 v. f3 0.89 0.87 0.88 0.90 0.88 0.89
f2 v. f3 0.86 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.90 0.88
Rows indicate the estimates of which two support vector machines are being compared. Columns
indicate the test sets used in each case. The cells indicate the percentage of respondents for which
the two vector machines in the corresponding row agree in their contact prediction.
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4.C Multi-level Regression and Poststratification
To estimate constituency level support for the different parties (and to derive an
estimated winner in each constituency), I use multi-level regression and poststrat-
ification (MRP). MRP has been developed to generate good estimates of public
opinion in subnational areas based on national survey samples.22 In MRP, I first
estimate a model of vote choice using survey individual demographics together
with constituency-level information. I then use this model to predict the voting
behavior for each demographic-constituency type. Finally, I use poststratification to
true population characteristics to estimate the level of support for each party at the
constituency level.
Multi-level Model
To implement the multi-level regression I use five individual demographic charac-
teristics: age (9 categories), gender (2 categories), home ownership (3 categories),
ethnicity (2 categories), and qualifications (6 categories). I also use the following
constituency level information: an indicator for the party that actually won the
constituency, the actual vote shares that the parties received in the constituency,
the percentage of long-term unemployed, the percentage in industry manufacturing,
population density, indicators for whether parties are standing in the constituency.
With this information, I estimate the following model:
P(y ji = 1) = Λ(β0 + αagea[i] + α
gender
g[i] + α
home
h[i] + α
ethnic
e[i] + α
qual
q[i] + α
const
c[i] ), (4.6)
where y ji denotes where respondent i intends to vote for party j, a[i] denotes respon-
dent i’s age group, g[i] denotes respondent i’s gender, h[i] denotes respondent i’s
home ownership status, e[i] denotes respondent i’s ethnicity, q[i] denotes respondent
i’s highest qualifications, and c[i] denotes respondent i’s constituency.
Each of the demographic effects is drawn from a normal distribution with mean zero
22See, for example, Park, Gelman, and Bafumi (2004), Hanretty, Lauderdale, and Vivyan (2016),
Leemann and Wasserfallen (2017), Lax and Phillips (2009), and Warshaw and Rodden (2012).
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and some (estimated) variance:
α
age
a ∼ N(0, σ2age), a = 1, ..., 9 (4.7)
α
gender
g ∼ N(0, σ2gender), g = 1, 2
αhomeh ∼ N(0, σ2home), h = 1, 2, 3
αethnice ∼ N(0, σ2ethnic), e = 1, 2
α
qual
q ∼ N(0, σ2qual), q = 1, ..., 6.
The constituency effects are modeled as a function of the constituency characteris-
tics:
αconstc ∼ N(βconst0 + βX, σ2const), (4.8)
where X is a vector of constituency characteristics.
I estimate this model for England, Scotland, and Wales separately. Estimation
for each country is performed using one-versus-the-rest. The left out party is the
Conservative party in England, the SNP in Scotland, and Labour in Wales.
Once the model is estimated, I predict the voting probabilities of each demographic
group in each constituency for each of the parties:
p̂g jc, (4.9)
where g denotes each of the 648 distinct demographic groups that arise from com-
bining the demographic characteristics.
Poststratification
Performing MRP requires knowledge of the joint population distribution of all
poststratifying variables for every constituency to generate the poststratification
weights. However, this information is not available from the U.K. Census at the
constituency level. For this reason, I combine two sources of information to impute
the joint distribution for each constituency. First, I use data from the Annual
Population Survey (APS), which provides data on over 300,000 respondents at the
national level. Second, I use the constituency level marginal distributions of the
demographic variables of interest obtained from Nomis Census Area Statistics.
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To impute the joint distribution for each constituency, I rake the subsample of the
APS corresponding to the region where the constituency lies.23 The outcome of
this raking is an imputation of the joint distribution of the demographics of interest
for each constituency: pigc, where c denotes the constituency and g denotes the
demographic group. This procedure is related to those used byHanretty, Lauderdale,
and Vivyan (2016) and Leemann and Wasserfallen (2017).
To obtain the estimates of vote intention for each party in each constituency, I
perform the following calculation:
p̂ jc =
∑
g
p̂g jcpigc∑
g
pigc
, (4.10)
where p̂ jc is the vote intention for party j in constituency c.
MRP Uncertainty
There are two sources of uncertainty in the estimation of the seat changes under
the counterfactuals. The first is the estimation of the multilevel regression; this
source applies both for the baseline and the counterfactuals. The second is from the
individual counterfactuals that are then used to estimate the multilevel regression
for the seat counterfactuals.
To incorporate the first source of uncertainty, I take draws from the posterior dis-
tribution of the corresponding multilevel regression model and re-poststratify each
time to obtain predicted vote shares and seats. To obtain seat changes between
the baseline and the counterfactual, I compare each draw from the baseline and the
corresponding counterfactual. Some seat changes have a skewed distribution, which
means that 95% confidence intervals will not be centered around the point estimate.
The second source of uncertainty is more challenging to incorporate. One way to do
it is to take draws from the causal model in equation 4.2; then, for each draw, run a
newMRP. However, this process is highly computationally demanding. Therefore, I
do not incorporate this source of uncertainty to the estimates of seat counterfactuals
reported in the paper.
23These regions are Scotland, Wales, and the 9 Government Office Regions of England: East
Midlands, East of England, London, North East England, North West England, South East England,
South West England, West Midlands, and Yorkshire and the Humber.
